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Abstract
Both our economy and our society experience continuous digitization throughout the 21st
century, which has facilitated the emergence and continued growth of digital platforms.
Today, a variety of platform-based peer-to-peer business models shape the e-commerce
landscape. Within the socio-economic crucible of peer-to-peer platforms, understanding
and examining the interplay of social and economic values, user representation, and user
behavior constitutes a challenging research endeavor. A structured literature review on
the blueprint for peer-to-peer platforms (i.e., Airbnb) conceptualized open research ques-
tions that have been tackled by the thesis at hand. The central part of the thesis reports
on four studies. The first online experiment focuses on how social and economic value
expectations guide transaction intentions and how these are connected to the transac-
tion partner’s user representation. Next, a laboratory experiment investigates how user
representation impacts actual behavior across multiple transactions. The subsequent
scenario-based online survey answers the question if, in light of “trust-free” systems,
trust-fostering user representation becomes obsolete. Last, the presence of peer-to-peer
platforms causes societal issues. Whether tax compliant behavior on peer-to-peer plat-
forms constitutes a moral obligation and guides transaction partner choice is the focus
of the last online experiment. The thesis concludes with an outlook and pathways for
future research.
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Both our economy and our society experience continuous digitization throughout the
21st century, which has facilitated the emergence and continued growth of digital plat-
forms. Today, these platforms represent an integral part of the e-commerce landscape
(Mittendorf, Berente, and Holten, 2019; Zimmermann et al., 2018; European Commis-
sion, 2016). As part of this emerging “platform economy,” we have seen the birth of
the “sharing economy” (Sundararajan, 2016; Teubner and Hawlitschek, 2018), where
underutilized resources are e↵ectively shared among users. Peer-to-peer (P2P) shar-
ing platforms represent one of the most successful and fastest-growing business models
(Mittendorf, Berente, and Holten, 2019; Zimmermann et al., 2018). While the Eu-
ropean Commission already identified annual spendings of e 27.9bn within the EU on
these platforms in 2016 (European Commission, 2016), Mastercard and Kaiser Asso-
ciates (2019) expect P2P platforms to generate a worldwide gross volume of US$455bn
by 2023—doubling their 2018 gross volume.
The prime example of a successful P2P platform is the accommodation sharing
platform Airbnb. As of July 2020, the platform o↵ers more than 7 million listings from
over 220 countries and claims to have already completed 750 million transactions since its
foundation in 2008.1 Additionally, Airbnb practically constitutes the blueprint for a whole
category of new business models within the platform economy, shaping the standards
for web design, transaction processing, and both social and behavioral norms. Though
there are numerous other examples of P2P sharing platforms from the fields of car (e.g.,
Drivy) and ride-sharing (e.g., BlaBlaCar, zimride), resale (e.g., Etsy, eBay) or crowd-
work (e.g., TaskRabbit), they all have one common objective: Creating transactions by
matching supply and demand in the form of providers and consumers. The process of a
P2P transaction itself, however, di↵ers from traditional e-commerce in two key aspects.
First, both the supply side (provider) and the demand side (consumer) are commonly
represented by non-professional private individuals—without an established brand image
or global recognition. Therefore, unlike in transactions with established companies, con-
sumers particularly face additional economic exposure caused by potential unreliability
or fraudulent o↵ers (AirbnbHell, 2019). At the same time, the transactions are subject




of the o↵er (e.g., an accommodation’s condition). This aspect is particularly decisive,
considering that in almost every P2P transaction, private individuals interact with each
other for the first time (Ke, 2017b; Teubner, 2018). These conditions render one value
particularly important for the realization of transactions—trust, the quintessence of the
P2P platform economy (Gebbia, 2016; Hawlitschek, Teubner, and Weinhardt, 2016;
Möhlmann and Geissinger, 2018). On the ride-sharing platform BlaBlaCar, for instance,
consumers literally put their lives into the hands of their transaction partners (i.e., the
driver).
Second, as transactions on P2P platforms can grant access to resources within
providers’ privacy spheres, a part of the transaction may take place o✏ine, in the real
world. For instance, conducting a transaction on an accommodation sharing platform
leads to a real-world interaction with the respective provider, who may even be present
throughout the entire duration of the stay (co-usage sharing). Thus, in addition to their
asset or service, providers and consumers themselves become an inherent part of the
transaction. The resulting personal interactions extend the transaction by an additional
social facet. Nevertheless, because of the transaction’s extension to providers privacy
sphere, common P2P platform designs require consumers to request transactions from
providers. In contrast to ordinary e-commerce, where consumers can purchase o↵ered
services or commodities directly, a transaction on these platforms takes place only if the
provider agrees to this transaction request in an additional step. Consequently, for the
formation of a transaction, both providers and consumers need to market themselves on
the platform (Tussyadiah, 2016b; Karlsson, Kemperman, and Dolnicar, 2017).
From a conceptual point of view, P2P platforms can be classified by two dimensions
(see Figure 1.1). First, by the mode of bringing together providers and consumers.
This can be either exogenous, that is, determined by the platform itself (e.g., Uber)
or endogenous, whereby providers and consumers themselves form transaction dyads
on the platform (e.g., Airbnb). Second, by the degree of transactionality, that is, the
degree of both sides’ personal exposure within the transaction. While on platforms like
eBay or Etsy, provider and consumer presumably never meet in the real world, the level
of exposure is inevitably higher on platforms like Blablacar or Airbnb, on which o✏ine
interaction constitutes an integral part of the transaction.
To facilitate transactions between providers and consumers, platform operators have
established a broad variety of artifacts (e.g., star ratings, profile photos, labels) for user
representation (UR) (Abrahao et al., 2017; Dann, Teubner, and Weinhardt, 2019). Plat-
form users can leverage these artifacts to build and maintain a reputation and present
themselves as a trustworthy transaction partner. Overall, creating a trustworthy en-
vironment and maintaining a high level of trust between users is arguably the most
decisive challenge platform operators face (Hawlitschek, Teubner, and Gimpel, 2018;
Hawlitschek, Teubner, and Weinhardt, 2016; Mittendorf, Berente, and Holten, 2019).
Strategies for implementing these trust-building UR artifacts, also called trust cues, in
turn, highly depend on each cue’s individual characteristics. Trust cues themselves, how-
ever, di↵er systematically in their mode of obtaining (e.g., by evaluations of previous
transaction partners) and their content (e.g., text of a self-description) (Hesse et al.,
2020). The individual characteristics of each trust cue determine how users perceive


























Figure 1.1: Delineation of P2P platforms, based on Dann et al. (n.d.)
Against this backdrop, present literature is still inconclusive regarding the influence
of di↵erent types of trust cues on consumer behavior. Questions arise concering the
dynamic interplay of di↵erent types of trust cues—an aspect that is particularly relevant
for nascent platforms, struggling with reaching a critical mass of transactions without an
established trust and user base (Hodapp, Hawlitschek, and Kramer, 2019). Moreover,
platform designs based on new technologies such as the blockchain challenge existing
assumptions about the overall need for trust cues. Blockchain has already been described
as the technology that could render trust between users obsolete and promise to establish
trust by design (Lundy, 2016; Glaser, 2017). However, empirical evaluations of this
strong claim are scarce.
Moreover, the existence of P2P platforms raises societal questions. The present
lack of a uniform transnational-applicable taxation regulation of P2P transactions allows
providers to evade income taxes. Consequently, providers benefit from unfair competitive
advantages over established business models, such as the hotel industry (OECD, 2019).
In the US, for instance, less than 25% of all Airbnb providers comply with applicable
tax regulations (Bibler, Teltser, and Tremblay, 2019). In this context, it remains unclear
whether consumers are even aware of providers’ tax behavior, whether it constitutes a
tangible value in the selection of transaction partners, and whether this process is strictly
economically-driven or constitutes a moral decision.
Summarizing, the overarching objective of the thesis at hand is to develop a com-
prehensive understanding of the economics of P2P platforms—with a focus on social
and economic value dimensions in the initiation and conduction of transactions. This
objective resonates with the following research agenda.
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1.2 Research Agenda and Research Questions
This thesis raises four individual research questions. First, it is essential to generally
understand the interplay of both social and economic value and UR. Anticipating a P2P
transaction, which will include an o✏ine, real-world experience, renders providers’ UR on
the platform highly relevant for consumers (Ert, Fleischer, and Magen, 2016; Fagerstrøm
et al., 2017; Krasnova, Veltri, and Günther, 2012). Research on how the di↵erent UR
artifacts a↵ect consumers’ perception of individual providers is still limited and incon-
clusive regarding the influence of social value. The question remains open, whether or
not, economic considerations predominantly frame transaction intentions and how the
presence of di↵erent UR artifacts a↵ect either social or economic expectations. Hence,
the first research question is:
RQ1: How do di↵erent UR artifacts facilitate co-usage transactions through social and
economic value?
However, while the overall influence of social and economic values is inevitably nec-
essary to understand how transactions on P2P platforms emerge in general, examining
behavior within transactions requires the consideration of further aspects. As prior liter-
ature has already shown, P2P platforms implement a variety of trust cues within URs to
foster trust between strangers. In this regard, present literature has commonly agreed
that the e↵ect of these trust cues’ are predominantly stable (McKnight, Choudhury, and
Kacmar, 2002; Mcknight, Cummings, and Chervany, 1998) or steadily increasing (Cabral
and Hortaçsu, 2010) across several transactions. Nevertheless, the seminal Elaboration
Likelihood Model (ELM) by Petty and Cacioppo (1986) challenges these assumptions
by arguing that the type of trust cues determines whether its influence is rather stable
or temporary. To explore the presumably varying e↵ect of di↵erent trust cues over time
(i.e., across multiple transactions), the next research question states:
RQ2: How does the interplay of cognitive and a↵ective trust cues a↵ect trusting be-
havior in sharing transactions over time?
Beyond the mere examination of trust within transactions on P2P platforms, the
influence of a platform’s technological foundation on trusting perceptions represents an-
other interesting facet. Since technological environments that enable platforms (e.g., the
Internet) have already shown to be a vital antecedent for trust in providers on the plat-
form, the question arises whether the blockchain may induce similar e↵ects. While the
blockchain is generally attributed to a↵ect trust (Beck, 2018), the question of whether
consumers perceive it as a technology that renders trust among platform users obsolete,
remains open. To shed light on the trusting relationships in blockchain-enabled environ-
ments, the next research question is:
RQ3: How do blockchain-enabled platforms frame consumers’ trust perception and their
intention to enter a transaction?
Although the platform economy has written several success stories, some of its busi-
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ness models can be linked to emerging economic and societal problems. In this man-
ner, P2P accommodation sharing, for instance, is increasingly being discussed in the
same breath with problems such as over-touristification (Oskam and Boswijk, 2016),
ever-increasing rent prices (Gurran and Phibbs, 2017), and illegal hospitality operations
(Schäfer and Braun, 2016). One contributing factor to all these problems is existing
tax evasion by providers on the platform (OECD, 2019). Recalling the importance of
mutual trust among transaction partners, providers suspected to evade taxes may find
themselves confronted with mistrust from prospective consumers. Since tax behavior is
not observable for consumers today, the question arises whether providers may benefit
from indicating tax compliance, for instance, by leveraging a visual label in their UR. To
disentangle these relationships, the next research question states:
RQ4a: How does the presence of a tax compliance label a↵ect consumers’ trust towards
and, in turn, their intentions to book at the tax-compliant provider?
Beyond the mere influence on the transaction intention, questions arise regarding the
composition of the e↵ect of tax compliance. Because of its extensive impact on society
as a whole, tax compliance is a controversial issue. Public budgets directly linked to
tax compliance elevate tax compliance to a societal and even moral obligation. Since
personal moral norms are, in general, a determinant of economic decisions (Frey and
Torgler, 2007; Antonetti and Anesa, 2017), the question arises whether they also guide
the choice of the P2P transaction partner. Consequently, the second part of this research
question is:
RQ4b: How do individual moral norms moderate the e↵ect of tax compliance labels?
1.3 Thesis Structure
This thesis covers five chapters (Figure 1.2). Following this introductory chapter, Chap-
ter 2 provides the scientific foundation for this thesis by including the paper “Poster child
and guinea pig – insights from a structured literature review on Airbnb.” The study rep-
resents the first published structured literature review on the prominent blueprint for
P2P platforms and summarizes the scientific findings of 118 highly diverse articles.
Chapter 3, the main part of this thesis, reports on four studies on the social and
economic values on P2P platforms. Chapter 3.1, “Where the host is part of the deal:
Social and economic value in the platform economy,” consists of an online experiment
that examines how individual UR artifacts facilitate transactions through consumers’
expectation of social and economic value. To answer Research Question 1, the study
considers UR artifacts that either provide personal information, stem from exogenous
sources, or entail both of these aspects.
Chapter 3.2, “On the dynamics of cognitive and a↵ective trust cues: Behavioral
evidence from a peer-to-peer sharing platform experiment,” is, at present, submitted to
the second round of revision at the Journal of the Association for Information Systems.
Within a laboratory experiment, the study investigates the interplay of cognitive and
a↵ective trust cues on trusting behavior across multiple P2P transactions. The study
answers Research Question 2.
Thesis Structure 7
Chapter 3.3, “Blockchain and Trust in the Platform Economy: The Case of Peer-to-
Peer Sharing,” sheds light on blockchain-based P2P sharing platforms using an scenario-
based online survey. Answering Research Question 3, this study investigates how the
presence of the blockchain as a P2P platform’s technological layer impacts consumers’
trusting perception, transaction intention, and whether it renders further trust cues on
the platform obsolete.
Chapter 3.4, “How do Tax Compliance Labels Impact Sharing Platform Consumers?
An Empirical Study on the Interplay of Trust, Moral, and Intention to Book,” examines
the existence of P2P platforms from a societal perspective. The study is currently sub-
mitted to the Business & Information Systems Engineering journal. To answer Research
Question 4, the study investigates the role of tax compliance for platform users by em-
ploying an online experiment. In light of current policy debates about the taxation of
P2P platform transactions, the study investigates whether tax compliance is a relevant
factor for choosing transaction partners on P2P platforms and whether this constitutes
a matter of morality.




Chapter 2: P2P Platforms in Research
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Figure 1.2: Thesis structure and overview of publications
Chapter 2
P2P-Networks in Research
2.1 Poster child and guinea pig—insights from a struc-
tured literature review on Airbnb
To provide an adequate understanding of P2P platforms per se, this chapter includes a
structured literature review of the platform, which represents the blueprint for a variety
of other P2P business models—Airbnb. The literature review shows that research on
Airbnb is highly diverse in terms of domains, methods, and scope; motives for using
Airbnb are manifold (e.g., financial, social and environmental); trust and reputation are
considered crucial by almost all scholars; the platform’s variety is reflected in prices; and
the majority of work is based on surveys and empirical data while experiments are scarce.
David Dann, Timm Teubner & Christof Weinhardt1
2.1.1 Introduction
A growing body of research from various domains investigates questions revolving around
the accommodation sharing platform Airbnb. With over three million listings in almost
any country worldwide, Airbnb has grown to be the most important peer-based platform
for accommodation sharing (Airbnb, 2018). Ten years after its foundation in 2008,
Airbnb’s market evaluation ranges in the league of large hotel groups and metasearch
platforms such as Expedia and Booking.com (Forbes, 2017; McDermid, 2017). Airbnb
operates a two-sided market, matching supply (providers) and demand (consumers) for
peer-based accommodation. The variety o↵ered through the platform is large, including
urban apartments, guest rooms and vacation homes—and also more exotic listings such
as tree houses, castles, igloos, and houseboats (Forbes, 2016). Airbnb addresses both
private and business customers and facilitates everything from day trips to stays of
several months (Mittendorf and Ostermann, 2017). The platform’s role as a marketing
channel is undeniable, as hosts generate an average additional income of $924 per month
(Earnest, 2017). Importantly, platforms such as Airbnb enable access to a resource
within the private sphere of the provider. Hence, these are required to deliberately
accept incoming booking requests. Note that this constitutes a fundamental di↵erence
1This study was published in the International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management,
https://doi.org/10.1108/IJCHM-03-2018-0186, (Dann, Teubner, and Weinhardt, 2019).
Poster child and guinea pig—insights from a structured literature review on
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to other accommodation platforms (e.g., Booking.com) and also to other C2C platforms
(such as eBay). Further, it renders design artifacts of reputation management and user
representation on Airbnb especially important as here, both providers and consumers
need to market themselves (Tussyadiah, 2016b; Karlsson, Kemperman, and Dolnicar,
2017).
Airbnb’s emergence has not gone unnoticed within the tourism, hospitality, and
travel literature. Recent studies consider Airbnb’s value proposition in comparison to
“traditional” hotel o↵ers, consumers’ motives for choosing it (Guttentag et al., 2018;
Lalicic and Weismayer, 2018; Tussyadiah and Park, 2018), and the platform’s impact on
the hotel industry (Akbar and Tracogna, 2018; Blal, Singal, and Templin, 2018; Cheng
and Foley, 2018).
Overall, the literature on Airbnb has grown rapidly. A Google Scholar search for the
keyword “Airbnb” yields 28,500 hits as of May 2018. Although the great majority of these
references do not represent genuine research on Airbnb (but rather brief mentions), we
believe that it is due time to take a step back and asses the current state of a↵airs. Given
Airbnb’s multifacetedness, it is not surprising that research on the platform comprises
many domains, including Information and Management, Tourism/Travel/Hospitality,
Law, and Economics. But also the platform itself and its technical, economic, social,
and legal environments evolve frequently, fundamentally, and fast. This holds particu-
larly true for legal aspects (e.g., changing municipal housing rules) and for the platform’s
mechanisms and design, as for instance illustrated by updates in the review system Airbnb
(2014a) or the introduction of automated pricing regimes (Yee and Ifrach, 2019). Inter-
estingly, such services are also o↵ered by third-party providers (e.g., beyondpricing.com).
In this regard, it is also not surprising that Airbnb operates its own multi-method, multi-
perspective research team with some 100+ designers, data scientists, survey experts,
and user experience specialists (Antin, 2016; Bion, Robert, and Goodman, 2017).
With this overview article, we attempt to provide a map of the broad research land-
scape around Airbnb. We identify common approaches, methods, findings, and—based
on this—identify research gaps and derive opportunities for future work. To the best of
our knowledge, this paper represents the first structured literature review on the diverse
and complex topic of Airbnb and thus closes a research gap in and by itself. Despite
Airbnb’s relative novelty, there has emerged an accumulated body of research that needs
analysis and synthesis. We bring together previously disparate streams of work, providing
a holistic picture. In systematically outlining what already has been done and what has
not, which methods have been used in which domains and in combination with which
research objectives and foci, we enable the identification of advisable and promising
directions for future work.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Chapter 2.1.2, we describe
the steps of the literature review procedure and provide first descriptive statistics. In
Chapter 2.1.3 and 2.1.4, we explore the Airbnb-related literature along the structure
of conceptual themes. Last, in Chapter 2.1.5, we discuss our overarching findings and,
based on this, present managerial implications and pathways for future work.
Poster child and guinea pig—insights from a structured literature review on
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2.1.2 Method
The literature search and selection process follows common methodological suggestions
(Webster and Watson, 2002). As the existing literature on Airbnb is highly interdis-
ciplinary, we queried several databases (i.e., ACM Digital Library, AIS Electronic Li-
brary, EBSCOhost, Emerald Insight, IEEE Xplore Digital Library, ProQuest, ScienceDi-
rect/Scopus, Web of Science) using the search term “Airbnb” in title, abstract, or
keywords (Brocke et al., 2009). After removing duplicates, this yielded 243 articles. We
then analyzed each article’s title and abstract and excluded those that did not focus
on Airbnb in particular. This concerned articles on the overall development of platform
business models where in many of these cases, the paper refers to Airbnb in a sequence
along with other platforms such as Uber. Moreover, in this step, we excluded redundant
papers (e.g., multiple versions), early-stage drafts, and non-scientific publications (e.g.,
press releases). This resulted in a set of 86 articles. Following that, we conducted suc-
cessive backward and forward search resulting in 32 additional relevant articles, yielding
a total of 118. A summary of all articles is provided in Table 2.1.
Our literature review follows a concept-centric approach. To identify key concepts
and themes, we started investigating an initial set of papers in conference proceedings
and journals in the domains of tourism and information systems. We then independently
identified a set of concepts to classify the articles. Subsequently, the set of concepts was
synthesized and clarified by means of discussion. The identification process was primarily
oriented toward ensuring that all concepts are sound, cohesive within, and su ciently
distinct between each other. Following the suggestions by Webster and Watson (2002),
this set of concepts was adopted in the subsequent process of classification and synthesis.
In a similar manner, the articles were classified with regard to method (e.g., experiment
or survey), perspective (e.g., provider, consumer), and further aspects. The classification
process was conducted by the involved authors independently. Again, discrepancies were
discussed and resolved.
The identified themes relate to:
• user motives and types (i.e., which kinds of people use Airbnb and why; 45 studies);
• reputation systems (i.e., how are reputation and trust managed on Airbnb; 31
studies);
• text reviews and self-descriptions (i.e., what do Airbnb’s write about themselves
and other users; 21 studies);
• profile images (i.e., which role does imagery play for interaction and which types
of photos are used; 9 studies);
• prices and pricing (i.e., how are listings priced, which factors entail economic value;
27 studies);
• economic and media impact (i.e., how did the emergence of Airbnb impact the
hotel industry, local housing markets, and how has it been reflected in the popular
press; 17 studies); and
Poster child and guinea pig—insights from a structured literature review on
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• legal and regulatory aspects (i.e., where does Airbnb get in conflict with existing
law, how may regulation be developed, how are cities dealing with the platform;
18 studies).
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Note that this categorization is not disjunctive. Hence, each publication may be
associated with more than one category and in fact, about one-third of all publication
is multi-thematic in this regard.
Overall, the reviewed literature is methodologically diverse, for instance, based on
surveys (37), interviews (8), empirical data (58), experiments (4) or conceptual work
(17). Other less frequent methods are theoretical models, social network analysis, and
Delphi panels. Note that these figures sum up to over 118 as some articles use more than
one method. In terms of domains, most articles refer to Tourism/Travel/Hospitality (48)
or Information and Management (42), while a smaller proportion falls into the domains
of Economics (13), Law (6), or has working paper status (9). The vast majority of
the reviewed articles was published in the past four years 2018 (25), 2017 (54), 2016
(21), and 2015 (15). Moreover, we find that most studies focus on North America
(51), Europe (24), and Asia (9), while fewer use worldwide data (10) and only 5 studies
consider di↵erent reference areas (e.g., the sample’s origin) at the same time.
2.1.3 Airbnb in Research
Representing a poster child of the broader platform economy landscape, Airbnb has
emerged as a frequently studied application, as it allows examination on both macroe-
conomic and socio-psychological levels. To provide some structure and overview, we use
the seven identified themes to discuss, summarize, and synthesize the retrieved publica-
tions. First, we take a look at motives for people to use Airbnb in the first place (either
as hosts, guests, or both). This stream of research naturally extends to the identification
of di↵erent user types and their characteristics. Next, we consider the paramount factors
of trust and reputation. As Airbnb deliberately “designs for trust” (Gebbia, 2016), these
are reflected by a variety of artifacts such as star ratings, text reviews, self-descriptions
and profile images. We then conflate research on how prices (on Airbnb) emerge, that
is, the tangible economic value of various exogenous and user-related factors—and what
this means for hosts’ pricing decisions. Next, we review work on Airbnb’s impact on the
hotel industry and the housing market. We then take a look at work on how Airbnb
has been received by the public and the media. Ultimately, we take a look at legal
and regulatory aspects around Airbnb, including matters of housing legislation, taxation,
liability, consumer protection and platform competition and data ownership.
User Motives and User Types
User Motives from the Consumer Perspective Very much in line with findings
on user motives for adopting sharing platforms in general, research on Airbnb identifies
a multiplicity of relevant motives, including economic, sustainability-related, and so-
cial aspects (Hamari, Sjöklint, and Ukkonen, 2016; Hawlitschek, Teubner, and Gimpel,
2016; Tussyadiah, 2016a). Taking a look at Airbnb’s advertising, it becomes clear that
the platform attempts to appeal in particular to users seeking social, local, unconven-
tional, and authentic experiences (Airbnb, 2014b; Airbnb, 2015b). And in fact, from
the consumers’ perspective, beyond economic benefits, motives do include aspects such
as community feeling and sustainability (Möhlmann, 2015; Tussyadiah, 2015; Guttentag
et al., 2018). Interestingly, and despite the fact that Airbnb tends to attract consumers
Poster child and guinea pig—insights from a structured literature review on
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with high income, high education, high travel activity, and high tech a nity, cost sav-
ings still remain the dominant motive. Beyond conducive factors, impediments have
been identified likewise, including lack of trust in other users (Hawlitschek, Teubner,
and Gimpel, 2016), emphasizing the importance of the platform as a trusted third party
for reducing risks (Kim, Yoon, and Zo, 2015).
Extending work on motives for initially adopting Airbnb, cost savings, utility, trust,
perceived value, and familiarity are found to drive consumers to use the platform again
(Möhlmann, 2015; Mao and Lyu, 2017; Liang, Choi, and Joppe, 2018b; Liang, Choi,
and Joppe, 2018a). Specifically, user loyalty is found to be driven by hedonic value (Lee
and Kim, 2018) and social and authentic experiences (Lalicic and Weismayer, 2018).
. . . and from the Provider Perspective While most published papers have con-
sidered motives from the consumer’s (i.e., the guest’s) perspective (31 studies), fewer
studies focus on hosts (16 studies). The sizeable income opportunities for hosts ($924
per month on average) suggest that financial factors may play a paramount role (Earnest,
2017). Other studies suggest that hosts use Airbnb for both financial and social reasons
(Ikkala and Lampinen, 2015). Interestingly, this holds true for “remote” hosts with fewer
in-person interactions as well.
Consumer Types In view of the broad spectrum of products and applications, it is not
surprising that Airbnb users di↵er in many ways. Guttentag et al. (2018), for instance,
consider di↵erent types of guests based on the motives interaction, home benefits, nov-
elty, sharing economy ethos and local authenticity. They find that people are attracted
to Airbnb’s practical (e.g., cost savings, convenient location, household amenities) rather
than its experiential attributes (e.g., excitement, novelty, uniqueness). The authors clus-
ter respondents into the five motivational segments money savers, home seekers, col-
laborative consumers, pragmatic novelty seekers, and interactive novelty seekers, where
home seekers represent the largest group. Users from this cluster are usually older, more
experienced, tend to book longer trips, entire homes, and travel as larger parties and
significantly more likely with children. Pragmatic novelty seekers, in contrast, are more
likely to rent entire homes while collaborative consumers tend to rent co-used accommo-
dations. Further, they tend to have Airbnb experience both as guests and hosts. From
a platform’s perspective, such user typologies enable a better understanding of its users
and a↵ord apposite targeting and marketing approaches.
In addition, Airbnb users di↵er from non-users in general. With regard to personality
traits, they score higher on conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and openness
(Pezenka, Weismayer, and Lalicic, 2017). Other studies report di↵erences with regard to
consumer-object relationships (Varma et al., 2016; Festila and Dueholm Müller, 2017;
Poon and Huang, 2017). While some consumers prefer a personal experience, expressed
through a reflection of the host’s personality in the accommodation, others favor a
cleaner, more hotel-like experience. In terms of expectations regarding personalization
and further aspects such as serendipity, localness, and communities, Airbnb surpasses
traditional hotel o↵ers (Mody, Suess, and Lehto, 2017). Furthermore, compared to users
who book traditional hotels, Airbnb users are found to put less importance on factors
such as security or housekeeping (Festila and Dueholm Müller, 2017).
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Host Types Also from the hosts’ perspective, there are found di↵erent clusters (e.g.,
global citizen, local expert, personable, established, creative) which di↵er in self-presen-
tation, communication behavior, pricing, and hosting frequency (Tussyadiah, 2016b).
While all archetypes are distinguished by their textual self-description, important factors
such as acceptance rates, response rates, and guest evaluations are comparable across
clusters. However, “established” hosts exhibit slightly lower response rates, higher re-
sponse time, lower prices, and higher rating scores.
Importantly, Airbnb hosts exhibit di↵erent behaviors depending on whether they
leverage the platform in a professional or non-professional way. In several cities, pro-
fessional hosts (i.e., those who o↵er more than one listing) account for more than half
of all available listings (Table A.1). For instance, professional hosts generate higher
revenues and have higher occupancy rates (Li, Moreno, and Zhang, 2015; Gibbs et al.,
2018a). Likewise, professional hosts are early adopters, their listings tend to be entire
apartments rather than private rooms, and they are more likely to be located within
cities (Ke, 2017b). On the listing’s page, professional hosts use the self-description
section for listing advertising purposes rather than for describing themselves personally.
Importantly, professional hosts are perceived as being more trustworthy (Tussyadiah and
Park, 2018).
Airbnb hots also di↵er from those on other accommodation sharing platforms. Couch-
surfing hosts consider a prospective guest’s online representation as a supportive and
friendship-forming tool while Airbnb hosts focus on risk assessment (Tussyadiah and
Park, 2018).
Reputation Systems and Trust
A central and ongoing challenge for Airbnb is the creation and maintenance of trust
between its users (Gebbia, 2016). The platform provides di↵erent IT artifacts for sig-
naling user reputation, where both hosts and guests can leverage these cues to manage
their reputation and to establish trust (Fuller, Serva, and Benamati, 2007; Jøsang, 2007;
Bente, Baptist, and Leuschner, 2012; Xie and Zhenxing, 2017). Such means include star
ratings (Teubner, Hawlitschek, and Dann, 2017; Zervas, Proserpio, and Byers, 2015),
mutual text reviews (Abramova et al., 2015; Bridges and Vásquez, 2018), personal
self-descriptions (Tussyadiah, 2016b; Ma et al., 2017), profile images (Teubner et al.,
2014; Ert, Fleischer, and Magen, 2016; Fagerstrøm et al., 2017), identity verification
and insurances (Teubner and Hawlitschek, 2018) and social connections, displaying how
users are connected to others, directly or through mutual friends, usually based on their
Facebook contacts (Airbnb, 2011). Importantly, hosts on Airbnb may also inherit the
user’s general trust in the platform (Han, Koo, and Chung, 2016). In the following, we
consider the most widely studied categories of trust and reputation management.
Star Ratings Airbnb’s prominent star rating system can be seen as a form of experi-
ence assessment. After a completed transaction, guests are prompted to rate their host
on a scale of 1 to 5 stars along the sub-dimensions accuracy, communication, cleanliness,
location, check in, and value. The resulting average rating score (rounded to the half
unit) represents an essential parameter for prospective user interaction. Airbnb displays
this cumulative score only for hosts with at least three ratings (Airbnb, 2016b) and more
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than half of all listings (54.6 per cent) have not reached star rating visibility yet (Ke,
2017b). Moreover, guests are rated by their hosts as well. This assessment comprises
an up- or down vote of whether they can recommend the guest to other hosts, a text
review and star ratings for cleanliness, communication, and compliance with house rules.
Overall, the distribution of (the hosts’) rating scores is subject to a distinct skewness
where ratings tend to be on the positive side (see Table A.1). Based on more than
600,000 Airbnb listings worldwide, Zervas, Proserpio, and Byers (2015) report that
almost 95 per cent of all listings exhibit an average rating score of 4.5 or 5.0 stars
and that hardly any listings have ratings of 3.5 stars or less. Moreover, they find a
stronger positive bias in Airbnb reviews than for the same listings when also listed on
TripAdvisor. Similar findings are reported by most other studies (Ert, Fleischer, and
Magen, 2016; Ke, 2017b). Further, little to no di↵erences in the star rating distribution
is found when di↵erentiated by room type (i.e., entire home, private room, shared room).
Moreover, comparing Airbnb and Booking.com in five European cities, “a consistent gap
of approximately 20 per cent in the average score per city in favor of Airbnb listings”
is found (Ert, Fleischer, and Magen, 2016, p. 66). These results echo earlier research
on rating systems, showing that over 98 per cent of all exchanged ratings were 5.0
stars (Slee, 2013). Teubner and Glaser (2018) discuss several potential reasons for this
skewness and consider survivorship processes where, in fact, low-rated listings exhibit
increased churn rates.
Gutt and Kundisch (2016) focus on the rating sub-dimension value. They show
that—compared to the overall rating—the value sub-dimension can o↵er additional
insights for potential guests as it puts a listing’s quality in perspective of price. In
contrast, Fradkin, Grewal, and Holtz (2018) argue that the high share of positive ratings
is not explained by the system itself, but by the high quality standards most hosts meet.
This hypothesis is corroborated by two experiments and internal data from Airbnb,
indicating that the positivity bias may be caused by:
• Airbnb’s e↵orts of verifying user identities and actively fostering high-quality user
profiles;
• Airbnb’s explicitly selective ranking algorithm that ranks down unfit hosts (e.g.,
based on listing quality, location relevance, reviews, host response time and guest
and host preferences; Grbovic, 2017); and
• a natural selection process, where low-quality listings receive negative reviews,
hence are not booked again, and in consequence drop out of the market.
Interestingly, review scores appear to be subject to spatial influences within a city,
where more central areas typically exhibit better scores (Cummins, 2017).
Recently, scholars have begun to use scenario-based choice experiments on the ef-
fectiveness of di↵erent reputation cues showing, for instance, that the availability of a
review score increases a listing’s chances of being booked (Ert, Fleischer, and Magen,
2016). In a similar manner, the number of positive reviews is identified as a strong
trust-enhancing cue, instrumental for shaping consumers’ booking decisions (Abramova,
Krasnova, and Tan, 2017). In fact, the e↵ect of star rating availability is supported by:
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• results from a trust game experiment among actual Airbnb users; and
• transaction data from the platform itself (Abrahao et al., 2017).
The availability of a high star rating increases others’ willingness to trust and it can
particularly counter the detrimental trust e↵ects of high social distance.
According to Abramova, Krasnova, and Tan (2017), beyond review score, also the
number of reviews represents an important driver for guest’s rental decisions. Several
studies use this number as a proxy for a listing’s popularity and hence its performance
(Lee, 2015; Ke, 2017a; Ke, 2017b; Liang et al., 2017). What is frequently reported is
that Airbnb listings exhibit a richer-get-richer phenomenon, where “listings with more
existing reviews will have more new reviews” (Ke, 2017b, p. 9). Last, listings with
Superhost status are found to receive more ratings within a given time frame, and that
these are higher on average (Liang et al., 2017).
Text Reviews and Self-Descriptions Beyond star ratings, users on Airbnb rely on
text-based elements to build trust. First, users can provide a textual self-description on
their profile, that is, provide some personal information such as occupation, hobbies, or
life motto (Ma et al., 2017). Airbnb suggests providing a description of at least 50 words
highlighting why a user decided to join the “community,” their interests, or anything
else they believe a prospective interaction partner would want to know (Airbnb, 2017b).
Second, along with numerical star ratings, prior transaction partners describe their ex-
periences with each other by means of text reviews. These typically entail statements
about the host/guest, travel purpose, and the apartment and its surrounding, represent-
ing valuable information for potential future guests/hosts (Bridges and Vásquez, 2018;
Bae et al., 2017). The implications emanating from text-based online representation are
considerable. Both self-descriptions and text reviews are actively used to reduce percep-
tions of risk and to prevent users from misunderstanding and unfounded expectations
(Jung and Lee, 2017).
A↵orded by the availability of textual profile information, recent research has applied
text analysis and natural language processing to decipher meaning and implications of
such text-based elements and to understand Airbnb’s users in greater detail. Tussyadiah
(2016b) uses word co-occurrence in the textual self-descriptions to identify and di↵er-
entiate clusters of hosts. Categories are style of self-presentation, pricing, and activity
patterns. Similarly, Ma et al. (2017) find hosts’ self-descriptions to refer to di↵erent
themes (i.e., origin/residence 69 per cent, work/education 60 per cent, interests and
tastes 58 per cent, hospitality 53 per cent, travel 48 per cent, relationships 28 per cent,
personality 27 per cent, life motto and values 8 per cent) and that a hosts’ trustworthi-
ness increases:
• with the length of self-descriptions; and
• or profiles that disclose information particularly referring to work, origin, hospitality,
and personal interests.
Text reviews have been subject to in-depth investigations too. Bridges and Vásquez
(2018), for instance, explore linguistic patterns in Airbnb reviews, by and large reflecting
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the high proportion of positive star ratings also in these written evaluations (93 per cent
of the analyzed text reviews were classified as positive). Interestingly, 79.5 per cent of
all guest reviews mention the host by name (other studies report similar proportions;
Alsudais, 2017). Of the 7 per cent not-entirely positive reviews, three out of four came
from guests, typically referring to issues with comfort (48 per cent), communication (21
per cent), or cleanliness (15 per cent). The authors suggest that negative experiences
are communicated by means of subtle or “lukewarm” cues, for instance by explicitly not
writing or emphasizing something.
Importantly, not every user submits a review after each transaction; di↵erent sources
report review rates between 31 per cent and 72 per cent (Cox, 2019). In this vein, Bae
et al. (2017) find that divergence between expectation and trip experience (regardless of
whether in a positive or in a negative way) increases the likelihood of review provision.
Similarly, the authors show that users perceive reviews as more credible for small social
distance between themselves and the host. Review credibility, in turn, supports approval,
ultimately resulting in increased booking intentions.
Analyzing word co-occurrence within text reviews, Tussyadiah and Zach (2017) iden-
tify five recurrent themes (referring to service, facility, location, feeling welcome, and
comfort). Linking these themes to a listing’s overall rating, the authors find that the “lo-
cation” and the “feel welcome” themes are associated with higher ratings, while signal
words from the “service” theme are associated with lower ratings. Similarly, Brochado,
Troilo, and Shah (2017) distinguish eight themes (stay, host, home, place, location,
apartment, room, city). Interestingly, they find that this categorization is robust for
di↵erent cultures (i.e., India, Portugal, US). Similarly, Camilleri and Neuhofer (2017)
identify welcoming, expressing feelings, evaluating location and accommodation, help-
ing and interacting, recommending, and thanking as key components. Similar to the
positivity bias in ratings, the positive-to-negative word ratio of 14 million English Airbnb
reviews is more than twice as high when compared to a benchmark of Yelp reviews (Ke,
2017b).
Profile Images The intuitive judgement of other people on the basis of their visual
appearance represents an innate human behavior. Based on two discrete-choice exper-
iments, Ert, Fleischer, and Magen (2016) show that this intuitive evaluation process
leads to a preferred selection of hosts with trustworthy profile images. In a similar
manner, Fagerstrøm et al. (2017) find an increased likelihood to rent from hosts with
positive or neutral facial expressions. Negative expressions or the absence of images,
in contrast, are not even compensated by lower prices or higher ratings, demonstrating
the paramount importance of visual, particularly facial cues. Interestingly, women are
more a↵ected by facial expressions than men and similarity seeking is found to govern
trusting decisions and transactions on Airbnb, where higher social distance (i.e., lower
similarity) is associated with lower levels of trust and fewer transactions (Abrahao et al.,
2017). Due to the fact that not only hosts but also guests have to market themselves on
Airbnb, they are also subject to photo evaluation. Focusing on the decision of hosts to
accept or reject booking requests, Karlsson, Kemperman, and Dolnicar (2017) find that
women, elderly people, and users with trustworthy photos are more likely to be granted
permission to book.
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Prices and Pricing
Financial motives represent one of the key factors for buyers on peer-to-peer marketplaces
(Bucher, Fieseler, and Lutz, 2016). For many cities such as Berlin, Airbnb listings are
roughly 30 per cent less expensive than hotel rooms (BATO, 2016). It is hence not
surprising that prices and pricing strategies are of particular relevance for Airbnb which
is also reflected in distinct price di↵erences between cities (see Table A.1 and Figure A.1
in the Appendix). Several papers have explored determinants of listing prices, usually
based on hedonic pricing models (Rosen, 1974). Such models assume that any valuable
amenity (e.g., a whirlpool) or other competitive advantages (e.g., favorable location)
will sooner or later be reflected by the price. While this relation is well-established for
brick-and-mortar factors in the hospitality and tourism literature (Wang and Nicolau,
2017), the success of Airbnb now begs the question whether these relations transfer to
the C2C context and whether additional, soft factors such as a host’s reputation and
personal branding yield tangible economic value as well. And indeed, based on interviews
with hosts, Ikkala and Lampinen (2014) and Ikkala and Lampinen (2015) find that hosts
monetize their reputational capital in the form of demanding higher prices.
Several empirical studies have since then supported the notion that higher rating
scores, along with other reputational signals (e.g., verified identification, duration of
platform membership, Superhost status, number of Facebook friends) in fact translate
into price markups (Edelman and Luca, 2014; Abramova, Krasnova, and Tan, 2017;
Chen and Xie, 2017; Gibbs et al., 2018a; Liang et al., 2017; Teubner, Hawlitschek, and
Dann, 2017; Wang and Nicolau, 2017). For instance, Teubner, Hawlitschek, and Dann
(2017) find that an additional star is reflected in a $20 markup for a typical stay at
a typical accommodation (2 persons, 2 nights). Moreover, the attainable price is also
driven by the host’s level of professionalism. Li, Moreno, and Zhang (2015) show that
professional hosts:
• generate 16.9 per cent more in daily revenues,
• exhibit 15.5 per cent higher occupancy rates, and
• are less likely to exit the market.
Furthermore, with the Superhost badge, Airbnb provides an own attestation of host
superiority (e.g., high response rate, positive evaluations, su cient number of bookings,
few cancelations; Liang et al., 2017). The authors show that guests accept this badge
as an indicator of quality and are willing to pay more for a Superhost’s accommodation
as compared to hosts without the badge. Moreover, the results of Gutt and Herrmann
(2015) suggest that pricing is subject to the visual presence of reputational capital,
for instance, expressed through the star rating. As outlined above, Airbnb displays the
accumulated star rating scores only for listings with three or more ratings. A longitudinal
assessment reveals that once a listing surpasses this threshold, hosts monetize their
ratings’ reputational capital, where “rating visibility causes hosts to increase their prices
by an average of e 2.69” (Gutt and Herrmann, 2015, p. 7). Similarly, panel data
suggests that hosts react to receiving additional reviews, ID verification, and superhost
status by increasing prices slightly (i.e., by 0.5 per cent to 1.6 per cent; Neumann and
Gutt, 2017).
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In contrast to models based on empirical data, choice experiments are used to study
the influence of information cues and profile images on user decisions and willingness to
pay. Abramova, Krasnova, and Tan (2017), for instance, compare trust-enhancing cues
and estimate the marginal willingness-to-pay showing that, for instance, consumers are
willing to pay e 27.76 extra for a listing with 15 positive reviews. Also, visual information
conveyed through profile images has a significant impact on listing prices, as its absence
or angry facial expressions are found to be compensated neither by low prices nor high
ratings (Fagerstrøm et al., 2017). Ert, Fleischer, and Magen (2016) find that more
trustworthy hosts (based on perceptions of their photo) yield higher willingness to pay.
Also, they report a significant positive influence of the apartment photos’ visual appeal
on price, which is consistent with another study’s finding that an increase of $2,455 in
annual revenues due to high apartment photo quality (Zhang et al., 2016).
Economic Impacts and Media Coverage
Economic Impacts Having established an alternative mode of consumption, it comes
as no surprise that Airbnb has a↵ected the “traditional” hotel industry. Arguably, com-
pared to a hotel, a stay at an Airbnb host di↵ers entirely in terms of comfort and overall
experience and that hence, Airbnb is not likely to substitute hotels altogether. Recent
studies estimate that a 1 per cent increase in Airbnb inventory results in a 0.05 per cent
decrease of hotel revenues (Zervas, Proserpio, and Byers, 2017), and that additional
Airbnb supply has a negative e↵ect on hotel performance (Xie and Zhenxing, 2017).
In contrast, others do not find significant e↵ects of the number of Airbnb listings on
hotel sales performance (Blal, Singal, and Templin, 2018). Yet, major hotel and lodg-
ing associations consider Airbnb as a threat that is already causing price and revenue
cuts—especially during peak times (Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2009). This particularly
a↵ects mid-price hotels, for which Airbnb listings are considered a suitable substitute
(Guttentag and Smith, 2017).
Beyond the hotel industry, it is suggested that the emergence of Airbnb has also
a↵ected local housing markets. While there is currently limited evidence how specifically
peer-based accommodation sharing a↵ects prices and availability, there are indications
of cyclic dynamics insofar as that rental price increases are highest in areas with already
large numbers of Airbnb listings (Schäfer and Braun, 2016), causing further regular
apartments to be converted into short-term o↵ers. This consequently puts increasing
pressure on the housing market—an e↵ect that has been reported for Boston (Horn
and Merante, 2017), Barcelona (Llop, 2017), and Sydney (Gurran and Phibbs, 2017).
While for popular neighborhoods in Berlin, a relation between the presence of Airbnb and
rental price growth is found (Schäfer and Braun, 2016), none is observed for the city of
Hamburg (Brauckmann, 2017). Besides increasing rent levels and the potential e↵ects
of gentrification, the increasing frequency of short-term renting raises questions also
for those who live in “airbnbified” cities and neighborhoods, including noise, pollution,
tra c, nuisance, and waste management (Gurran and Phibbs, 2017).
Media Coverage In view of Airbnb’s meteoric success and such impacts on entire
industries, cities, and residents, the platform’s development was accompanied by ample
media coverage and several studies have portrayed this process. Between 2009 and 2013,
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Airbnb’s presence in common mainstream publications passed through three di↵erent
phases. While first attempts to understand and locate the platform in existing categories
turned out to be inappropriate, Airbnb was then described as a distinct phenomenon, and
eventually acknowledged as an iconic business model (Mikhalkina and Cabantous, 2015).
Similarly, the tech blogging community captured Airbnb’s development between 2011
and 2014 as a two-stage process. The first step was to establish a two-sided market
with respective network- and lock-in e↵ects and thereafter, a process of augmenting
the platform through incremental improvements for consumers and providers followed
(Constantiou, Eaton, and Tuunainen, 2016).
Legal and Regulatory Aspects
The character of Airbnb’s (and its hosts’) business model raises a variety of legal ques-
tions and sometimes conflicts with applicable national law. These questions can roughly
be structured along the categories housing, taxation, consumer protection, regulation,
and liability.
Housing First and foremost, short-term rental is legally restricted in many cities. Con-
sider Berlin as an example. Here, like in most other European capitals, the vacation rental
business is flourishing. In 2016, 600,000 guests booked a stay, representing an annual
increase of around five percent (Airbnb, 2016c). In the same manner, the number of
hosts has grown by around eleven percent. These figures are politically explosive insofar
as they suggest that the city’s misappropriation act has had little e↵ect (BATO, 2016;
Schäfer and Braun, 2016). Since May 2014, hosts are not allowed to rent out entire
apartments or houses repeatedly on a short-term basis (with few exceptions). In other
European cities, Airbnb’s strategy of lobbying and acting upon legislation has been quite
successful. For instance, Airbnb agreed on a time limit for renting holiday homes in Am-
sterdam. Residents are allowed to (fully) rent out their apartments for a maximum of
60 days per year. In London, this limit is 90 days. Here, Airbnb has agreed to block all
orders that exceed this number. In other cities with a vibrant tourism industry such as
Barcelona, the dispute between Airbnb and municipals is far from being settled (Interian,
2016; Llop, 2017; Gutiérrez et al., 2017; Santolli, 2015).
Taxation Next, there exist concerns with regard to taxation, comprising mainly two
aspects. First, many cities charge tourism taxes, typically in the range of 5-10 per cent
of the room rate. Private Airbnb hosts usually do not pay this as they are not registered
as hotel or tourism operators. In many cities (mainly in the USA), Airbnb was hence
forced to cooperate with the fiscal authorities and now transfers the tax directly, a model
which is argued for by legal scholars (Lee et al., 2016). Second, rental income is subject
to personal taxation. However, the literature suggests that many private hosts ignore
the tax relevance of this type of income (Cleveland, 2016).
Consumer Protection and Regulation Another conflict is rooted in the fact that
hosts o↵er products and services that may substitute those of hotels but do not face
equally strict regulation, for instance, with regard to hygiene and fire inspection stan-
dards (Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2009). This raises questions of consumer protection
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and competition fairness. In this regard, Airbnb argues that the “self-regulating com-
munity” of hosts and guests, supported by the platform’s reputation systems, actually
can complement, if not replace governmental monitoring and/or regulatory processes
(Stabrowski, 2017). Moreover, Airbnb claims to perform background checks on hosts
for criminal records and sex o↵ender registries (Airbnb, 2017a; Le Vine and Polak, 2017).
As a contrast, Airbnbhell.com o↵ers a platform for guests and hosts to share their neg-
ative experiences to raise awareness about its risks and to prevent other people from
using it (AirbnbHell, 2019).
The debate on unfair competition between the highly regulated hotel industry and
Airbnb revolves around seven key issues which public institutions should consider to
prevent pressure on the housing market and to counteract touristification, including tax-
ation schemes, the control of visitor streams, information ownership, safety, consumer
protection, fair competition, and the housing market in general (Oskam and Boswijk,
2016). There exists no one-size-fits-all vision for handling short-term rentals in the fu-
ture. Regulatory measures are intended to protect interests of both visitors and locals
and thereby require businesses and hosts to comply. For instance, an analysis of written
submissions to the city of Sydney revealed that noise, tra c, parking, and waste, but
also a general feeling of unease bothers local residents where short-term rentals pen-
etrate residential areas (Gurran and Phibbs, 2017). Local institutions are required to
frame regulation on the basis of individual indicators such as visitor numbers, frequency
and type of incidents, collected taxes, and the evolution of housing prices—and it is
argued that individual and novel regulation is better suited to govern Airbnb than the
existing and one-size-fits-all approaches (Jonas, 2015; Lines, 2015; Oskam and Boswijk,
2016). It is proposed that Airbnb may actively support such e↵orts by committing to
self-regulatory measures such as providing transparency about operated properties and
visitors (Quattrone et al., 2016).
Liability Furthermore, questions of liability particularly apply to hosts. First, a guest
may (intendedly or not) cause damage to the host’s property. For such cases, Airbnb
o↵ers a 1-million dollar insurance (Airbnb, 2015a) but it is questioned that adequate
coverage can be claimed in case it is actually needed (Lieber, 2014; Dobbins, 2017).
Of course, financial compensation will not be able to cover damage or loss of objects
of sentimental value. Perhaps even more importantly, liability is largely unclear for
cases in which a guest comes to harm, for instance, due to technical deficiencies of the
apartment (Booth and Newling, 2016). In particular, Airbnb hosts are considered as
landlords (rather than innkeepers) by some jurisdictions in which case they are not held
liable for injuries that occur on their property (Loucks, 2015).
Discrimination Last, for peer-based sharing platforms, the general tenet is that more
disclosed information leads to better assessments, reduced uncertainty, and hence the
facilitation of transactions among strangers. Nevertheless, Airbnb’s striving to facilitate
the creation of trust may result in further, unexpected consequences. One observation
is that African-American hosts are forced to charge lower prices (Edelman and Luca,
2014). A subsequent study demonstrated that also guest profiles with distinctively
African-American names are denied 16 per cent more often when requesting a stay than
potential guests with distinctively “white” names (Edelman, Luca, and Svirsky, 2017).
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Here, rejection rates did not depend on the host’s age, experience, location, listing
price, or usage (occasional/ professional). Moreover, even the host’s own ethnicity did
not a↵ect rejection rates, suggesting that in-group thinking or homophily are not at
work. In an e↵ort of preemptive obedience, Airbnb prompted its hosts to commit to
a non-discrimination statement (Airbnb, 2016b; Benner, 2016). In view of Airbnb’s
general terms of use, it is argued that users are forced to sign the included arbitration
agreements which prevent legal enforcement against cases of racial discrimination and
that, further, without regulatory adaptions, such waivers threaten civil rights enforcement
(Toto, 2017). Another suggestion is to expand the instant booking option which lets
guests book without further host approval (Edelman, Luca, and Svirsky, 2017). As of
today, however, only about 25 per cent of all listings o↵er the instant booking option
(see Table A.1). It was also discussed to reduce the prominence of profile photos which
do, however, play an unchanged paramount role.
2.1.4 Correlation of Themes, Methods, Foci and Domains
We now analyze the di↵erent themes, methods, foci, and domains of the reviewed
studies in greater detail. Considering the general occurrence of di↵erent themes, the
role of profile photos has experienced rather little research attention (9 studies) while
user types and their motives to use Airbnb have been subject to much more extensive
investigation (45 studies). Moreover, we consider the occurrence of combinations of
these factors to derive first insights into possible research gaps. To do so, we use make
use of correlation analysis for the outlined measures (see Table 2.2).
A first insight from this pertains to the relations between surveys, empirical work,
studies on motives, and the foci on providers/consumers. We see that motives are usually
assessed by means of surveys (r = 0.64) and hardly by empirical analysis (-0.53). Also,
surveys usually focus on consumers (0.67) and hardly on providers (-0.63). In contrast,
research on providers is usually based on empirical work (0.46), a method which is, how-
ever, underrepresented for the consumer perspective (-0.36). In consequence, research
into the providers’ motives to adopt and use Airbnb represents a natural opportunity for
future work—especially for the domain of tourism as this domain focuses particularly on
consumers (0.31). Next, Table 2.2 reveals that studies on legal and regulatory aspects
(which tend to be published in law outlets, 0.55) are often conceptual (0.50). Thus,
data-driven research may further inform Airbnb-related debates in jurisprudence.
With regard to timely developments, we see that the domain of tourism is taking
over recently (0.31), while conceptual work appears to die o↵ (-0.27). Furthermore, we
see that empirical work is mainly conducted on pricing strategies and prices (0.37), and
in particular so for US/Canada-based samples (0.34).
2.1.5 Discussion and Conclusion
We have taken a look at the research landscape around Airbnb and some fundamental
data on the listings supplied through the platform. Airbnb represents a poster child of the
platform economy and likewise serves as a guinea pig in a variety of contemporary studies
in the domains of Information and Management, Tourism/Travel/Hospitality, Law, and
Economics. Along the dimensions of user motivation, trust and reputation, prices,
Poster child and guinea pig—insights from a structured literature review on
Airbnb 40
economic and media impacts and legal and regulatory aspects, we provide a structured
overview on this timely and emerging field of research. We argue that studying Airbnb
represents a highly worthwhile endeavor as the platform represents more than a simple
booking portal, but rather a blueprint for an entire category of novel business models—
setting de facto standards for web design, trust and reputation management, and for
the social and behavioral norms of user interaction—also outside the domain of travel
and tourism. From this analysis there emerges a set of overarching stylized facts and
implications for both research and practice.
Table 2.2: Correlation table of publication properties (n = 118; cut-o↵ |r| <0.25)






User Motives Types 2
Reputation Systems Trust 3
Text Reviews and Descriptions 4
Photos 5
Prices and Pricing Strategies 6
Economic and Media Impact 7
Regulatory and Legal Aspects 8
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Survey 11 .64 -.25 .67 -.63
Interview 12 .34
Empirical 13 -.53 .37 -.35 .46
















Tourism, Hospitality, Travel 22 .31 .31
Information Management 23 -.27
Working Paper 24 .26
Economics 25 .30
Law 26 .55 .56
Theoretical Implications
First, research on Airbnb with regard to quantity, related fields, used methods, scope,
and research questions has experienced tremendous growth over the past years. While
earlier work mainly considered user types and motivations, we now see research on
reputation mechanisms, user interface design, trust, legal assessments, prices and pricing,
geographic aspects, text sentiment, the platform’s overall inventory and its impact on
established industries. However, not all aspects and methods (and combinations thereof)
are equally represented (see Chapter 2.1.4). Future work should hence consider to focus
the identified gaps and hitherto scarcely used combinations (e.g., of method and focus).
Second, for platform business models, trust is considered as crucial by scholars, users,
and platform providers. A broad variety of mechanisms and artifacts are implemented by
the platform and a plethora of studies confirm their e↵ectiveness for creating trust and
facilitating transactions. Specifically, positive e↵ects are found for higher star ratings
scores (Lee, 2015; Ert, Fleischer, and Magen, 2016; Zhang et al., 2016; Abrahao et
al., 2017; Fagerstrøm et al., 2017; Ke, 2017b; Sanchez-Vazquez, Silva, and Santos,
2017; Fradkin, Grewal, and Holtz, 2018), larger numbers of ratings (Li, Moreno, and
Zhang, 2015; Zhang et al., 2016; Abrahao et al., 2017; Abramova, Krasnova, and
Tan, 2017; Ke, 2017b), the presence of text reviews (Ikkala and Lampinen, 2014; Bae
et al., 2017; Sanchez-Vazquez, Silva, and Santos, 2017; Fradkin, Grewal, and Holtz,
2018; Liang, Choi, and Joppe, 2018b; Liang, Choi, and Joppe, 2018a), profile images
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(Ert, Fleischer, and Magen, 2016; Fagerstrøm et al., 2017; Karlsson, Kemperman, and
Dolnicar, 2017; Liang et al., 2017), personal information (Ikkala and Lampinen, 2014;
Ma et al., 2017), and other subordinate factors such as the Superhost badge (Ke, 2017b;
Liang et al., 2017), ID verification (Abramova, Krasnova, and Tan, 2017; Jung and Lee,
2017), or favorable room presentation (Zhang et al., 2016; Abramova, Krasnova, and
Tan, 2017; Jung and Lee, 2017; Liang et al., 2017). While most of these studies
conceptualize trust as an undi↵erentiated construct, little was it studied in its multi-
dimensionality (e.g., ability, benevolence, integrity) or multi-referentiality (e.g., platform,
peers) in the context of Airbnb (Hawlitschek, Teubner, and Weinhardt, 2016). As
Airbnb, however, deliberately “designs for trust” (Gebbia, 2016), an even more nuanced
conceptualization of trust may yield further insights into trust-related entanglements on
Airbnb specifically—but also on peer-to-peer platforms in general.
Third, as this literature review has revealed, a large share of work on Airbnb is based
on empirical data. For such studies, we observe that the website InsideAirbnb.com is
increasingly used as a viable resource, providing data on listings, reviews, and calendars.
It appears quite likely that much of the upcoming research will do so too as Insid-
eAirbnb.com, as a data repository, alleviates researchers from the technical burdens of
implementing web scrapers and allows for better comparability across results. Research
should move toward building atop of a common ground of data structure and vocabulary.
Practical Implications
The present research also yields several managerial implications for the traditional hotel
industry. For instance, it becomes evident that managers in the hotel industry can no
longer ignore the presence of Airbnb and the type of service it provides to its users (Blal,
Singal, and Templin, 2018). Instead, hotels should actively di↵erentiate their o↵ers from
Airbnb and emphasize their own strengths. This includes, for instance, strengthening
loyalty programs, for which Airbnb does not o↵er a substitute (Young, Corsun, and Xie,
2017). In addition, hotels can leverage economies of scale to provide access to assets
that are hardly being o↵ered by private hosts (open spaces, gastronomic facilities, gyms,
etc.) and services (concierge, maintenance) (Akbar and Tracogna, 2018). This is well in
line with hotels’ higher family friendliness (Mao and Lyu, 2017; Poon and Huang, 2017)
and aspects such as instant booking and confirmation, the absence of minimum stay
durations, and more reliable room availability throughout the year (Gunter and Önder,
2017). Eventually, with regard to Airbnb, hotels’ marketing should particular stress their
superiority with regard to process risks, safety, and security (Yang and Ahn, 2016; Mao
and Lyu, 2017; Poon and Huang, 2017; Young, Corsun, and Xie, 2017; Malazizi, Alipour,
and Olya, 2018).
Another recurrent theme in the literature are motives for using Airbnb and we find
that such motives are manifold. Financial (Tussyadiah, 2016a; Guttentag and Smith,
2017; Liang, Choi, and Joppe, 2018b; Liang, Choi, and Joppe, 2018a) and social rea-
sons (Möhlmann, 2015; Tussyadiah, 2015; Guttentag et al., 2018), trust (Tussyadiah,
2015; Mittendorf and Ostermann, 2017; Wang and Nicolau, 2017), and risk-related fac-
tors (Lampinen, 2016; Varma et al., 2016; Jung and Lee, 2017) emerge as the most
important motives but there are indices of other factors too, including sustainability
(Hamari, Sjöklint, and Ukkonen, 2016) and authenticity (Guttentag and Smith, 2017;
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Guttentag et al., 2018). Importantly, not only consumers but hosts as well are found
to be motivated both by economic and social motives. Interestingly, while most studies
identify financial motives as predominant, Airbnb’s marketing does not address this di-
rection at all. Apparently, the platform attempts to create an image of a social travelers’
community in which money does not play a role at all. Such “sharewashing” practices
have recently been discussed as misleading users and the public and it may well be that
the disavowal of most users’ economic motives harms rather than benefits Airbnb as a
company Troncoso (2014) and Hawlitschek, Teubner, and Gimpel (2018). One prac-
tical implication standing to reason for Airbnb but also for other platform operators is
that they may want to revisit their users’ motives, their marketing communication, and
possible discrepancies between them.
Limitations
Like any research, the present study is not without limitations. One aspect may concern
the literature screening process. Given that there does not exist a natural and clear-cut
criterion for what constitutes a su ciently Airbnb-related paper, this process may be
vulnerable to some selection bias. Nevertheless, error sensitivity may be rather low as
exclusion criteria were thoroughly discussed among authors. Moreover, given the rapid
development of the platform, regulation, and Airbnb-related research, this review must
be considered as a snapshot in time. Nevertheless, we are positive that it may help to
identify research lacunas.
Future Research
Airbnb’s worldwide presence is reflected in a large spectrum of cultural habits, products,
and prices—which all interact. Investigating actual Airbnb data reveals that there exist
significant di↵erences with regard to market penetration, prices, and more intricate
aspects such as reputation scores (see Table A.1 and Figure A.1 in the Appendix). For
“local” studies on Airbnb, it is hence important to keep in mind that rash generalizations
to other cities and regions, let alone for the entire platform, may not be justified. A
striking observation in this regard is the low number of studies that deliberately consider
and compare samples of di↵erent origins (Brochado, Troilo, and Shah, 2017; Rahimi, Liu,
and Andris, 2016). Future research hence should examine socio-demographic, regional,
and cultural aspects in greater depth, for instance, with regard to the e↵ect of cultural
norms on the roles of user motives, prices, trust building, and reputation (e.g., across
Western/Eastern societies).
Moreover, only few studies have set out to conduct experiments on provider-consumer
interactions and trust (Abrahao et al., 2017) or actual field experiments directly on
the platform (Edelman and Luca, 2014; Edelman, Luca, and Svirsky, 2017). Despite
the technical and ethical intricacies of audit studies, this approach represents a highly
promising path for future work as it reveals insights into actual, that is, non-hypothetical
user behavior. The open data repository InsideAirbnb.com provides monthly panel-like
data for an increasing number of cities which open up the possibility of studying dynamic
aspects, for instance, with regard to the evolvement of prices, transaction volumes, or
user reputation (Teubner and Glaser, 2018). This opportunity should be seized by future
work.
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Beyond these currently discussed topics, several other, less obvious research gaps
come to mind. First, two of the most recent developments include experiences and
the platform’s automated pricing algorithm (Hill, 2015; Gibbs et al., 2018b). With
the introduction of experiences in late 2016, Airbnb attempts to tap into an additional
business potential, where locals o↵er (i.e., sell) guided tours, workshops, and other
activities—positioning Airbnb as a wholesale tourism company. Research on such peer-
based tourism services is, however, scarce. Moreover, Airbnb’s automated pricing tool
represents by and large terra incognita.
Second, what is common to many platforms is that users need to market them-
selves based on their online reputation and/or personal brand (Harris and Rae, 2011;
Yannopoulou, 2013; Tussyadiah, 2016b; Dann et al., 2018). With each platform spe-
cializing on one particular type of product or service, users handle distinct reputation
scores for an increasing number of platforms (Dakhlia, Davila, and Cumbie, 2016). The
ever-growing relevance of Airbnb and other peer-based platforms prompts the idea of
leveraging one’s reputation from one context in other contexts as well, that is, on dif-
ferent platforms. This poses the question of whether (and if so, how) reputation is
actually transferable between platforms (Teubner and Flath, 2019). Instead of starting
all over again with zero reviews and no reputation, new Airbnb users could refer to their
existing ratings on other platforms. This notion of reputation portability is identified as
an important lever to address issues of platform competition (European Union, 2017, p.
93).
Third, while the rating distribution skewness toward positive ratings on Airbnb is
regarded as common knowledge and many studies have described this distribution (Zer-
vas, Proserpio, and Byers, 2015), little is known about the root causes for its occur-
rence. There exist several conjectures, for instance, on social interactions among hosts
and guests, under-reporting of negative experiences, non-anonymity and publicity of re-
views, mid- and long-term selection, or strategic reasons in view of future transactions
(Dambrine, Jerome, and Ambrose, 2015; Bridges and Vásquez, 2018). Empirical work
addressing these suppositions, however, is yet scarce.
2.1.6 Conclusion
Studying Airbnb is due even beyond the questions and issues directly related to the
platform as it serves as a template for various other ventures, reflected in many star-
tups’ claim to represent “the Airbnb of. . . ” (Horton, Stern, and Zeckhauser, 2016).
In addition, many of the mechanisms and design elements used by Airbnb (e.g., star
ratings, text reviews, profile images) are being used by most other platforms too. Given
the increasing importance of two-sided markets, platform business models, the associ-
ated economic, social, and regulatory upheavals, and Airbnb’s function as a poster child
and role model make it worth studying all the more. In summary, our study provides an
overview of work on the accommodation sharing platform Airbnb. The prevalence of per-
sonal host-guest interactions—both online and, importantly, also o✏ine—distinguishes
the platform from traditional accommodation markets (i.e., hotels) and charges the used
IT design elements and mechanisms with particular social and economic meaning. As a
highly diverse and steadily growing community of scholars investigates the phenomena
surrounding Airbnb, this review can only represent a first step in view of the necessity to
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sort, structure, and review the vast amount of literature. We hope that researchers and
practitioners alike will find this review useful as a reference for future research and as a
guide for the development of innovative applications based on the platform’s peculiarities
and paradigms in e-commerce practice.
Chapter 3
Social and Economic Values on
Peer-to-Peer Platforms
3.1 Where the host is part of the deal: Social and
economic value in the platform economy
With a general understanding of P2P platforms and the current state of research on their
most popular representative, this chapter continues with developing an understanding
of why consumers intend to enter a transaction on these platforms. Within an online
experimental approach, the following study investigates how providers’ appearance on
platforms (i.e., their UR) is linked to consumers’ intention to enter a transaction with
them. The experiment considers three types of UR artifacts: Artifacts that (1) convey
personal information (e.g., self- descriptions), (2) are provided by exogenous sources
(e.g., star ratings), and (3) conflate both of these informational properties (e.g., text
reviews). The results illustrate the dual property of text reviews and that transaction
intentions are driven by expected social and economic value to about equal extents.
David Dann, Timm Teubner, Marc T. P. Adam & Christof Weinhardt1
3.1.1 Introduction
An ever-growing number of businesses in today’s platform economy enable the renting
and sharing of resources from peer to peer (P2P) (Sundararajan, 2016). One of the
predominant applications of these platforms is accommodation sharing.2 In this domain,
platforms such as Airbnb, HomeAway, Homestay, and Wimdu create value by matching
potential hosts and guests (i.e., the consumers). To do so, they make use of a variety
1This study was published in the Electronic Commerce Research and Applications journal, https:
//doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2019.100923, (Dann et al., 2020b).
2The European Commission quantifies the annual expenditure on P2P platform markets at e 27.9bn
within the EU and identifies accommodation sharing and renting as one of the key business models
(European Commission, 2016). In contrast to B2C e-commerce and P2P platforms such as eBay, real-
world social interactions represent an integral part of accommodation sharing. Thereby, it represents
a particularly interesting example in view of social facets as the expected personal interactions are
substantial.
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of user representation (UR) artifacts to create trust between users and hence facilitate
transactions (Abrahao et al., 2017; Dann, Teubner, and Weinhardt, 2019).
Listings on accommodation sharing platforms are often run by private individuals,
and consumers may hence face significant exposure due to fraudulent o↵ers, unreliability,
or inappropriate conditions (AirbnbHell, 2019). Consequently, assessing potential hosts
is essential for forming expectations about the economic value one may derive from
a transaction. Also, many o↵ers by private individuals are associated with co-usage,
also referred to as “on-site hospitality” (Ikkala and Lampinen, 2015, p. 1036), where
consumers and hosts share a space at the same time (Teubner, Hawlitschek, and Dann,
2017). On Airbnb, for instance, co-usage accounts for 31.5% of all transactions (Ke,
2017b). Such scenarios imply personal interactions that create an additional social
value dimension for consumers. Such value may, for instance, be based on authentic,
local, or cultural insights, a personal hospitality experience, or simply pleasant company
(e.g., Ikkala and Lampinen, 2015; Lalicic and Weismayer, 2018; Tussyadiah, 2016a). As
co-usage is not o↵ered by traditional hotels, accommodation sharing platforms explicitly
promote personal aspects (e.g., “Experience a home away from home”, Homestay, 2017;
“Belong anywhere”, Airbnb, 2014a; or “Don’t go there. Live there”, Airbnb, 2016b).
Anticipating the prospective o✏ine experience based on online information renders
the realization of transactions highly dependent on hosts’ user representation (Ert, Fleis-
cher, and Magen, 2016; Fagerstrøm et al., 2017; Krasnova, Veltri, and Günther, 2012).
Overall, this representation (1) may convey personal information (e.g., self-descriptions
on occupation, interests, hobbies), (2) may be provided by an exogenous, third party
(e.g., star ratings), and (3) conflate both of these properties (e.g., text reviews; Hesse
et al., 2020). However, at this stage, there is limited research on how the di↵erent UR
artifacts a↵ect expected social and/or economic value. We hence pose the following,
overarching research question:
RQ: How do di↵erent UR artifacts facilitate co-usage transactions through social and
economic value?
In this paper, we develop a research model tying together di↵erent UR artifacts, their
informational properties, as well as social and economic value motives. We evaluate our
model by means of an online experiment. Participants take the role of consumers who
examine prospective hosts’ listings. This paper makes three main contributions. First, by
causally linking the outlined UR artifacts to booking intentions, we advance the under-
standing of the driving factors of consumer behavior in accommodation sharing. Specif-
ically, we show that consumers do in fact take prospective social value into account.
Second, supporting our theoretical reasoning, results show that artifacts providing per-
sonal information a↵ect consumers’ expectations about social value while artifacts pro-
viding exogenous information a↵ect expectations about economic value. Consequently,
text reviews emerge as a particularly powerful cue as they conflate both informational
properties (personal and exogenous) and also a↵ect booking intentions both through
economic and social value expectations. Overall, platform operators should thus be well
aware of the di↵erent artifacts’ nuances and importance as facilitators for transactions.
Third, to the best of our knowledge, our study represents the first to examine the dual
e↵ect of text reviews on booking intentions through social and economic value expecta-
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tions. Complementary to previous studies that mainly describe the e↵ect of text reviews,
our study is one of the first to experimentally test their impact.
3.1.2 Related Work and Theoretical Background
Given the intensity and intimacy of interactions in domains such as accommodation
sharing, and how expectations about such interactions ultimately come down to the
individual persons, the role of UR artifacts is rendered particularly relevant. In this
regard, hosts can leverage expectations about social value to advertise their listing,
services, and ultimately themselves (Harris and Rae, 2011; Tussyadiah, 2016b).
Social and Economic Value in P2P Sharing Platforms
While scholars have identified numerous motives for consumers to engage in transactions
on sharing platforms (e.g., sustainability-related or anti-capitalistic considerations), eco-
nomic and social motives have emerged as prevailing (e.g., Hawlitschek, Teubner, and
Weinhardt, 2016; Tussyadiah and Park, 2018). Beyond mere economic value, trans-
actions on accommodation sharing platforms inherently include the prospect of social
value. As shown in Figure 3.1, in the context of co-usage sharing,
• social value emerges, inter alia, from authentic and local experiences, new and
pleasant encounters, conversation and socializing, or cultural insights, while
• economic value emerges, inter alia, from cost savings (e.g., compared to hotels),

















Economic ValueSocial Value Co-usage Sharing
Figure 3.1: Social and economic value in co-usage (accommodation) sharing.
Overall, social value may be defined as “the pleasure, satisfaction, and gratification
individuals derive from participating in interpersonal interactions” (Jiang et al., 2013, p.
582). Humans assign value to social factors (Fareri and Delgado, 2014; Sanfey, 2007),
and engaging in interpersonal interactions has been a crucial factor in the continuation
of the human species (Tamir and Ward, 2015). Consequently, the human brain has
developed a variety of processes that reward us when engaging in social activities (Kelley
and Berridge, 2002; Tamir and Ward, 2015) and humans seek social value. Krach et al.
(2010), for instance, find that some of the most potent stimuli to the human brain
are linked to positive social interactions. Also, Fogg (2009, p. 4) argues that “[t]he
Where the host is part of the deal: Social and economic value in the
platform economy 48
power of social motivation is likely hardwired in us.” Social value can be evoked by
a variety of stimuli, including encounters with interesting people of diverse cultural
backgrounds (Ikkala and Lampinen, 2015), emotional expression (Rademacher et al.,
2010), cooperation and fairness (Lieberman and Eisenberger, 2008), peer approval and
friendly gestures (Bhanji and Delgado, 2014), communication (Krach et al., 2010), or
simply others’ attention (Buss, 1983).
The notion of social value applies to P2P platforms in several ways. Services that cre-
ate social value are, for example, found to entail higher usefulness for consumers (Barnes
and Mattsson, 2017), and the desire to form social ties and community-belonging are
some of the driving factors for engaging on P2P platforms (Bucher, Fieseler, and Lutz,
2016; Tussyadiah, 2015). From a consumer’s perspective, estimating potential social
value relates to various steps throughout transactions with real-world interaction. These
include the initial search, sending requests, the transaction itself, and reviewing the
transaction afterward. Unsurprisingly, platform operators employ social cues to stimu-
late expectations about social value (Airbnb, 2014a; Airbnb, 2016b; Homestay, 2017).
Thus, a user profile can be seen as a “preview” of the social value that can be expected
down the line. It conveys an impression about the chance to meet a person in the real
world who may be worthwhile getting to know.
User Representation Artifacts on Sharing Platforms
Platform operators make use of a variety of artifacts for user representation. These
artifacts exhibit specific characteristics that can be categorized as (1) providing personal
information about the host and as (2) providing an exogenous view which renders the
information particularly credible. A self-description text is an example for the former,
while star ratings are an example for the latter. Importantly, there exist artifacts that








Figure 3.2: Informational properties of di↵erent UR artifacts.
Self-descriptions are textual accounts that enable users to create expressive and lively
profiles. About 40-50% of Airbnb hosts make use of this option (Ke, 2017b) and express
themselves in about 100 to 230 characters to convey a positive self-image by disclosing
personal information (e.g., Hesse et al., 2020; Ma et al., 2017; Tussyadiah and Park,
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2018). Typical users’ self-descriptions refer to their hobbies and interests, occupation,
life motto, or why they have joined the platform community (e.g., Tussyadiah, 2016b;
Zhang, Gu, and Jahromi, 2019).
Star ratings are a transaction-based numerical aggregation of prior users’ experiences
(Teubner, Hawlitschek, and Dann, 2017). After a transaction is completed, consumers
evaluate their hosts on a scale of 1 to 5 stars, and the (rounded) average rating is
displayed on the host’s profile. On some platforms, the rating is only displayed if a par-
ticular number of evaluations is surpassed (Airbnb, 2016a). Importantly, for the example
of Airbnb, slightly more than half of all hosts have not crossed this visibility threshold
(Ke, 2017b), equipping the availability of a rating score with actual di↵erentiating power
(Qiu and Abrahao, 2018). Nevertheless, among hosts that possess a rating score, there
is evident skewness in the distribution of ratings towards the maximum value and a
standing rating of 4 stars may already appear as rather poor (e.g., Dann, Teubner, and
Weinhardt, 2019; Hesse et al., 2020; Ke, 2017b).
Text reviews are descriptions of about 70 to 270 characters that are provided by
previous guests (Hesse et al., 2020) and contain valuable information for potential future
guests (Veloso et al., 2019). They commonly refer to the overall experience, service
quality, the accommodation and its surrounding, and – importantly – personal aspects
regarding the host (e.g., Bae et al., 2017; Cheng et al., 2019; Tussyadiah and Zach,
2017). As such, text reviews help consumers to reduce uncertainty and to avoid false
expectations (Jung and Lee, 2017). Importantly, not every transaction is concluded
with a text review. In fact, a substantial share of listings (35.7%) does not include
text reviews (Ke, 2017b). Overall, text reviews conflate both the personal information
property (similar to self-descriptions) and represent exogenous information (similar to
star ratings).
Research Gap
Previous research has either investigated (1) consumers’ motives to engage in sharing
transactions or (2) the trust-building e↵ects of di↵erent UR artifacts (see Appendix B.1).
In this study, we conflate these two perspectives, linking UR artifacts to the outlined
motives and hence allowing for a more precise attribution of how the availability of
specific artifacts a↵ects booking intentions. Moreover, while previous work has described
text reviews (e.g., Bridges and Vásquez, 2018; Cheng and Jin, 2019; Ke, 2017b), research
on their perceptual, intentional, and behavioral e↵ects is scarce. The present study hence
addresses a research gap by shedding light on the causal e↵ects of text review availability
on consumers’ value perceptions and booking intentions.
3.1.3 Hypotheses Development
In our research model, we link consumers’ booking intentions to the hosts’ UR through
the theoretical pathways of economic and social value (see Figure 3.3). While previous
research has established the importance of these motives for participating in peer-based
sharing in general, our study sheds light on how consumers form expectations about
economic and social value from a transaction with a specific host based on that host’s
UR. The notion of economic value captures aspects such as organizational e↵ort (e.g.,
issuing booking requests), potential cost savings, as well as associated uncertainty (e.g.,
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potential unacceptable housing conditions). By contrast, the notion of social value refers
to characteristics of social interactions with the host, including meeting someone who
is nice to get to know in person and prospective pleasant socializing (e.g., enjoyable

























Figure 3.3: Treatment design and conceptual research model.
Influence of Self-Descriptions on Expected Social Value
In their self-description, hosts provide information regarding, for instance, their occupa-
tion, hobbies, interests, or activities (Ma et al., 2017; Tussyadiah, 2016b). By decid-
ing how much and what sort of information they disclose, hosts determine their self-
presentation and hence, how they are perceived by consumers (Tussyadiah and Park,
2018). An UR artifact that provides personal information contributes to drawing a
vivid picture of the particular person and hence allows consumers to perceive them as
a real and multifaceted human being. By making use of self-descriptions, hosts can in-
duce feelings of connectedness, sociability, and intimacy – and hence increase liking and
understanding (Altman and Taylor, 1973; Janssen, IJsselsteijn, and Westerink, 2014).
While there exists a range of di↵erent topics that hosts mention in their self-descriptions
(Tussyadiah, 2016b), Ma et al. (2017) show that information on occupation, personal
background, and personal interests is particularly beneficial. As such, the self-description
of a host inherently promotes expectations about the social value of a transaction (Hesse
et al., 2020). Consequently, we hypothesize:
H1 (The Sociability Hypothesis): The availability of a host self-description has a
positive e↵ect on consumers’ social value expectations.
Influence of Star Ratings on Expected Economic Value
Hosts and consumers evaluate each other once a transaction is completed (without
knowing the other’s evaluation; Fradkin, Grewal, and Holtz, 2018; Hesse et al., 2020).
Previous research has established that rating scores represent crucial elements for en-
gendering trust between users of P2P platforms (Chica et al., 2019) and that ratings
do in fact reflect the o↵ered good’s or service’s quality (Gutt and Kundisch, 2016). In
particular, star ratings reflect users’ aggregated reputation. They typically represent re-
liable information as they stem from various exogenous sources (e.g., Fagerstrøm et al.,
2017; Fagerstrøm et al., 2018; Luca, 2017). We suggest that an (excellent) star rating
functions as a positive cue for a host’s overall quality and hence increase expectations
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of economic value. Formally:
H2 (The Reliability Hypothesis): The availability of an excellent star rating has a
positive e↵ect on consumers’ economic value expectations.
Influence of Text Reviews on Expected Social and Economic Value
Unlike self-descriptions, text reviews are authored by other users, thus stem from an
exogenous source. Yet, they can contain personal information about the described host.
On Airbnb, close to 80% of all text reviews refer directly to the reviewed host by ex-
plicitly naming them (Alsudais, 2017). Similar to star ratings, text reviews represent a
track record of consumers’ experiences with a certain host. Cui, Lui, and Guo (2012,
p. 45) outline that “positive reviews by other consumers are indicative of a product’s
quality and reputation.” For co-usage sharing platforms, text-based evaluations of user
experience hence represent an influential cue (e.g., Cheng et al., 2019; Heejeong, 2019;
Zhu, Lin, and Cheng, 2019). This applies particularly to hospitality, where consumers
prefer (personal) peer assessments over information provided by (professional) travel
agencies (Chen, 2008; Gretzel and Yoo, 2008). Apart from the personal information as-
pects provided by text reviews, they can also reduce consumers’ risk perceptions (Liang,
Choi, and Joppe, 2018a). Hence, they are likely to play a role also for the formation of
expectations on economic value with a particular host (Bae et al., 2017). Yet, not every
listing exhibits a text review (Cox, 2019; Ke, 2017b). Consequently, the mere presence
of one or more reviews is a potential feature of distinction. In this regard, Abramova,
Krasnova, and Tan (2017) find that consumers are willing to pay more for positively
reviewed o↵ers. Given this dual role of text reviews, we hypothesize:
H3 (The Two-Birds-One-Stone Hypothesis): The availability of a positive text
review has positive e↵ects on a) social and b) economic value expectations.
3.1.4 Research Methodology
To evaluate the proposed model, we conduct a scenario-based online experiment in
which participants take the role of prospective consumers on a P2P accommodation
sharing platform, considering to book with a specific host. Using experimental treatment
manipulation, this allows us to maintain a high level of control over the exogenous
variables.
Treatment Design and Stimulus Material
We use a 2 (self-description: yes, no) ⇥ 2 (star rating: yes, no) ⇥ 2 (test review:
yes, no) full factorial treatment design. By doing so, we contrast all 23 = 8 possible
treatment combinations against each other. Each participant is exposed to exactly one
of these conditions (between-subjects design). An exemplary sketch of the host’s UR is
provided in Figure 3.4.
Self-Description: Participants either see no self-description (50% of all cases) or a
brief description of the host. Therefore, we employ four prevalent categories referred
to by platform users within their profiles. Following the results of Ma et al. (2017),





Figure 3.4: Exemplary screenshot of stimulus material with highlighted treatment vari-
ables (H1: self-description, H2: star rating, H3: text review).
Tussyadiah (2016b), and Zhang, Yan, and Zhang (2018), our categories encompass the
topics occupation, interests, activities, and hobbies. The self-descriptions shown to each
participant were randomly compiled from the predefined sets of categories and features
shown in Table 3.1.

















as a physiotherapist. crime fiction. swimming gardening
as a teacher. biographies. running visual design
as a medical doctor. modern history. bicycling board games
as a historian. architecture. playing soccer modern art
in marketing. photography. hiking movies
as a biologist. theatre. playing volleyball textile design
Note: Any of the resulting 64 = 1,296 combinations was selected with equal probability.
Star rating : Participants either see no star rating at all (50% of all cases) or one
out of the two (positive) rating conditions of 4.5 or 5.0 stars (25% each). In doing
so, our treatment design captures the skewed distribution of star ratings on actual P2P
platforms such as Airbnb where more than half of the listings (54.6%) have not received
a star rating yet and 40.6% either have 4.5 or 5 stars (e.g., Hesse et al., 2020; Ke,
2017b; Zervas, Proserpio, and Byers, 2015).
Text review : Participants either see no text review (50% of all cases) or a positive
text review. The structure and tonality of each review is based on actual Airbnb reviews
(e.g., Bridges and Vásquez, 2018; Hesse et al., 2020; Ke, 2017b). Specifically, this
includes a general statement, a comment on the host, information on the property and
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its surroundings, as well as a conclusion. For each of these four categories, we randomly
select one out of five possible characteristics from the predefined sets shown in Table
3.2.
Table 3.2: Construction set for text review stimulus.
General Host House/property/surroundings Conclusion
Wonderful place to
spend a long weekend.
[Name] is a very welcoming
host and truly made us feel at home.
The house has everything you




Our stay at [Name]’s
home was simply amazing!
[Name] is absolutely lovely and
will spare no e↵ort to make you
feel welcome.
Really gorgeous location, situated
in a beautiful part of town.
Definitely worth
booking!
We really loved our
stay at [Name]’s house.
Very comfortable place and
[Name] gave us some really
helpful recommendations and is
such a lovely host!
The house is even more beautiful
in real life – simply perfect!
By far our favorite Airbnb
that we have ever stayed at!
Our stay at [Name]’s
house was simply amazing.
[Name] was really welcoming and helpful.
[He/she] provided detailed recommendations
for us for our weekend and even made us
some fresh snacks!
The place was simply gorgeous,
and it was perfect to explore the




couldn’t have been better.
A fantastic place to stay. [Name] truly is a
very generous and kind host who will spare
no e↵ort to make you feel at home.
Beautifully decorated place and
a great vibe!
We would stay here
again in a heartbeat!
Note: Any of the 54 = 625 combinations was selected with equal probability.
Overall, we seek to display as little information as possible to avoid confounding
e↵ects. In particular, this includes the profile images (Karimi and Wang, 2017), for
which we use blurred pictures. Host and reviewer names are picked randomly from a
set of common first names (see Teubner and Flath, 2019 for a similar approach). As
a control variable and to allow for an assessment of the monetary equivalents of the
investigated artifacts, one of four prices is displayed ($108, $187, $216, and $374).
These values are derived from the price distribution for a typical booking (private room,
two nights, including cleaning fee), as reported in prior literature (Teubner, Hawlitschek,
and Dann, 2017). Accommodation properties such as amenities, exact location, and
cancellation policies are not displayed.
Measures
Whenever possible, we adapted previously validated scales for the context of this study.
All items are measured on 7-point Likert scales. In addition to the constructs directly
related to the research model, we collect demographic and trait information as control
variables, including age, gender, experience with P2P accommodation sharing platforms,
and individual risk propensity. All measurement instruments and sources are provided in
Appendix B.2.
Procedure and Sample
We recruited subjects from 1) a student subject pool at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
and 2) Prolific.ac. Participants took a median time of 6.42 minutes to complete the
experiment and received an average compensation of e 12.34 per hour. Overall, 625
participants started the experiment. From these, 486 completed the experiment and
passed attention checks (239 male, 247 female). Table 3.3 summarizes the sample
characteristics. We determined the required sample size using G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al.,
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2007). Allowing for a detection of e↵ect sizes d=.20 (alpha=.05) with a power of 1 –
beta=.90, the indicated required sample size is 472.








Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Female
(0: male, 1: female)
.508 .353 .650
Age (18 – 73) 30.6 10.2 24.7 2.65 36.0 11.4
Risk propensity
(0 – 10)
4.85 2.04 5.04 1.94 4.67 2.12
Experience (0: never,
1: at least sometimes)
.529 .647 .421
Note: SD = standard deviation.
3.1.5 Results
A 2 ⇥ 2 ⇥ 2 ANOVA reveals significant e↵ects of all treatment variables on booking
intention (Table 3.4). Controlling for second- and third-order interactions yields no
significant e↵ects. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test confirm significant
di↵erences for all three artifacts (all p-values < .01). Figure 3.5 and depicts the main
e↵ects of the three treatment variable groups on booking intention.
Table 3.4: Main E↵ects of Self-Descriptions, Text Reviews, and Star Ratings on Con-
sumer’s Intention to Book.
Artifact
ANOVA Artifact not displayed Artifact displayed
F-score p Mean SD 95% CI Mean SD 95% CI
Self-Description F(1,482) = 8.78 .003 4.14 1.56 [3.85, 4.43] 4.50 1.49 [4.23, 4.77]
Text Review F(1,482) = 12.7 .001 4.11 1.58 [3.82, 4.40] 4.52 1.51 [4.25, 4.79]
Star Rating F(1,482) = 9.44 .002 4.02 1.56 [3.74, 4.30] 4.63 1.49 [4.36, 4.90]
Note: SD = standard deviation.
Measurement Model
Next, we evaluate our research model using partial least squares structural equation
modeling (PLS-SEM) with SmartPLS 3.0 (Ringle, Wende, and Becker, 2019). We chose
PLS-SEM because of (1) its broad scope and flexibility regarding theory and practice
(Richter et al., 2016) and (2) its flexibility in handling binary variables (Hair et al., 2016).
The sample size satisfies the guidelines by Hair et al. (2016). Power analysis shows that
the sample size is adequate to detect small-sized e↵ects with a power of .80 and alpha
of .01 (Cohen, 1992).
Table 3.5 summarizes construct descriptives, reliability measures, and correlations.
Regarding reliability, all constructs exceed the common thresholds of .70 for Cronbach’s





Figure 3.5: Main treatment e↵ects on Intention to Book (ITB), left: by the 23=8
treatment conditions (ordered by ITB), right: aggregated by the 3 UR artifacts. Error
bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Alpha and composite reliability (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988). For convergent validity, all values
of Average Variance Extracted (AVE) exceeded the threshold of .50. For discriminant
validity, all square roots of AVE were larger than any correlation between that construct
and any other construct (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). Further, discriminant validity is
verified by the fact that all item loadings on their respective constructs are larger than
on other constructs (Gefen, Straub, and Boudreau, 2000) and a heterotrait-monotrait
(HTMT) ratio less than the .90 threshold for all constructs (Henseler, Ringle, and
Sarstedt, 2015). Item reliability is verified by checking for indicator loadings larger than
.70 (Chin, 1998).
Table 3.5: Construct descriptives, reliability measures, and construct correlations (square







Mean SD ITB ESV EEV
ITB 4.55 1.63 .923 .876 .800 .408 .895 .618 .604
ESV 4.67 1.20 .893 .821 .737 .071 .858 .429
EEV 3.86 1.67 .962 .947 .863 .303 .929
Note: AVE: Average Variance Explained; SD = Standard Deviation
Structural Model and Hypotheses Testing
We evaluate the model using bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrapping with 5,000
resamples (no sign changes, two-tailed testing). Table 3.6 shows the path coe cients
and e↵ect sizes. All hypotheses are supported, explaining 54.6% of the variance in
consumers’ booking intentions. All UR artifact e↵ects (H1: self-description, H2: star
rating, H3a/b: text review) are fully mediated via expected social or economic value,
and the model remains stable in a saturated form (Gefen, Straub, and Rigdon, 2011;
Appendix B.3). While the e↵ects between the endogenous survey constructs exhibit
medium e↵ect sizes, the exogenous relations between the binary UR artifact variables
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and survey constructs are rather small. Due to the recent controversy around PLS-SEM,
we corroborate our analysis using covariance-based modeling (CB-SEM). This analysis
does not reveal any path di↵erences in terms of sign, magnitude, or significance (i.e., all
paths remain significant).









ESV → ITB .420 .001 .310 Medium
EEV → ITB .424 .001 .322 Medium
H1 Self-Description → ESV .169 .001 .032 Small
H2 Star Rating → EEV .126 .001 .025 Small
H3a Text Review → ESV .203 .001 .046 Small
H3b Text Review → EEV .129 .001 .026 Small
Control variables
Participant’s age → EEV .122 .002 .020 Small
Participant’s experience → ITB .177 .001 .030 Small
Participant’s risk propensity → ESV .170 .001 .032 Small
Participant’s risk propensity → ITB .086 .004 .016 Small
Price → EEV -.536 .001 .389 Large
Price → ESV -.121 .007 .016 Small
Note: ITB: Intention to Book; ESV: Expected Social Value; EEV: Expected Economic Value
Control Variable Analysis
Next, we consider the impact of secondary variables on the model’s constructs and rela-
tions, including participants’ age, gender, experience with P2P accommodation sharing,
risk propensity, perceived similarity with the host, and listing price. This control vari-
able analysis yields the following insights. First, higher age is associated with higher
expected economic value (  = .122, p = .002). Second, participants’ experience (as
a P2P accommodation consumer) represents a driver of booking intentions (  = .117,
p < .001). Third, higher risk propensity positively a↵ects expected social value (  =
.170, p = .001) and booking intention (  = .086, p = .004). Finally, both expected
economic and social value are negatively a↵ected by the listing’s price ( EEV = -.536,
p < .001;  ESV = -.121, p = .007). Table 3.6 summarizes these findings. Importantly,
all hypothesized main e↵ects (H1 to H3) remain una↵ected in terms of magnitude, sign,
and significance when adding/removing control variables.
Monetary Equivalents
Based on the four price levels used in the stimulus material ($108, $187, $216, $374), we
can now calculate the monetary equivalents of displaying a specific UR artifact. Specif-
ically, when averaging out all other factors, we find that a price increase of $10 yields a
decrease in booking intentions of about .03 units on the 1-7 Likert scale. Based on the
average di↵erences in booking intentions induced by the three investigated UR artifacts,
we can now provide rough estimations of monetary equivalents for self-descriptions ( 
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= .40, $133), star ratings (  = .38, $126), and text reviews (  = .46, $153). While
the exact values must be interpreted with caution, it becomes evident that artifact
availability is associated with significant commercial value for hosts.
Multi-Group Analysis
Assessing the reliability of our results, a multi-group analysis (MGA) considering gender,
age, risk propensity, and experience with accommodation sharing yields three significant
path di↵erences (Table 3.7). First, the positive relation between expected social value
and booking intentions is significantly stronger for female than for male participants ( 
= .274). In contrast, the e↵ect of expected economic value on intention to book is
larger for male than for female participants (  = .196). Moreover, we find that the
younger half of participants ascribe more weight to star ratings in view of economic
value expectations than the more senior half (  = .156). Finally, we did not observe
any systematic impact of experience or risk propensity on the relations expressed in the
model.












ESV → ITB .420 .001 .301 .575 .274 .999 .403 .445 .043 .697
EEV → ITB .424 .001 .516 .320 .196 .005 .441 .428 .002 .495
H1 SLFD → ESV .169 .001 .175 .149 .025 .388 .187 .210 .061 .247
H2 STRR → EEV .126 .001 .066 .151 .086 .834 .208 .052 .156 .038
H3a TXTR → ESV .203 .001 .163 .234 .072 .798 .204 .170 .001 .494
H3b TXTR → EEV .129 .001 .099 .146 .047 .696 .135 .167 .011 .450
Note: p-values indicate significance of di↵erences, values above 0.95 also indicate statistical significance.
3.1.6 Discussion and Conclusion
Theoretical Implications
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that systematically accounts for con-
sumer perception of di↵erent UR artifacts with personal and/or exogenous information,
and the social and economic value expectations that arise therefrom. While previous
research has either considered general drivers of engaging in sharing transactions (e.g.,
Barnes and Mattsson, 2017; Hawlitschek, Teubner, and Gimpel, 2018; Lee and Kim,
2018) or tested specific UR artifacts (e.g., Qiu and Abrahao, 2018; Tussyadiah and
Park, 2018; Zloteanu et al., 2018), our study conflates both perspectives. We show
that booking intentions are a↵ected by social and economic value to about equal ex-
tents and that these expectations, in turn, depend on the availability of UR artifacts. In
comparison to prior research, we find rather large e↵ect sizes for the relations between
the social/ economic value motives and booking intentions (Figure 3.6). This duality
of motives emphasizes that it may not be su cient to consider one of the motives in
isolation while neglecting the other. This extends and partly challenges prior findings,
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typically reporting a predominant role of economic factors while social motives are fre-
quently found to be insignificant (e.g., Lutz et al., 2018; Oyedele and Simpson, 2018;
So, Oh, and Min, 2018) (see also Table B.2 in the Appendix).
Figure 3.6: Path coe cients of the social (left) and economic (right) value motives in
related work. Studies sorted by path coe cient. Error bars indicate 95% confidence
intervals. Positive coe cients in green, negative coe cients in red, non-significant
coe cients semi-transparent. Coe cients of our study are indicated in black.
Note: If neither standard errors nor t-values were provided in the publication, we used upper
bound approximations based on the information on significance. For some studies, we received
this data from the respective study’s authors via email, which is gratefully acknowledged.
Several theoretical contributions arise from our study. First, we determine the role of
three common UR artifacts within online booking processes and link their informational
properties to consumer motives to engage in co-usage sharing. In doing so, we stress the
instrumental role of platforms in designing and maintaining (trust-) supporting environ-
ments (Kim, Yoon, and Zo, 2015). While self-descriptions serve as a cue for personal
information and engender expectations about the social value of a transaction (i.e., the
sociability hypothesis), star ratings provide exogenous information that allows to form
expectations about economic value (i.e., the reliability hypothesis). Importantly, these
two artifacts function either via social or economic value exclusively, whereas text reviews
conflate both informational properties (personal and exogenous) and, consequently, exert
significant e↵ects via both motives (i.e., the two-birds-one-stone hypothesis). Notewor-
thy, emphasizing the importance of this artifact, the individual e↵ects on social and
economic value expectations are also strongest for text reviews.
Second, our results expand on previous findings on text reviews from a strictly eco-
nomic perspective (Abramova, Krasnova, and Tan, 2017), as we also uncover a marked
social value dimension. Unlike other UR artifacts in most profiles (e.g., profile pictures),
the presence of a positive text review represents an explicit sign of quality. In contrast to
product reviews on e-commerce platforms such as Amazon, text reviews on P2P sharing
platforms can be assumed to stem from actual transactions.
Naturally, given the personal nature of co-usage accommodation sharing, our findings
highlight that the type of transactions needs to be considered carefully. Other modes
of P2P sharing exhibit much lower levels of personalness, temporal extent, and physical
closeness. Importantly, even accommodation sharing itself needs to be di↵erentiated in
this regard. While approximately 30 percent of all hosts o↵er shared apartments, many
others o↵er entire homes with very limited potential for interaction (Ke, 2017b). In this
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regard, Tussyadiah (2016b) reports the social motive to be contingent on the co-usage
property.
Last, our results provide insights into consumer-specific di↵erences in the weighting
of social and economic value. For instance, male participants weight economic value
more strongly than social value. This resonates with the tenets of Social Role Theory,
suggesting women to have a stronger focus on establishing bonds while interacting with
others as compared to men (Kimbrough et al., 2013). Also, we find that the influence of
non-personal artifacts (i.e., star ratings) on expected economic value is predominantly
driven by younger participants.
Practical Implications
Our study provides practical implications for platform operators and users alike. Against
the backdrop that social and economic value exhibit about equal impact on booking
intentions, platform operators may want to rethink how to balance their marketing
in this regard. Many platforms emphasize the social aspects involved in co-usage so
predominantly that basic economic benefits, for instance, compared to hotels, may no
longer become evident. Also, female consumers put a stronger emphasis on social value
than male consumers, while the reverse pattern can be observed for economic value.
Platform operators may build on this and adjust the emphasis on each motive by taking
into account consumers’ gender.
Furthermore, platforms may consider the potential of matching users based on “so-
cial” criteria. This may, for instance, include the ability to search for hosts with spe-
cific professions, interests, language skills, or hobbies. Nevertheless, platform operators
should be highly aware of potential issues associated with such as social discrimination
and harassment (e.g., Dann, Teubner, and Weinhardt, 2019; Edelman and Luca, 2014;
Toto, 2017). Hence, promoting social aspects of transactions needs to go hand in hand
with (1) communicating and fostering a culture of inclusion and tolerance and (2) an
appropriate design of UR artifacts.
Given the power of text reviews, platforms should urge users to follow up on each
transaction by writing a review. To support this, the platform may provide building
blocks with prefabricated text modules. However, while this may increase the frequency
of reviews, it may have unintended side e↵ects such as reduced credibility, repetitive
wording and low verbal diversity (Aerts, Smits, and Verlegh, 2017), and hence limited
possibilities of expressing acknowledgment, appreciation, critique, or commendation. It
may also be an option for platforms to require consumers to write a review before they
can issue further booking requests.
Limitations and Future Work
Like any study, the present paper has limitations. First, consumers’ actual decisions
in P2P accommodation sharing may vary from what they state within a hypothetical
scenario. Field experiments should complement our approach (external validity). Despite
this, we believe that our stimulus material induces the scenario quite realistically, where
structure and visuals are guided by the “look and feel” of popular accommodation sharing
platforms. Thereby, we also account for potential influences on the perceived quality of
information caused by the mere aesthetics of the presentation (Xu and Schrier, 2019).
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Note that our treatment design includes only a selection of all artifacts being used by
platforms. While we consider the most common artifacts, other artifacts are of similar
interest, for instance, profile images. However, profile images often involve issues of
discrimination and e↵ects due to specific photos, thus rendering statements on general
e↵ects of the artifact less reliable (Edelman, Luca, and Svirsky, 2017; Fagerstrøm et al.,
2017).
Furthermore, our design focuses on positive text reviews. Bridges and Vásquez
(2018) show that consumers communicate less-than-positive experiences by using subtle
cues, for instance, by not mentioning or saying something. Being able to read between
the lines is probably an essential skill for interpreting text reviews. Additionally, the
availability of multiple (potentially contradictory) reviews (Maslowska, Malthouse, and
Viswanathan, 2017; Park and Kim, 2008) and individual review’s helpfulness (Korfiatis,
Garćıa-Bariocanal, and Sánchez-Alonso, 2012) requires further exploration.
In terms of sample, it needs to be acknowledged that about 47% of the respon-
dents did not have practical experience with P2P accommodation sharing. However,
the results of the MGA indicate that whether or not a participant had experience with
P2P accommodation sharing did not significantly a↵ect any of the paths in our research
model. In other words, the practical implications drawn from our study are not partic-
ularly dependent on the di↵erentiation between active versus potential users. Last, we
acknowledge that the explained variance of ESV is rather low (10.6%), meaning that
there must exist further influences on this variable.
Given the attempt of major platforms to broaden their business beyond accommoda-
tion (e.g., guided tours provided by locals; Airbnb, 2016b; Airbnb, 2016a), the notion of
social and economic value will undoubtedly remain of interest. Obviously, staying under
the same roof for a weekend or longer reaches deep into the involved persons’ spheres
of privacy (Teubner and Flath, 2019). Examining whether and under which boundary
conditions the present findings apply to consumer behavior in other domains represents
a natural next step for future research.
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3.2 On the dynamics of cognitive and a↵ective trust
cues: Behavioral evidence from a two-sided plat-
form experiment
After understanding how UR is connected to users’ intentions to enter transactions on
P2P platforms, the next chapter focuses on behavior within transactions. Therefore,
the following study reports on a laboratory experiment examining the influence of cog-
nitive and a↵ective trust cues within the UR on trusting behavior. Current research
widely accepts that the trust-building capacity of trust cues are relatively stable. The
experimental study sheds light on the interplay of cognitive and a↵ective trust cues on
trusting behavior across multiple transactions. Drawing on the Elaboration Likelihood
Model (ELM), the results show that assumptions about stability only applies to cognitive
trust cues, associated with the central route of information processing. The e↵ect of
the a↵ective trust cues, associated with the peripheral route of information processing,
is found to be time-dependent, as their e↵ect on trusting behavior follows an inverted
u-shape. The findings indicate that cognitive and a↵ective trust cues are complementary
over time.
David Dann, Timm Teubner, Mareike Möhlmann, Florian Hawlitschek & Marc T. P.
Adam3
3.2.1 Introduction
Peer-to-peer sharing platforms represent one of the most successful and fastest-growing
business models in today’s e-commerce landscape (Mittendorf, Berente, and Holten,
2019; Sundararajan, 2016; Zimmermann et al., 2018). For example, the accommodation
sharing platform Airbnb was only founded in 2008 but reported 2 million daily users by
early 2020, being valued at approximately 30 billion USD.4 Creating and maintaining
mechanisms for building trust among users is one of, if not the most crucial endeavor
for platform operators (Hawlitschek et al., 2016b; Hawlitschek et al., 2016a; Mittendorf,
Berente, and Holten, 2019). Previous research established that peer-to-peer sharing
platforms leverage trust between strangers by implementing a range of trust cues, which
we define as “information (. . . ) [that] can help build trust” (Nicolaou and McKnight,
2006, p.332). The literature refers to two di↵erent types of trust cues—cognitive and
a↵ective. First, cognitive trust cues (e.g., Gefen and Straub, 2003; Lee, Lee, and
Tan, 2015; McAllister, 1995) facilitate instigating deliberate processes of calculative
reasoning. Transaction-based rating scores represent the most widely-employed example
for cognitive trust cues (e.g., Bolton, Loebbecke, and Ockenfels, 2008; Burtch, Ghose,
and Wattal, 2014; Gefen and Pavlou, 2012). Second, a↵ective trust cues engender
trust through emotions by conveying information that is understood without careful
consideration (Komiak and Benbasat, 2006; Stewart and Gosain, 2006). The most
3By this thesis’s submission date, this study was in the second round of revision at the Journal of
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apparent and widely-used example of an a↵ective trust cue in online settings are profile
photos (Ert, Fleischer, and Magen, 2016; Riedl et al., 2014). While the general trust-
building capacity of both cue types is well-established in the literature, less is known
about their dynamic interplay. Especially nascent platforms strongly rely on building
trust early on—while at the same time struggling with a need for quick success in
reaching a critical mass of transactions (Hodapp, Hawlitschek, and Kramer, 2019). As
a result, it is of utmost importance to understand the predictive power of cognitive and
a↵ective cues for trust at di↵erent stages of platform evolution.
Previous research widely accepts that the e↵ects of trust cues on trust are relatively
stable. Once the predictive power of a specific trust cue is (empirically) confirmed, it is
assumed to have similar e↵ects on trust across several interactions. To this end, McK-
night and colleagues, for instance, have theorized that certain trust cues may indicate
stability through structural assurances and situational normality (McKnight, Choudhury,
and Kacmar, 2002; Mcknight, Cummings, and Chervany, 1998). Mirroring such assump-
tions, previous research has shown that the e↵ects of rating scores are relatively stable
in the sense that their trust-building capacity is increasing steadily with quality (i.e.,
better average scores) and quantity (i.e., a larger number of underlying scores) (Cabral
and Hortaçsu, 2010).
However, these widely accepted assumptions are challenged by the Elaboration Like-
lihood Model (ELM) on information processing (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, Ca-
cioppo, and Schumann, 1983) once applied to the context of trust research. Petty and
colleagues distinguish two di↵erent routes of information processing—the central and
the peripheral route. The central route refers to changes in attitudes resulting from
an individual’s cognitive considerations of the information’s actual quality, such as a
careful calculation of advantages and disadvantages (e.g., Bhattacherjee and Sanford,
2006; Chang, Lu, and Lin, 2020; Cyr et al., 2018). Second, the peripheral route is not
based on extensive contemplation about the issue at hand, but its mode of evaluation
relies on a↵ective conclusions drawn from intuitive impulses and impressions (Chang,
Lu, and Lin, 2020; Cyr et al., 2018). ELM researchers theorize that changes of at-
titudes associated with the peripheral route of information processing are temporary
(Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann, 1983), as they are less
stable over time (Bhattacherjee and Sanford, 2006). Surprisingly, previous research on
trust in sharing transactions has not addressed potential temporary perceptions about
a↵ective trust cues processed via the peripheral route yet. These seem to challenge well-
established assumptions made about rather stable (McKnight, Choudhury, and Kacmar,
2002; Mcknight, Cummings, and Chervany, 1998) or steadily increasing (Cabral and
Hortaçsu, 2010) e↵ects of trust cues on trust as communicated in existing research.
In order to explore the varying e↵ect of cues across di↵erent stages of platform evolu-
tion, we raise the following research question: How does the interplay of cognitive and
a↵ective trust cues a↵ect trusting behavior in sharing transactions over time?
To address this research question, we conduct a controlled laboratory experiment
that allows us to investigate actual trusting behavior over time, that is, across several
interactions with di↵erent counterparts. Previous research into cognitive and a↵ective
trust cues, for instance, on star ratings and reviews (e.g., Abrahao et al., 2017; Banerjee,
Bhattacharyya, and Bose, 2017; Cheng et al., 2019) and profile photos (e.g., Ert, Fleis-
cher, and Magen, 2016; Fagerstrøm et al., 2017) has commonly conceptualized trust
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through self-reported scales on (hypothetical) intentions (Hawlitschek, Notheisen, and
Teubner, 2018). While such approaches have undoubtedly informed our understanding of
trust in online platform ecosystems, they have neither considered the emergence across
several interactions nor how trust materializes in actual rather than intended behavior.
To capture actual trust behavior, we hence conduct a controlled laboratory experiment
in which participants interact within a peer-to-peer sharing platform environment.
In line with a large body of experimental research (e.g., Blue et al., 2020; Ewing,
Sutherland, and Willis, 2019; Gefen, Benbasat, and Pavlou, 2008, we operationalize
trust as the amount of money trustors transfer to trustees in an adapted version of Berg
et al.’s (1995) trust game. We extend the original trust game to a peer-to-peer sharing
platform context with multiple periods and endogenous matchmaking, where participants
either take the role of consumers or providers. Specifically, we employ a 2 (star ratings:
provided/not provided) ⇥ 2 (profile photos: provided/not provided) between-subjects
design. Further, given the focus of our study on peer-to-peer sharing platforms such
as Airbnb, our experimental design captures that (1) peer-to-peer matches occur as
the result of a free market-based requests-and-response process (endogenous matching),
unlike, for instance, on Uber, where the platform determines which driver is matched
with which passenger, and (2) exchanges are highly transactional for both sides, unlike,
for instance, on eBay, where buyer and seller never meet, and buyers do not face any
considerable economic or social exposure. An illustration of this delineation is provided
in Appendix C.8.
We contribute to trust research on peer-to-peer sharing platforms in multiple ways.
Our starting point is previous Information Systems (IS) research, which widely accepts
the e↵ects of trust cues as relatively stable (McKnight, Choudhury, and Kacmar, 2002;
Mcknight, Cummings, and Chervany, 1998) or steadily increasing with quality and quan-
tity (Cabral and Hortaçsu, 2010). We apply the ELM’s theoretical perspective on this
research, challenging this assumption in that it may only apply to cognitive trust cues
(associated with the central route) while a↵ective trust cues (associated with the pe-
ripheral route) may be temporary, and thus characterized by less stability (Bhattacherjee
and Sanford, 2006; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann, 1983).
To this end, our findings indicate that the trust-building capacity of the a↵ective trust
cue of profile photos is rather dynamic and follows an inverted u-shape form. Thus, we
contribute to research by deepening the understanding of the interplay of cognitive and
a↵ective trust cues as antecedents to trust across several peer-to-peer sharing trans-
actions over time. Our findings demonstrate that a↵ective trust cues associated with
the peripheral route may serve as a powerful complement in early stages of platform
evolution and may thus help to overcome the inherent “cold start problem” of platforms
in general and users thereon in particular (Wessel, Thies, and Benlian, 2017) as profile
photos enable a kick-start for trust even before users can establish a transaction-based
reputation.
3.2.2 Theoretical Background
Star Ratings as Cognitive Trust Cues
Cognitive trust cues instigate a process of calculative reasoning. Reputation systems are
a prime example of artifacts that provide cognitive trust cues (Chen et al., 2015; Mishra,
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Heide, and Cort, 1998). On peer-to-peer sharing platforms, users tend to interact with
transaction partners that they have never met or interacted with before (Teubner, 2018).
Thus, users cannot build a history of personal interaction or gain first-hand experience of
the other’s trustworthiness. Reputation systems help to overcome this gap by enabling
access to another user’s accumulated digital footprint and documented past behaviors
(Bolton, Greiner, and Ockenfels, 2013; Mazzella et al., 2016).5 This track record, in turn,
sets expectations and reduces uncertainty about future behavior, for instance, regarding
whether a product or service will be delivered as promised, or about an individual’s
behavior.
Star ratings are arguably the most widely-used type of reputation system (Abramova,
Krasnova, and Tan, 2017; Dann, Teubner, and Weinhardt, 2019) and are employed in
some form by most consumer platforms (Hesse et al., 2020; Schoenmüller, Netzer, and
Stahl, 2018). Star rating scores are inherently dynamic and evolve over time as they
represent the aggregation of feedback from continuous transactions with ever-varying
partners (Ba and Pavlou, 2002; Dellarocas, 2006; Rice, 2012). To avoid the risk of collu-
sion or retaliation, these systems commonly follow a simultaneous evaluation process, in
which ratings are only revealed after both parties have submitted their evaluations (Frad-
kin, Grewal, and Holtz, 2018). Consequently, a user’s average rating score serves as a
quantification of their trustworthiness based on their overall (past) behavior on the plat-
form. Indeed, positive ratings are a driver for demand (Abramova, Krasnova, and Tan,
2017; Ert, Fleischer, and Magen, 2016) and allow users to enforce higher prices (e.g.,
Gan and Wang, 2017; Gibbs et al., 2018a). Rice (2012) showed that, while the mere
existence of a numerical rating system encourages participants to engage in the market
at all, the specific information conveyed by the ratings facilitates actual transactions
among them. Furthermore, a su ciently high number of underlying ratings increases
the reliability of the rating score as it reduces the potential impact of fraudulent, shill,
or erroneous reviews (e.g., Rice, 2012; Tadelis, 2016). Numerical rating systems are
hence likely to become more reliable and functional for increasing numbers of completed
transactions. Considering the dynamics of peer feedback on eBay, Cabral and Hortaçsu
(2010) concluded that star ratings’ trust-building capacity depends on factors such as
the current rating score’s duration, its total number of underlying ratings, as well as the
frequency of new ratings. Consequently, accumulating a high number of (positive) eval-
uations constitutes a potent trust cue to the opposite market side and hence contributes
to facilitate transactions.
Profile Photos as A↵ective Trust Cues
A↵ective trust cues are processed without careful consideration. Trust as a whole is not
solely a calculative process but also involves emotions (Komiak and Benbasat, 2006).
Indeed, all social interactions inherently entail the sending and receiving of social cues
that allow prospective transaction partners to form trust (Komiak and Benbasat, 2006;
Stewart and Gosain, 2006). At the same time, human behavior is subject to emotional,
5Pioneered by eBay in the 1990s, reputation systems are primary trust formation tools in digital
environments (e.g., Gefen and Pavlou, 2012; Rice, 2012) and have been widely adopted on peer-to-peer
sharing platforms (Hesse et al., 2020). On peer-to-peer platforms, users can commonly only submit a
rating and/or a review after a completed transaction.
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spontaneous, and impulsive traits, rendering a↵ective trust cues pivotal for trust forma-
tion on peer-to-peer sharing platforms. Due to the human brain’s ability to intuitively
process human faces, profile photos are one of the most common a↵ective trust cues in
online settings (Kanwisher, McDermott, and Chun, 1997). In this regard, neuroscientists
identified the fusiform face area in the extrastriate cortex as being “selectively involved
in the perception of faces” (Kanwisher, McDermott, and Chun, 1997, p. 4302). This
general innate face orientation appears to be genetically coded into humans (Anzellotti
and Caramazza, 2014), as infants react to face patterns within the first minutes after
birth (Goren, Sarty, and Wu, 1975), and the process of detecting facial expressions is
an unconscious process in the magnitude of milliseconds (Willis and Todorov, 2006).
By disclosing a personal profile photo, users may provide clues regarding their gender,
ethnicity, approximate age, or lifestyle, that is to say, their social identity. Like other
social cues, human faces can foster trust (Cyr et al., 2018; Gefen, Karahanna, and
Straub, 2003; Gefen and Straub, 2004; Hassanein and Head, 2007; Ou, Pavlou, and
Davison, 2014). Specifically, the use and e↵ects of photos within online profiles represent
a strong trust-building cue that can enable e-commerce transactions (Qiu and Benbasat,
2010; Steinbrück et al., 2002) and positively a↵ects trusting behavior (Ert, Fleischer, and
Magen, 2016; Fagerstrøm et al., 2017). Steinbrück et al. (2002), for instance, showed
that embedding user photos on an e-vendor webpage’s positively influences consumer
perceptions about the e-vendor’s trustworthiness. Similarly, Teubner et al. (2013) showed
in a laboratory experiment that photos foster resource sharing in gift-giving networks.
It is not surprising that most platforms o↵er customizable profiles, and the majority
(if not all) users make use of profile photos (Ert, Fleischer, and Magen, 2016; Fagerstrøm
et al., 2017; Hesse et al., 2020; Teubner et al., 2014). In fact, many platform operators
actively encourage their users to upload a profile photo when setting up their account.
The ride sharing platform BlaBlaCar even provides a search option allowing users to filter
rides based on the condition that the driver has uploaded a profile photo (BlaBlaCar,
2018) and states that on average, users with a profile photo are contacted three times
more often than those without a profile photo.
Experimental Studies
However, only few experimental studies have considered the e↵ect of cognitive and
a↵ective trust cues on trusting behavior—typically operationalized by variations of the
seminal trust game (e.g., Bente et al., 2014b; Qiu and Abrahao, 2018). Furthermore,
our literature review (Table 3.8) reveals certain limitations of previous research, as it
(1) either captures a↵ective or cognitive cues, but not their interplay (e.g., Ewing,
Sutherland, and Willis, 2019; Kas, Corten, and Rijt, 2020), (2) only considers one side
of the trust game without allowing for actual two-way interactions (e.g., Dai et al.,
2018), (3) comprises only one single period of transactions (e.g., Barbosa et al., 2020;
Qiu and Abrahao, 2018), or (4) matches transaction partners exogenously instead of
endogenously (e.g., Bolton, Katok, and Ockenfels, 2004a; Ignat, Dang, and Shalin,
2019).
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Elaboration Likelihood Model
The ELM, introduced by Petty and Cacioppo (1981), is a general theory of attitude
change that provides a framework for understanding persuasive communication. The
model describes the processing of informational stimuli through two routes, the central
and the peripheral route. Information that is processed via the central route is mainly
evaluated with regard to aspects that involve more thorough cognitive processing, in-
cluding the actual underlying arguments, quality, and the potential resulting merits. The
influence of information processed via the central route on attitude changes is consid-
ered to be persistent and resistant, rendering the central route decisive in its influence on
trust-building. In contrast, information that is processed via the peripheral route is eval-
uated a↵ectively and heuristically. Attractions, impulses, and triggers become dominant
factors. Those include, for instance, the visual appeal of the provided information or
the presumed competence of the person associated with it (Chang, Yu, and Lu, 2015).
Peripherally processed information is considered to be rather weak and unsustainable
in its influence on attitude change. However, even though information processed via
the central route is considered to be more influential (Chang, Lu, and Lin, 2020; Petty,
Barden, J., 2009), information processed via the peripheral route also a↵ects consumer
behavior (Chen, Kim, and Lin, 2015; Greiner and Wang, 2010).
Emerging from social psychology, ELM found several applications in marketing-
related domains (e.g., Chang and Thorson, 2004; Kim, Kim, and Park, 2010). IS
literature considered ELM for the evaluation of expert systems (Dijkstra, 1999; Mak,
Schmitt, and Lyytinen, 1997), online shopping (Chang, Lu, and Lin, 2020; Zhou, Lu,
and Wang, 2016), privacy concerns (Angst and Agarwal, 2009), technology acceptance
(Bhattacherjee and Sanford, 2006; Li, 2013), and web personalization (Ho and Bodo↵,
2014; Tam and Ho, 2006). ELM is particularly well-suited to study the e↵ects of trust
cues because it is able to di↵erentiate the influence of di↵erent cue types on attitude
change and behavior. In contrast to other theoretical models, such as Mcknight, Cum-
mings, and Chervany (1998) or Signaling Theory (Spence, 1973), ELM is not limited to
static trust relationships at a fixed point in time but provides a theoretical framework
to understand dynamic e↵ects of these trust cues. Building on ELM, we can identify
cognitive and a↵ective trust cues to information that is processed via the central or the
peripheral route. We provide definitions of relevant terms in Table 3.9.
Table 3.9: Definitions of relevant terms
Term Definition
Trust Cue Information that helps to build trust in another person.
Cognitive Trust Cue
Trust information that is processed involving some degree of calculative reasoning
(e.g., star ratings). According to ELM, cognitive trust cues are processed via the
central route.
A↵ective Trust Cue
Trust information that is processed a↵ectively and, most likely, without careful
consideration (e.g., profile photos). According to ELM, a↵ective trust cues are
processed via the peripheral route.
Central Route
Mode of evaluation relies on thorough consideration and cognitive evaluation of the
information’s actual quality. Resulting attitude change is stable.
Peripheral Route
Mode of evaluation relies on a↵ective conclusions drawn from intuitive impulses and
impressions. Resulting attitude change is instable.
First, the persuasiveness of information processed via the central route inevitably
hinges on the reliability-determining quality of the information itself (Bhattacherjee and
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Sanford, 2006; Li, 2013; Zhou, Lu, and Wang, 2016). In turn, this quality is directly
dependent on the information’s completeness and accuracy (Chang, Lu, and Lin, 2020).
Cognitive trust cues, such as star ratings, fulfill all typical characteristics of centrally
processed information. They require a certain amount of deliberation on the assessment
of the actual argument quality, and their persuasiveness gains in completeness and ac-
curacy as the number of underlying transactions increases. For instance, a star rating
of 5 (out of 5) stars from one single assessment is undoubtedly less complete, accurate,
and reliable than an average star rating score of 4.5 stemming from ten assessments.
Within the tenets of ELM, star ratings as a cognitive trust cue should be processed via
the central route.
Second, information typically processed through the peripheral route relates to “non-
informational aspects” (Alpert, Alpert, and Maltz, 2005) such as meta-information and
less to actual argument quality (Bhattacherjee and Sanford, 2006). Meta-information
includes, for instance, the mere aesthetics of how the information is presented (Chang,
Yu, and Lu, 2015) or triggers of simple a↵ective states (Alpert, Alpert, and Maltz, 2005).
A↵ective trust cues, such as profile photos, fulfill the typical characteristics of periph-
erally processed information. Commonly, they provide additional (meta)-information,
which can be processed without thoughtful consideration (e.g., background information
on the associated person). Besides, they can contribute to the information’s visual ap-
peal and a↵ective impact—for instance, by being perceived as vivid and aesthetic (Cyr
et al., 2009; Hassanein and Head, 2007). Thereby, the ELM suggests that profile photos
as a↵ective trust cues should be processed via the peripheral route.
3.2.3 Hypotheses Development
The Influence of Star Ratings on Trusting Behavior (H1a, H1b)
Star rating systems are widely-used to establish trust across various contexts (Dellaro-
cas, 2003). Building on the ELM, we argue that star ratings contribute to building trust
as cognitive cues via the central route. While the general e↵ectiveness of star ratings
is well-established, the theoretical lens of ELM allows to investigate their influence over
time (Kitchen et al., 2014). In this sense, star ratings represent a type of persuasive
message that is of high personal relevance for a decision-maker in a peer-to-peer sharing
context. In absence of strong distractions, processing a message’s content via the central
route of persuasion is likely and will lead to behavioral change—in this case, in trusting
behavior (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). Extant literature suggests that a cue’s strength
impacts persuasion outcomes (e.g., trust; Kim and Benbasat, 2009). Updating a star
rating periodically (through additional transactions) not only improves it continuously
in terms of reliability by reducing the potential impact of fraudulent, shill, or erroneous
reviews (e.g., Rice, 2012; Tadelis, 2016) but also in terms of completeness and accuracy.
Thus, we expect that the influence of continuously updated star ratings will result in an
increasing e↵ect on trusting behavior over time. In line with previous research, we expect
the increasing e↵ect to be stable over time since attitudes that result from central route
processing tend to be marked and persistent (Bhattacherjee and Sanford, 2006; Petty,
Barden, J., 2009).
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H1a: The availability of star ratings as a cognitive trust cue has a positive e↵ect on
trusting behavior in peer-to-peer sharing transactions.
H1b: The e↵ect of star ratings on trusting behavior in peer-to-peer sharing transactions
increases over time.
The Influence of Profile Photos on Trusting Behavior (H2a, H2b)
The e↵ects of human images and profile photos on trust have been confirmed in various
contextual settings, including many sharing economy platforms (Cyr et al., 2009; Ert,
Fleischer, and Magen, 2016). Within IS literature, the positive e↵ect of profile pho-
tos on trust is commonly explained by Social Presence Theory, that is, the idea that
specific forms of interaction require a “fitting” medium that allows the provision of nec-
essary information, such as the extent of users being psychologically present (Cyr et al.,
2009). More recent studies link the concept of perceived social presence to ELM (Cyr
et al., 2018). The central argument in conflating Social Presence Theory with ELM is
that human photos can induce perceptions of “exuding warmth,” which, in turn, cause
increased issue involvement (i.e., an individual’s motivation) in processing via the pe-
ripheral route and thus result in attitude changes. In the context of their experimental
setup, however, Cyr et al. (2018), somewhat surprisingly, find no empirical evidence for
the e↵ect of perceived social presence on issue involvement. The authors argued that
the specific context was not suited to induce feelings of warmth and sociability and,
thus, recommend to investigate the positive e↵ect of social presence conveyed through
photos through the lens of ELM in further contexts.
As the context of peer-to-peer sharing puts a particular focus on the perception of
profile photos, we argue that the processing of these a↵ective cues will—other than in
the study setup of Cyr et al. (2018)—lead to an e↵ect on trusting behavior. We expect
that the profile photos will be processed as a↵ective trust cues through the periph-
eral route, yielding a peripheral attitude change and, thereby, increase trusting behavior.
Since profile photos convey no persuasive argument per se, they rather trigger “relatively
primitive a↵ective states” (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986, p.134) such as the perception of
social presence. The triggered state becomes associated with the subjects’ attitude and
thus results in a positive e↵ect on trusting behavior. However, we expect the e↵ect to
decrease over time for mainly two reasons. First, attitudes formed through the periph-
eral route tend to be “weak” and prone to decay over time (Bhattacherjee and Sanford,
2006; Petty, Barden, J., 2009). Since—in contrast to star ratings—the informational
value of profile photos does not change over time, their impact can be expected to
decay. Second, attitudes that are formed via the peripheral route are less resistant to
counterarguments (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). A strong counterargument to a weak
positive attitude towards trusting behavior is the actual experience of exploitation (i.e.,
untrustworthy behavior). While, in general, negative experiences are rare on established
peer-to-peer sharing platforms (Zervas, Proserpio, and Byers, 2015), the likelihood of
exposure increases with the overall number of transactions over time. The low resistance
of the positive attitude formed through the mere peripheral processing of profile photos
will thus result in a decreasing e↵ect on trusting behavior over time.
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H2a: The availability of profile photos as an a↵ective trust cue has a positive e↵ect on
trusting behavior in peer-to-peer sharing transactions.
H2b: The e↵ect of profile photos on trusting behavior in peer-to-peer sharing transactions
decreases over time.
3.2.4 Method
To investigate the outlined research question, we conduct a controlled laboratory exper-
iment. Behavioral experiments for investigating platform-related questions have experi-
enced increasing popularity in various fields. Most importantly, the use of experiments
enables causal inferences, augmenting the inferential power of correlative models, and
thus bearing the potential to enrich existing research (Friedman and Cassar, 2004).
Treatment Structure
Participants engaged in a series of peer-to-peer sharing transactions in a proprietary web
interface reflecting typical features of “Airbnb-like” platforms. Thereby, each participant
either took the consumer or the provider role, and kept this role for the entire experiment.
The experiment had a 2 (star ratings: yes/no) ⇥ 2 (profile photos: yes/no) full factorial
between-subjects design. Further, to capture the dynamics of cognitive and a↵ective
trust cues over time, each experimental session included a total of 6 periods. To avoid
end-game e↵ects, some vagueness was introduced in that participants only knew that
the experiment would have between 5 and 8 periods (Bolton, Greiner, and Ockenfels,
2013; Rice, 2012).
Based on the two-by-two design, Figure 3.7 shows examples of how the user profiles
were displayed in the four treatment conditions. Thereby, it is important to note that
all participants in a given experimental session were allocated to the same treatment
condition. Specifically, each experimental session included 12 participants, who were
randomly allocated the roles of consumers and providers (6 each). Hence, depending
on the treatment condition, either all 12 participants in this cohort were able to see and
provide star ratings, or none of the participants were. Similarly, either all 12 participants
were able to see profile photos, or none of them were. In total, we conducted three
sessions for every treatment condition, resulting in a total sample size of 144 participants
(= 4 conditions ⇥ 3 sessions ⇥ 12 participants). This sample is su cient to detect
e↵ects of size .25 with a power of 1  =.917 (4 treatment groups; 6 periods; ↵=.05;
Faul et al., 2007).
Star ratings—In the star ratings conditions, consumers (providers) saw the providers’
(consumers’) average rating scores (rounded to the half unit) along with the number of
ratings received. In addition, each participant also saw their own average rating score.
Participants evaluated each other on a scale from 1 to 5 stars after they had completed
a transaction. To avoid retaliation or tit-for-tat strategies (or the anticipation thereof),
ratings were submitted simultaneously (i.e., without knowing the rating one receives
from one’s transaction partner). In contrast, in the conditions without star ratings,
participants could neither see any other participants’ ratings nor did they rate each
other after the transactions.
Profile photos—In the profile photos conditions, participants’ user profiles included a
photo as provided by the participants. A few days prior to the experiment, the research
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Figure 3.7: Examples for the display of user profiles in the four di↵erent treatment con-
ditions
Note: The examples are from the provider perspective. The corresponding screens for the con-
sumer perspective are shown in Appendix C.6 (Figures C.8-C.17). Profile photos are pixelated
to preserve participants’ privacy.
team contacted participants via email to advise that in the experiment, they would
engage with others through an online platform. In that email, participants in the profile
photo conditions were additionally informed that they may represent themselves to other
participants by means of a profile photo, which they were able to provide via return
email before the experiment. They were advised that the photo should ideally have a
height-width ratio of roughly 4:3 with su cient resolution. No other instructions were
provided with regard to the photo’s content or style. All 72 participants in the profile
photo condition provided a profile photo. Within these photos, the participants’ face
was clearly visible in 60 cases, partly visible in 5 cases, and not visible in 7 cases.6 In
the conditions without profile photos, participants were not able to provide a photo and
instead were all represented by a uniform default image (see Figure 3.7; right-hand side).
Experimental Task
In order to operationalize and assess trusting behavior, we build on Berg et al.’s (1995)
seminal trust game, following the design of Hawlitschek et al. (2016b). First published
in 1995, the trust game has become one of the most commonly applied experimental
tasks for modeling a large variety of real-world transactions (Riegelsberger, Sasse, and
McCarthy, 2005). In the IS domain, it has been applied to study a variety of artifacts
such as avatars (Riedl et al., 2014), fraudulent reviews (Ananthakrishnan, Li, and Smith,
2015), ratings (Bolton, Katok, and Ockenfels, 2004a; Rice, 2012), and user interface
6Complementary analysis showed that the degree of face visibility within the profile photos did not
yield significant di↵erences in behavior (see Appendix C.2).
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design in general (Hawlitschek et al., 2016a).
In the original trust game, two subjects—the trustor and the trustee—engage in two
stages. In the first stage, the trustor decides on how much of an initial endowment (e.g.,
$10) to transfer to the trustee. The transferred amount y is multiplied by a factor greater
than one (e.g., by 3). In the second stage, the trustee then decides on how much of the
received (multiplied) amount to return to the trustor (z). These transferred amounts
are generally considered as manifestations of trusting behavior (y) and trustworthiness
(z). Building on the transactions on actual peer-to-peer sharing platforms, we refer
to the trust game’s player types as providers (i.e., the trustors) and consumers (i.e.,
the trustees). The basic interaction of the trust game is thus a simplified analogy to
the interactions on Airbnb-like peer-to-peer sharing platforms, where providers entrust a
private resource (e.g., their apartment) to consumers, who will use and return it either in
a trustworthy (e.g., clean and intact) or in an untrustworthy (e.g., dirty and/or marred)
manner.
Further, to model peer-to-peer sharing transactions, we extend Berg et al.’s (1995)
experiment by (1) a matching phase in which participants are able to form dyads them-
selves, and (2) a booking fee that creates exposure also for consumers when entering
a transaction. These two extensions refer to the actual booking process on Airbnb-like
platforms, where selecting and booking a resource in advance (only based on the avail-
able information revealed through the platform) exposes consumers to the risk of paying
for a resource that could potentially fail to meet their expectations. Taken together,
the experimental task comprised three phases: (I) matching, (II) transaction, and (III)
rating, as summarized in Figure 3.8. These three phases resemble the basic mechan-
ics of sharing platforms such as Airbnb, BlaBlaCar, or Drivy, on which consumers first
request a resource (apartment, spare seat, car) from a provider and wait for confirma-
tion. Second, after the provider has accepted the request, consumer and provider enter
the transaction, where the provider grants access to their private resource in exchange
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Figure 3.8: The three phases of the experimental task
Note: As per the treatment structure, each participant engaged in six periods of the experi-
mental task. The rating phase only applies in the star rating condition.
(I) Matching Phase—To capture the notion that peer-to-peer sharing transactions
are commonly initiated by consumers and confirmed by providers, our experimental
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task includes a matching phase in which groups of participants form dyads themselves
(Bolton, Katok, and Ockenfels, 2004a). Note that any consumer-provider dyad usually
only occurs very few times within peer-to-peer sharing (or even only once; Teubner,
2018). To account for this fact, consumer requests were restricted to providers that
they had not engaged within the preceding two periods.78
• Consumers could send one request at a time. If the provider declined the request,
the consumer was able to submit a request to one of the remaining providers (if
any). Importantly, in each period, consumers could also abstain from sending
requests at all and instead click “skip period.”
• Providers could receive multiple requests from di↵erent consumers, but only accept
one request in any given period. Once a request was sent, the provider saw the
requesting consumer’s profile along with buttons to either accept or decline the
request (Figure 3.7). If the provider did not respond within 30 seconds, the request
was automatically withdrawn. Once a provider accepted a request, all contingent
requests from other consumers were automatically declined. Similar to consumers,
providers were able to skip the current period and decline all incoming requests.
The matching phase ended when (1) all existing requests had either been accepted or
declined, and (2) no further requests were possible (e.g., because consumers/providers
without matches decided to skip the period).
(II) Transaction Phase—Once a provider confirms a consumer’s request, the cor-
responding consumer-provider dyad enters the transaction phase. This phase includes
three steps. In the first step, the consumer pays a booking fee of 5 MU to the provider.
This reflects the fact that the consumer also faces some risk in that the provider may not
“deliver,” that is, for the case of accommodation sharing, provides an apartment in bad
or unacceptable condition. In the experiment, this may occur when the provider decides
not to transfer any MUs, which would leave the consumer with a loss compared to not
engaging in a transaction at all. In this second step, the provider decides on how much
of their endowment to transfer to the consumer (y) where 0  y  10 MU. Hence, the
providers’ endowment of 10 MU represents the private asset (e.g., their apartment) that
they bring into the transaction. The transferred amount y (trusting behavior) is tripled
and credited to the consumer. Contextualized to the setting of peer-to-peer sharing
platforms, this transfer captures the service delivery from the provider to the consumer.
In the third step, the consumer decides on how much z (trustworthiness) to return back
to the provider where 0  z  3y MU. The returned amount z represents the consumer’s
7A great majority, 69%, of all transactions were first-time encounters. Overall, there occurred 272
distinct dyads and 394 transactions. Hence, each dyad met 394/272=1.45 times on average, and
meeting only once was, in fact, most likely to be observed. Specifically, 161 dyads matched only once
(59%), 100 dyads matched twice (37%), and 11 dyads matched three times (4%). Hence, 161·1=161
of all 394 transactions were one-time encounters (41%), 100·2=200 were two-times encounters (51%),
and 11·3=33 were three-times encounters (8%).
8Due to a technical programming error, the restriction on sending requests blocked only one (rather
than two) periods in four of the twelve experimental sessions. This led to the few instances with three-
fold transactions. Note that the four a↵ected sessions included all four treatment conditions equally so
that no systematic confound was caused.
On the dynamics of cognitive and a↵ective trust cues: Behavioral evidence
from a two-sided platform experiment 74
behavior or the way the provider’s asset is treated (e.g., tidy or devastated apartment).
For any transfer y > 0, the provider hence faces exposure. The second and third steps
of the transaction phase are identical to the original trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, and
McCabe, 1995). A summary screen completes the transaction phase.
(III) Rating Phase—After completing the transaction phase, each consumer-provider
dyad enters a rating phase in which they evaluate each other using a star rating score
from 1 to 5 stars. Importantly, this phase does not exist for participants in the conditions
without star ratings; they directly proceed to the next period.
Overview of Variables
Table 3.10 provides an overview of the independent (treatment structure) and dependent
variables (measures) employed in the experiment, and how they align with our research
hypotheses.
3.2.5 Procedure and Sample
The experiment was conducted at the experimental lab of a large European univer-
sity. We recruited 144 participants (56 female, 88 male, average age=22.2 years, age
range=18 to 36 years) from a student subject pool using the hroot system (Bock,
Baetge, and Nicklisch, 2014). Informed consent was obtained from all participants, ex-
plicitly including permission to use the provided profile photos for scientific purposes.
The experiment was implemented through a proprietary online environment based on
standard web development languages (HTML, PHP, CSS). Written instructions were
handed out to all participants and were read out aloud at the beginning of each session.
Participants answered 6 quiz questions to ensure comprehension. For a summary of all
instruction materials, see Appendix C.6 . Sessions took about 50 minutes on average. To
incentivize behavior, monetary units earned within the experiment were converted into
EUR at a rate of 4 MU=1 EUR. At the end of each session, 3 out of the 6 periods were
selected for each subject at random and paid out in cash (average payo↵=EUR 11.17).
Table 3.11 provides sample demographics for each treatment. A set of ANOVAs con-
firms that none of these variables (age, gender, experience with peer-to-peer platforms)
exhibits significant di↵erences across treatments (Star Ratings: FAGE(1,140)=.038,
p=.845, FGENDER(1,140)=.106, p=.745, FEXP (1,140)=.039, p=.843; Profile Pho-
tos: FAGE(1,140)=.350, p=.555, FGENDER(1,140)=1.12, p=.292, FEXP (1,140)=.547,
p=.461).
Manipulation Check
To ensure that the experimental manipulation was successful, we conducted an ex post
manipulation check using an online experiment. This confirmed that the tested artifacts
(star ratings and profile photos) were (1) recognized at all and (2) perceived as cognitive
(star ratings) and a↵ective (profile photos) trust cues, respectively. To this end, we
recruited 289 additional participants (166 female, 123 male, average age=33.62) from
Prolific.ac (Palan and Schitter, 2018).
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Table 3.10: Summary of independent and dependent variables in the experiment





Binary treatment variable to test
H1a and H1b. In the star rating
condition, participants evaluate
each other in the rating phase (1 to
5 stars). In the no star rating
condition, participants neither see a







Binary treatment variable to test
H2a and H2b. In the profile photo
condition, participants see a profile
photo of the other participants. In
the no profile photo conditions,






To test H1b and H2b, each
participant engages in six periods of
the experimental task. This allows
to discern the dynamic interplay of
cognitive and a↵ective trust cues.





The fraction y / 10 of the
endowment the provider transfers
to the consumer (y  10 MU). This
variable is a measure for the




The number of ratings a consumer
or provider has received. This
measure only exists in the star
rating condition.
{0, 1, . . . , 5}
Rating
The rating a consumer (/provider)
has provided to evaluate a provider
(/consumer) in the rating phase of
the experimental task (“stars”).
This measure only exists in the star
rating condition.
{1, 2, . . . , 5}
Average Star Rating Score
A consumer’s or provider’s average
star rating score (rounded to the
half unit). This measure only exists
in the star rating condition.
{1.0, 1.5, . . . , 5.0}
Consumer’s
Trustworthiness
The fraction z / 3 y of the available
amount that the consumer transfers
back to the provider (z  3y MU;
step 3 of the transaction phase).




⇡it = .5 + 1+ yit · (3zjt   1) . The
value (or payo↵) a provider receives
in period i, after having transacted
with consumer j. This value is
determined by the received booking
fee (.5), the provider’s endowment
(1), their transfer to the consumer
(yit), and the relative return from
the consumer (zjt). Note that
when no transaction occurs, this
payo↵ is 1 (endowment).
[0.5, 3.5]
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Table 3.11: Sample statistics on demographic control variables by treatment





Mean (SD) Mean Mean
no
no 21.9 (2.43) .417 .611
yes 22.4 (3.04) .333 .778
yes
no 22.2 (2.73) .444 .722
yes 22.3 (3.58) .361 .694
Using an identical treatment structure and interface design, the manipulation check
presented participants with a user profile of one potential transaction partner.9 Following
a general introduction on the experimental setup (i.e., the sharing transaction, rules,
procedures), participants indicated to what extent the displayed user profile provided
them with cognitive and a↵ective trust cues (Table C.12 , Appendix C.7). Internal
consistency for both the cognitive (Cronbach’s ↵=.93) and the a↵ective trust construct
(↵=.84) met the common threshold of .70 (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988).
The results of this manipulation check suggest that the experimental manipulation
was successful (Table 3.12). Specifically, we can confirm that (1) star ratings were
perceived as cognitive trust cues ( =3.22, p <.001), while (2) profile photos were
perceived as a↵ective trust cues ( =2.08, p <.001). At the same time, profile photos did
not exhibit any significant e↵ect on cognitive trust ( =.188, p =.404). While cognitive
trust is driven by star ratings only, a↵ective trust appears to be driven by both star
ratings and profile photos. Even though star ratings appear to have an influence on the
perception of a↵ective trust cues ( =1.20, p <.001), this e↵ect is outweighed by profile
photos by a factor of almost 2. Importantly, we observe no interaction e↵ects between
star ratings and profile photos as both cognitive ( =-.226, p =.481) and a↵ective ( =-
.601, p =.070) trust cues.





Star Ratings(yes=1, no=0) 3.22 *** 1.20 ***
(.223) (.230)
Profile Photos(yes=1, no=0) .188 2.08 ***
(.224) (.231)
Star Ratings ⇥ Profile Photos -.226 -.601
(.320) (.330)




Note: Ordinary least squares regression models. DV=dependent variable;
standard errors in parentheses; *** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05
9To preserve the data privacy of the participants in the lab experiment, the profile photos used in the
manipulation check study were generated using the generative adversarial network StyleGAN2 (Karras
et al., 2020). All photos were then classified for demographic characteristics using the Microsoft Face
and Emotions API. The final set of photos was selected to match our set of lab participants regarding
their demographic characteristics (i.e., age, gender).
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3.2.6 Results
Overall Treatment E↵ects on Trusting Behavior
As a first step of analysis, we consider the overall e↵ects of star ratings (H1a) and
profile photos (H2a) availability on the provider’s trusting behavior (i.e., the transferred
amount to the consumer). To be as specific as possible, we chose single transactions as
the unit of analysis (n=394). Figure 3.9 depicts the positive e↵ects of both cognitive and
a↵ective trust cues for the di↵erent treatment conditions at an aggregated level. A 2 ⇥
2 ANOVA (Table 3.13 ) reveals significant e↵ects for both star ratings (FStarRatings(1,
390)=32.3), p <.001) and profile photos (FProfilePhotos(1, 390)= 38.5), p <.001) on
trusting behavior while these variables do not significantly interact (p=.142). Providing
initial support for H1a and H2a, post-hoc comparisons (Tukey HSD) confirm that trusting
behavior is higher when star ratings (H1a:  =.150, p <.001), and/or profile photos (H2a:
 =.164, p <.001) are available.
Table 3.13: Treatment e↵ects of trust cues on trusting behavior
Trust Cue
ANOVA Not Displayed Displayed
F-score p-value Mean SD 95% CI Mean SD 95% CI
Star Ratings (SR) 32.3 .001 .670 .326 [.625, .716] .821 .213 [.791, .850]
Profile Photos (PP) 38.5 .001 .662 .315 [.618, .707] .826 .226 [.795, .858]





















Star Ratings (Cognitive Trust Cue)
no yes
Profile Photos (Affective Trust Cue)
yes
no
Figure 3.9: Main treatment e↵ects of trust cues on provider’s trusting behavior
Note: Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Trusting Behavior over Time
Next, we focus on the role of time-dependency. As shown in Figure 3.10, the joint
availability of star ratings and profile photos facilitates trusting behavior of about 75%
in the first period. In comparison, the absence of both trust cues yields about 50%.
In contrast, if only one of the two cues is present, first-period trusting behavior yields
levels of 60–65%. While all other treatment conditions exhibit an increasing and roughly
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linear trend, the condition in which profile photos are present exhibits a markedly di↵erent
pattern. Here, following an inverted u-shape, trusting behavior decrease back after an







































Figure 3.10: Course of provider’s trusting behavior across periods
Note: Data on transaction-level, n=394; error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
To statistically assess this time-dependency, we consider a set of random e↵ects panel
regressions. In the first two models (Models I and II), we include linear time e↵ects (see
Table 3.14 ). Further, the model takes into account repeated measures (period 1 to
6)10 per subject. The basic regression equation (Model I) is given as





i +  6t+ ✏i + µit,
where yit denotes the trusting behavior by participant i in period t. The variables x1
and x2 represent the treatment variables (ratings, profile photos), and x3 to x5 contain
demographic information (i.e., age, gender, experience). Note that these factors are
participant-specific and do not change over time (hence not depend on t). Furthermore,
we control for period (t) to capture general time trends. Last, ✏i denotes the participant-
specific error and µit the model error. Model I confirms the general treatment e↵ects
both of star ratings (supporting H1a:  =.139, p <.01) and profile photos (supporting
H2a:  =.153, p <.01). Moreover, this model shows that there exists a positive overall
time e↵ect throughout the six periods ( =.019, p <.001).
Next, in order to control for the development over time, this basic model is extended
by period-treatment interaction e↵ects (Model II). Here, the period-treatment inter-
actions show that the period-e↵ect is predominantly driven by star rating conditions,
which build up their e↵ect over time (supporting H1b:   =.023, p <.05) but have no
significant e↵ect in the first period yet (  =.083, p =.13). Conversely, profile photos
10Since we analyze the period variable’s interaction with the treatment variables, these values are
coded as 0 to 5 in order to be able to interpret the respective other variable’s coe cients as first-period
e↵ects.
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Table 3.14: Regression models
DV=Provider’s Trusting Behavior
Model I Model II
III(a) III(b) III(c) III(d)
Subsets (Trust Cues)
None Only Ratings Only Photos
Ratings
+ Photos
Star Ratings(yes=1, no=0) H1a .139 ** .083
(.051) (.055)
Profile Photos(yes=1, no=0) H2a .153 ** .152 **
(.052) (.056)
Period(0–5) .019 *** .008 .041 .057 ** .174 *** .085 ***
(.005) (.008) (.041) (.019) (.037) (.019)
Period2 -.008 -.004 -.032 *** -.012 ***
(.008) (.004) (.007) (.004)
Star Ratings ⇥ Period H1b .023 *
(.009)
Profile Photos ⇥ Period H2b .001
(.009)
Gender(female=1) -.055 -.055 -.176 .014 -.012 .016
(.054) (.053) (.151) (.111) (.107) (.071)
Age .009 .009 .021 -.006 .017 .001
(.008) (.008) (.032) (.019) (.018) (.008)
Experience(yes=1) .069 .068 .093 .202 .037 -.061
(.056) (.056) (.159) (.110) (.127) (.077)
Intercept .318 .348 .086 .661 .239 .791 ***
(.187) (.185) (.727) (.406) (.397) (.217)
Observations 394 394 96 97 100 101
R2 .086 .102 .029 .317 .209 .254
Note: Generalized linear models with subject random e↵ect. DV=dependent variable; standard errors in parentheses;
*** p.001; ** p.01; * p.05
have an immediate e↵ect right from the start (  =.152, p <.01), which then, however,
is time-invariant. Hence, H2b is not supported (  <.001, p =.997)—at least when
assuming a linear trend.
As clearly suggested by Figure 3.10, this assumption of linearity, however, does
not hold as there appears to exist a clear curvilinear progression when profile photos
are present. In Models III a-d, we hence introduce quadratic period e↵ects. In order
to avoid uninterpretable triple interactions (PP ⇥ SR ⇥ (t + t2)), we estimate four
separate models for each of the 2 ⇥ 2 treatment conditions in Models III(a)-III(d).
Naturally, the treatment variables are not part of these models. These analyses show
that both conditions with profile photos exhibit a curvilinear structure with positive and
significant linear estimates (  =.174, p <.001; resp.   =.085, p <.001) and negative
and significant second-order estimates for period (  =-.032, p <.001; resp.   =-.012,
p <.001). When only star ratings are present, there is a “simple” linear and positive time-
trend (  =.057, p <.01). In the setting with neither profile photos nor star ratings, no
significant time e↵ect occurs, albeit the direction is slightly positive (  =.041, p =.32).
None of the control variables (gender,   =-.055, p =.303; age,   =.009, p =.279;
experience,   =.069, p =.224) exert significant e↵ects on trusting behavior. Note that
we abstain from including the interaction between the treatment variables in the panel
models (let alone the triple interaction Star Ratings ⇥ Profile Photos ⇥ Period) as
there were no significant interactions between a↵ective and cognitive trust cues (see
Table 3.13 above).
The Di↵erent E↵ect Components of Star Ratings
We have now established that the presence of a star rating system has a significant
e↵ect on trusting behavior. Note, however, that there may be di↵erent factors at play
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since star ratings play a multi-layered role. First, the presence of a star rating allows for
an improved assessment of one’s counterpart (i.e., the consumer in this case) as some
historic information about their behavior is displayed. Moreover, it may allow for higher
degrees of provider’s trusting behavior since malicious exploitation of this trust could be
penalized by means of the rating system (ex post). Note that there even exists a third
aspect. Since the rating system works in a mutual way, also the provider will have to
take into account that he or she will be rated after the transaction by the consumer.
The anticipation thereof may, additionally, increase the exhibited trusting behavior (ex
ante).
Hence, it is important to delineate these e↵ect components in order to assess which
fractions of the observed trusting behavior are actually due to the displayed rating scores
(i.e., the net e↵ect). As a next step, we hence consider how trusting behavior evolves
over the course of the six periods for the star rating treatment condition. Note that
providers exhibit substantial trusting behavior even in the treatment condition in which
no trust cues whatsoever are displayed (“baseline” condition). In fact, in this condition,
providers transfer about half of their endowment (51.3%) to consumers on average.
Moreover, there exists a slightly increasing trend. We capture this by the General Trust
Baseline and the General Time E↵ect (see Table 3.15 and Figure 3.11). Also, note that
in the very first period (t=1), participants in the star rating conditions were not able
to draw on specific rating scores because no participant had had the chance to collect
ratings at that point. Nevertheless, we still observe higher first-period trusting behavior
as compared to participants in the non-star-rating conditions. This e↵ect, which we
label as Damocles E↵ect, indicates that the mere existence of the star rating system
(even without the display of actual rating scores) facilitates trusting behavior due to the
anticipation of rating and being rated as outlined above. Making use of this temporal
distinction, we can further subtract the Damocles e↵ect in all subsequent periods (t 2),
yielding a residual (red lines in Figure 3.11). This residual can be considered as the
Rating Score Net E↵ect. We observe that the net e↵ect increases only slowly within
the first four periods and then jumps to a level of about .15, comparable in size to the
Damocles E↵ect. This observation provides further evidence for H1b, but also suggests
that the impact of time (and/or the number of underlying ratings) on the net e↵ect
of an aggregated star rating score is more complex than a simple linear trend, maybe
non-linear or involve discontinuities.
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Figure 3.11: General Trust Baseline and resulting Damocles e↵ect, Net E↵ect of Rating
Score, and General Time E↵ect across periods
Table 3.15: Delineation of star rating’s e↵ect on trusting behavior
E↵ect Delineation
Period
1 2 3 4 5 6
General Trust
Baseline
The trusting behavior in the first
period of the baseline condition
(without star ratings and without
profile photos)
.513 .513 .513 .513 .513 .513
Time E↵ect
The e↵ect of time on trusting
behavior in the baseline condition
(without star ratings and without
profile photos)
— .046 .054 .108 .040 .081
Damocles
E↵ect
Level of trust behavior in the first
period of the star rating condition
.138 .138 .138 .138 .138 .138
Net E↵ect of
Star Rating
The residual between the actually
observed trusting behavior in the
star rating condition and the sum of
the General Trust Baseline, the
General Time E↵ect, and the
Damocles E↵ect
— -.016 .043 .019 .136 .149
Total E↵ect .138 .168 .235 .265 .314 .368
Result .651 .681 .748 .778 .827 .881
Complementary Analyses
Star Ratings and Trusting Behavior (Appendix C.1 )—Overall, our data show that the
rating distribution in our study is consistent with what is typically observed on contempo-
rary platforms. Moreover, the analysis reveals that the ratings providers and consumers
receive depend on their respective behavior (i.e., the amount they transfer or transfer
back). Importantly, also consumers’ chances of being accepted as well as providers’ trust-
ing behavior depend on the consumer’s aggregated star rating score. Hence, behavior is
reflected in star ratings and, vice versa, star ratings a↵ect behavior.
Visual Photo Properties and Trusting Behavior (Appendix C.2 )—Similar to the
analysis of specific star rating scores, we consider how specific visual properties of the
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profile photos, such as face visibility, attractiveness, and visual trustworthiness, a↵ected
trusting behavior. However, we did not find any evidence for significant e↵ects with
regard to these attributes.
Consumers’ Returns (Appendix C.3 )—While the focus of this work is on (providers’)
trusting behavior, we also considered consumers’ trustworthiness as operationalized by
the amounts they returned back to the provider. Typically, this analysis is secondary
and relatively straight forward, “as it tends to be overwhelmingly driven by the amount
invested by the sender” (Bapna et al., 2017, p.120). In fact, we find that the presence
of both types of trust cues has a positive e↵ect on returns, whereas the e↵ect of profile
photos is limited to the first periods.
Value Decomposition (Appendix C.4 )—Combining the findings of trusting behavior
(providers’ behavior) and ex post trustworthiness (consumers’ behavior), we can de-
compose the overall value providers receive along these (factorial) partial e↵ects. This
analysis grants further insight into how specifically the trust cues “generate” value. For
instance, we find that while overall, trusting behavior is similar when either one or the
other cue type is present, the presence of star ratings yields higher trustworthiness. This
treatment di↵erence can hence be attributed to the ratings’ e↵ect on consumers rather
than provider behavior.
Matches and Requests (Appendix C.5 )—Both across treatments and periods, we
observe non-significant di↵erences with regard to the number of matches (i.e., transac-
tions). The matching rate exceeds 90% throughout the experiment, so that basically
every participant is matched in almost every period. However, both star ratings and pro-
file photos have positive e↵ects on the share of participants who sent at least one request.
But, as there are no significant e↵ects on the fractions of participants who received at
least one request, the additional requests cannot be distributed evenly but concentrate
on those who already receive requests from other participants. Consequently, this does
not result in di↵erences in the number of matches. Period did neither a↵ect the number
of matches or request behavior.
3.2.7 Discussion
The number of peer-to-peer sharing platform businesses is ever-growing. Airbnb, Blabla-
car, or Drivy are already shaping a substantial part of today’s e-commerce landscape
with a steadily increasing share (Mittendorf, Berente, and Holten, 2019). At the same
time, maintaining trust among participants is of the utmost importance for the continued
existence of these platforms, particularly for emerging ones (Hodapp, Hawlitschek, and
Kramer, 2019). With our paper, we provide novel insights into the interplay of cognitive
and a↵ective trust cues over time.
Cognitive Trust Cues over Time: The E↵ect of Star Ratings
In the very first period of the experiment, participants in the star rating conditions were
not yet able to draw on any rating scores. Still, in these conditions, we observe more
intense trusting behavior (i.e., higher transfers) as compared to the non-star-rating con-
ditions. This finding reflects previous research such as Rice (2012), who distinguishes
between the trust-building e↵ect of the mere existence of a rating system and specific
scores. Our findings indicate that the existence of star ratings (even without displaying
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any scores) positively a↵ects trusting behavior (H1a). We o↵er a potential explanation
for this observation based on participants’ anticipation of ratings—the Damocles E↵ect.
In a sense, the prospect of leaving a rating and being rated seems to represent a mu-
tually impending threat, causing participants to exhibit trusting as well as trustworthy
behavior. Next, the e↵ect of star ratings on trusting behavior becomes stronger over
time (H1b). The fact that star ratings seem to represent a reliable cue, and that their
e↵ect is steadily increasing for increasing numbers of underlying ratings, is consistent
with previous research (Burtch, Ghose, and Wattal, 2014; Cabral and Hortaçsu, 2010).
A↵ective Trust Cues over Time: The E↵ect of Profile Photos
Interestingly, we find that that the e↵ectiveness of profile photos for engendering trust
seems to follow an inverted u-shape over time. Profile photos start out to function as
a powerful trust cue early on (clearly surpassing the e↵ectiveness of star ratings alone),
and this e↵ectiveness then increases further. Overall, they exert a positive influence on
trust behavior (H2a). However, being the sole cue, the trust-promoting capability of
profile photos collapses back to its origin level later on. Indeed, after the fourth period,
the power of profile photos seems to be eroding. The fact that this pattern can be
observed in both photo conditions (i.e., with and without star ratings) is not only an
indicator for the reliability of this result but also highlights the importance of viewing it
from a dynamic (rather than static) perspective. We suggest that the eventual decrease
of trusting behavior is driven by the drop in returns, which can be observed between
period 3 and 4, at the peak of the trusting behavior curve (see Figure C.7, Appendix
C.4). This drop precedes the downward slope in the inverted u-shape curve. From an
ELM perspective, this drop can be interpreted from two perspectives:
First, it implies emerging exploitation of providers’ trusting behavior by consumers.
This exploitation can be interpreted as a counterargument that burdens the positive
e↵ect of the a↵ective trust cue. Second, as part of the ELM, Petty and Cacioppo
(1986) describe an “elaboration continuum,” which states that the mode of informa-
tion evaluation is not subject to a strictly binary classification but rather a continuous
scale. As such, the mode of processing the a↵ective cue may shift across transactions.
Conceivably, overall trusting behavior may be subject to two partial e↵ects: (1) expe-
rience or confidence within the environment, and (2) the cue’s evidenced e↵ectiveness.
Initially, participants have no or little experience/confidence within the transactional en-
vironment (and, naturally, with the experimental setup too). This may lead them to
be rather cautious and, as a consequence, show limited trusting behavior (i.e., make
low transfers). At the same time, they may have rather high expectations regarding the
cue’s e↵ectiveness (or informational value). Throughout the experiment, these values
shift where, naturally, participants gain confidence with each transaction and period
but—at the same time—experience that profile photos may not (always) live up to the
high expectations they put in them (e.g., when their transaction partner disappoints the
trust they put in them by, say, a zero return). Since both factors are required, it can be
argued that trusting behavior emerges as the interaction of both. Given that one factor
(i.e., experience) increases monotonically (e.g., from some level close to zero) and the
other factor (i.e., evidenced e↵ectiveness) decreased monotonically (e.g., towards some
level close to zero), the result is a curvilinear progression of trusting behavior (inverted
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u-shape). Of course, this merely represents a potential explanation at this point, but it
may o↵er a rationale for the observed data. Future research will have to examine the
particular levels and courses of experience and evidenced e↵ectiveness as well as their
interaction and e↵ects on trusting behavior.
Overall, the finding of the inverted u-shape suggests that profile photos convey
varying e↵ects on trust, depending on the specific phase of transactions. Our results
thereby extend previous research, which has often abstracted from such potential time-
dependencies of interpersonal trust (Bapna, Qiu, and Rice, 2017; Gefen, 2000; Gefen,
Karahanna, and Straub, 2003; Pavlou and Gefen, 2004).
Dynamic Complementarity of Cognitive and A↵ective Trust Cues
To some extent, cognitive and a↵ective trust cues complement each other over time. In
contrast to star ratings, profile photos allow a “kick-starting” of trust in early phases in
which star ratings are less accurate and reliable, helping to overcome this cue’s inherent
“cold-start problem” (Wessel, Thies, and Benlian, 2017). However, the presence of both
trust cues leads to higher trusting behavior than when only one is available. Interestingly,
the cues do not significantly interact (Table 3.13) and have an additive e↵ect. This
non-dependence of cues can be interpreted as support for the assumption that the
cues are processed through di↵erent mental paths. In fact, Petty and Cacioppo (1986)
already pictured this additivity when combining centrally and peripherally processed
information for one-time exposure—a presumption that seems to hold and extend to
exposure throughout multiple periods in our experiment.
Theoretical Contribution
Our study provides theoretical contributions to research addressing trust on peer-to-
peer sharing platforms. Previous research widely agrees that the e↵ects of trust cues
on trusting behavior are relatively stable and comparable across di↵erent phases of their
“lifecycle” as their e↵ects are time-invariant. To this end, McKnight and colleagues have
theorized that certain trust cues may indicate stability through structural assurances and
situational normality (McKnight, Choudhury, and Kacmar, 2002; Mcknight, Cummings,
and Chervany, 1998). Only recently, the issue of longitudinal examination of trust cues
has drawn attention outside the IS community (Wer↵ and Buckley, 2017). Yet, previous
research does not su ciently capture on how the trust-building capacity of cognitive
and a↵ective trust cues on trusting behavior may be subject to dynamics across multiple
periods and/or transactions.
Drawing on the ELM (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann,
1983), we extend research on cognitive and a↵ective trust cues by taking a “dynamic”
perspective. We do so by drawing on the central and peripheral route of information
processing, as outlined in the ELM. In line with our theoretical reasoning, assumptions
about stable or increasing e↵ects of trust cues apply to star ratings (cognitive trust cues),
associated with the central route of information processing but not to profile photos
(a↵ective trust cues), associated with the peripheral route—their time-dependency shows
a non-linear pattern.
Rather than assessing their trust-building potential in isolation (Komiak and Ben-
basat, 2006; Stewart and Gosain, 2006), we analyze the combination and interplay of
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two specific types of cues. Thereby, we follow the plea of previous ELM research, stating
that “much more research is needed to examine the roles of [information] repetition and
[information] variation” and that “researchers and practitioners would benefit from a
better understanding of the degree to which the attitudes created or changed by their
e↵orts persist over time, resist change, or predict behavior” (Schumann et al., 2012,
p. 62). We investigate trust-building through the respective trust cues as a dynamic
process over time, using an experiment with multiple transactions. Showing that cogni-
tive and a↵ective trust cues exhibit time-dynamic complementarity, our findings indicate
that previous research may have underestimated the role of a↵ective trust cues so far as
they play an important role in complementing cognitive cues—in particular in the earlier
stages.
Methodological Contribution
Our study o↵ers a distinct methodological contribution. Specifically, we extend the
trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995) to the context of peer-to-peer shar-
ing platforms, by providing a controlled experimental setting in which the emergence
of trust can be investigated over the course of multiple periods. Complementary to
the existing approaches drawing on surveys (Ert, Fleischer, and Magen, 2016) or field
data (Edelman, Luca, and Svirsky, 2017; Fradkin, Grewal, and Holtz, 2018), our exper-
imental setup provides a proxy for understanding user behavior on peer-to-peer sharing
platforms, particularly when considering how trusting behavior evolves dynamically over
time. Our experimental design complements previous research by allowing for a more
natural investigation of transactional behavior. In contrast to prior studies, we use a
“natural” endogenous process of matchmaking with requests and responses, similar to
what is observed on many (if not: most) actual peer-to-peer sharing platforms (see Table
3.8).
Managerial Implications
The results of our study have important implications for consumers, providers, and
managers of peer-to-peer sharing platforms. Specifically, our results show that the
relative importance of cognitive and a↵ective trust cues is not stable but changes over
time. On the one hand, this time-dependency emphasizes the importance for platform
managers to actively encourage consumers and providers early on to upload profile photos
as a means to kick-start the formation of trust—particularly during the initial and early
stages of platform evolution. On the other hand, it is important for platform managers
to understand that the beneficial e↵ect of profile photos wanes o↵ over time. Clearly,
because of this dynamic interplay over time, it is vitally important to encourage users to
make active use of both types of trust cues instead of overly relying on one or the other. It
also emphasizes the dual role of human information processing vial central and peripheral
challenges, both of which need to be considered in platform design. While our study
focused specifically on peer-to-peer sharing scenarios with free market-based requests-
and-response process (endogenous matching) and highly transactional exchanges (e.g.,
Airbnb, see Appendix C.7), there is reason to believe that our results may provide
insights for a broader range of peer-to-peer sharing platforms. While platforms such
as Airbnb actively encourage their users to upload profile photos and to evaluate each
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other by means of ratings after each transaction, there exist other platforms such as
Craigslist or Gumtree (some of the most popular peer-to-peer platforms in the US, the
UK, and Australia) that do not enable their users to provide such cues. Furthermore,
on some platforms, even if they allow their users to upload personal photos, this option
is far from being used by everyone (Hesse et al., 2020). Uber have even experimented
with forcing users to leave a rating, for instance, by requiring them to provide feedback
before allowing them to engage in another transaction. As most peer-to-peer sharing
platforms’ business models are provision-based—and hence hinge on the realization of
transactions—they may eventually benefit from facilitating the use of a range of trust
cues to their users.
Limitations and Future Work
Alike any research, this study exhibits several limitations, some of which, however, pro-
vide viable starting points for future work.
Dual role of star rating—The availability of star ratings may have a dual e↵ect on
behavior. While users observe the ratings of others and can make inferences to their past
behavior and trustworthiness from that, they are also aware of the fact that (1) they
themselves will be rated after a transaction and (2) will be able to rate (i.e., to reward
or punish) their transaction partner. This should be kept in mind when investigating
star rating’s impact on trusting behavior. To separate such potentially confounding
e↵ects, one may consider trusting behavior in the very first period, where no user has
accumulated any reputation yet, but the prospect of the mutual rating process casts
its shadows before. As shown in Table 3.14 (Model II), the availability of star ratings
does not a↵ect trusting behavior in the first period, suggesting that the trust-enhancing
e↵ect is rooted in the available score rather than in prospects of being evaluated oneself
or being able to evaluate the other user.
Congruency of period and ratings—Since virtually all participants engaged in a trans-
action in almost any period (the overall fraction of realized transactions is 91% and varies
only negligibly between treatments), some caution is required concerning the process of
trust-building which may root either in time or the number of ratings, or both (using
both variables in the regression models would be subject to collinearity issues). While
there is some rationale for time- or period-contingent trusting behavior (e.g., gaining
experience and hence confidence in the processes and other users overall), the underlying
number of star ratings too represents a very plausible explanation for trust (i.e., cue ac-
curacy and reliability). Artificially preventing participants from conducting a transaction
each period could help to disentangle these factors.
External validity—While our study is based on actual and incentivized user behavior
and hence provides valuable insights into the formation of trust, it is still conducted
within an artificial laboratory environment and without framing to a particular appli-
cation context. In contrast to actual real-world transactions, there occurs no physical
interaction down the line, such as, for instance, a stay in someone’s apartment, rent-
ing their car, or sharing a ride. The interpretation of our findings hence requires some
caution with regard to transferability to actual transactions for platforms in the wild.
Dynamic e↵ects of other trust cues—Our study provides a sound understanding of
the e↵ects of star ratings and profile photos, common examples of cognitive and a↵ective
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trust cues, over time. However, future research should consider to also investigate the
e↵ects of other established trust cues (e.g., labels, badges, certificates, text elements,
videos). From the perspective of a peer-to-peer sharing platform provider, it is essential
to leverage a portfolio of trust cues, which add up to an overall trust enhancing e↵ect
that is e↵ective over the whole platform evolution. We encourage future work that
addresses this need in experimental studies grounded in ELM.
3.2.8 Concluding Note
Both cognitive (e.g., star ratings) and a↵ective (e.g., profile photos) trust cues represent
e↵ective means for trust-building in peer-to-peer sharing platforms. While we find no
evidence for an interaction of these cues, they complement each other over time. Our
findings inform both platform operators and users attempting to support and sustain
trust in such environments. Furthermore, our experimental design may serve as a basis
for scholars seeking to further investigate trusting decisions within the emerging platform
economy landscape.
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3.3 Blockchain and Trust in the Platform Economy:
The Case of Peer-to-Peer Sharing
The previous two studies investigated how individual UR influences P2P platform users’
perception and behavior. However, the underlying technological layer of a platform is
likely to influence users as well. As an innovation of the 21st century, the blockchain
may provide the foundation for trust-free systems and market exchanges. The next study
reports a scenario-based online survey with participants taking the role of a customer on a
blockchain-based P2P platform. The results confirm that while trust in peers and shared
products have no overall significant e↵ect on transaction intentions, trust in blockchain
technology and the community of blockchain users drive rental intentions mediated by
trust in the blockchain-based platform. The study sheds light on how established trust
relationships shift from a peer and product focus towards trust in platforms and their
underlying technology.
David Dann, Florian Hawlitschek, Christian Peukert, Carl Martin & Christof
Weinhardt11
3.3.1 Introduction
The emergence of thriving platforms (e.g., eBay, Airbnb, Uber) diversifies and changes
e-commerce (Sundararajan, 2016; Van Alstyne, Parker, and Choudary, 2016). Nascent
platform ecosystems crucially depend on a careful balance of aspects such as open-
ness and control, adequate value capture mechanisms, and, importantly, on building
trust (Hodapp, Hawlitschek, and Kramer, 2019). Within the broader platform economy,
peer-to-peer (P2P) sharing platforms are particularly flourishing (Dann, Teubner, and
Weinhardt, 2019). The “sharing economy” is a multifaceted concept that is associated
with ideas ranging from social and sustainable world improvement to a future of neolib-
eral platform capitalism. Following the European Commission, we understand it as an
environment for users to (fee-based) grant one another access to underused resources
(Frenken and Schor, 2017). The European Commission expects annual spending of
e 27.9bn on P2P platforms within the EU-28 states (European Commission, 2016). This
domain di↵ers from traditional e-commerce insofar as o↵ers and services on P2P plat-
forms are often run by private individuals. Consequently, users face economic exposure
caused by unreliability or fraudulent o↵ers that undermine the fundamental collabora-
tive mindset of the sharing economy (AirbnbHell, 2019), making one factor particularly
decisive: trust—so to speak the quintessence of the sharing economy (Gebbia, 2016;
Hawlitschek, Teubner, and Weinhardt, 2016; Möhlmann and Geissinger, 2018).
Trust itself is an area of research considered from various angles, which, in turn,
resonates with versatile concepts and theories for addressing it. For the connection
of trust with the sharing economy, literature highlights the relationship between three
main sides: Peers, products, platforms (Hawlitschek, Teubner, and Weinhardt, 2016;
Hawlitschek et al., 2016b; Möhlmann, 2016). In this work, we focus on trust from the
perspective of the platform’s underlying technology. Söllner, Ho↵mann, and Leimeister
11This study was published in the WI 2020 Proceedings, https://doi.org/10.30844/wi_2020_
n2-dann, (Dann et al., 2020a).
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(2016) demonstrate that trust in the environment enabling the platform is an antecedent
for trusting the platform provider. Beyond the Internet, the typical technological layer,
which enables the sharing economy (Hamari, Sjöklint, and Ukkonen, 2016), new envi-
ronments for enabling P2P sharing platforms are arising—among these, the blockchain
is probably the most popular (Hawlitschek, Notheisen, and Teubner, 2018; Seebacher
and Schüritz, 2017). The blockchain is attributed to a↵ect trust (Beck, 2018) and,
beyond that, to be the technology that is capable of establishing true trust-free sharing
economy environments (Lundy, 2016; Glaser, 2017).
Against this backdrop, we shed first light on trust relationships in a blockchain-
enabled sharing economy environment. Our overarching research question is:
RQ: How do blockchain-enabled platforms frame consumers’ trust perception and their
intention to enter a transaction?
To answer this question, we develop our research model building on a previous pilot
study from Hawlitschek (2019) and substantiate it with a more representative sample. In
addition, we conduct further analyses on demographic and character trajectories and pro-
vide insights from qualitative analyses. Overall, we argue that a platform that includes a
blockchain mechanism functions as a prospect of a trustable technological environment
where users are more willing to enter transactions. Using a scenario-based online sur-
vey, we assess individual e↵ects of both blockchain technology- and community-related
aspects on trust in the platform, its peers, and its products and, ultimately, how this
connects to their willingness to enter a transaction.
3.3.2 Related Work and Theoretical Background
The P2P sharing economy serves as a hypernym for a variety of platforms, activities,
and services (Hamari, Sjöklint, and Ukkonen, 2016). As a sub-category of e-commerce,
it is also subject to the fact that the facilitation of transactions via the Internet lacks
the development of social and economic bonding to induce trust between the transac-
tion partners (Bolton, Katok, and Ockenfels, 2004b). Furthermore, while in traditional
e-commerce, users mainly interact with professional vendors (B2C), transactions on P2P
sharing platforms rely upon two private individuals (Hawlitschek, Teubner, and Gimpel,
2016). These individuals usually have not met face to face before (Jones and Leonard,
2008), and, typically, interact with each other for the first time (Teubner, 2018). The
mere existence of mutual trust between these two peers, however, is not su cient to
engender a transaction, if it takes place within an environment that is perceived as un-
trustworthy (Sundararajan, 2016; Möhlmann, 2016; Einav, Farronato, and Levin, 2015;
Weber, 2014). Consequently, to understand trust relationships on P2P sharing plat-
forms, trust needs to be considered from a threefold perspective—peers, platforms, and
products (Hawlitschek, Teubner, and Weinhardt, 2016).
This renders trust a crucial element for a P2P sharing platform. Also referred to as
the “most often used word in any debate about the sharing economy” (Nesta, 2016), it
is a widely discussed topic in literature.
To induce trust, platform operators incorporate reputation mechanisms (e.g., star
ratings, text reviews, profile images) to establish trust in the products or services o↵ered
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as well as in the individual peers (Dann, Teubner, and Weinhardt, 2019; Teubner and
Dann, 2018). Nevertheless, the potential of reputation mechanisms is limited. Star
ratings, the most popular among these, are subject to a positive bias, in which users
tend to award the maximum rating (Teubner and Dann, 2018; Ert, Fleischer, and Magen,
2016; Ke, 2017b; Slee, 2013). On Airbnb, for instance, the average rating of close to
95% of all listings is between 4.5 or 5.0 stars, and virtually no listing has a standing rating
of 3.5 stars or below (Zervas, Proserpio, and Byers, 2015). Moreover, this positivity bias
also applies to text reviews (Teubner and Dann, 2018; Zervas, Proserpio, and Byers,
2015), diminishing the informative power of these mechanisms. Even self-generated
reputation mechanisms such as profile images are subject to unwanted side e↵ects. While
profile images are found to engender trust in the formation of a transaction (Bridges and
Vásquez, 2018), they may foster discrimination, a typical phenomenon on P2P sharing
platform (Edelman and Luca, 2014; Edelman, Luca, and Svirsky, 2017). This becomes
particularly evident, considering that the majority of peers on those platforms reveal
their faces with their self-uploaded profile images (Teubner and Dann, 2018).
Beyond trust induced by reputational mechanisms, trust may be induced from a
technological angle (Söllner, Ho↵mann, and Leimeister, 2016). The blockchain, also
referred to as a “trust machine” (The Economist, 2015), promises to revolutionize P2P
platforms and enable “trust-free” systems (Greiner and Wang, 2015). Despite calls to
examine the blockchain technology in the context of P2P platforms (Sundararajan, 2016;
Beck, Müller-Bloch, and King, 2018; Risius and Spohrer, 2017; Gertz, Puschmann,
and Alt, 2016; Notheisen, Hawlitschek, and Weinhardt, 2017), Information Systems
literature on blockchain-driven trust in this context is scarce (Hawlitschek, Notheisen,
and Teubner, 2018; Seebacher and Schüritz, 2017). Previous research mainly considers
blockchain-based systems from a cryptocurrency (e.g., Bitcoin) perspective (Auinger
and Riedl, 2018; Sas and Khairuddin, 2015; Ahangama and Poo, 2016; Ahangama and
Poo, 2016; Ahangama and Poo, 2016; Ingram and Morisse, 2016; Ingram and Morisse,
2016), relies on simulation-based evidence (Tumasjan and Beutel, 2019), or constitutes
conceptual work (Mehrwald et al., 2019).
Summarizing, studies on the perceptual, intentional, and behavioral e↵ects within
the intersection of trust on blockchain-enabled P2P platforms remain scarce. Thereby,
our study addresses a research gap by providing evidence on the causal e↵ects of a
blockchain-enabled platform on trust perception and their transaction-fostering poten-
tial.
3.3.3 Research Model and Hypotheses
We analyze the influence of blockchain as an underlying technology for P2P platforms on
transaction intentions and corresponding trust perceptions, by replicating and extending
Hawlitschek’s pilot study (Hawlitschek, 2019) of trust relationships in a blockchain-
enabled sharing scenario (see Figure 3.12).
The model is based on the well-established work of Söllner and colleagues 2016,
which suggests a model of trust in the context of general IS usage. We adapt their
model by replacing trust in the Internet with trust in blockchain technology and trust in
the community of Internet users with trust in the community of blockchain users. Next,
we replace intention to use with intention to rent as a proxy for the intention to enter
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Figure 3.12: Research Model of Hawlitschek, Teubner, and Weinhardt (2016).
a transaction. Last, to adapt the model to the context of P2P sharing platforms, we
replace the constructs trust in the information system and trust in provider with the 3P
model from Hawlitschek, Teubner, and Weinhardt (2016).
Following the argumentation of Söllner, Ho↵mann, and Leimeister (2016), we hy-
pothesize that trust in blockchain technology has a positive e↵ect on three targets—that
is trust in the community of blockchain users, trust in platform, and trust in peers. The
rationale behind these hypotheses is that people tend to trust more in other parties if
they act in a trustworthy environment (Söllner, Ho↵mann, and Leimeister, 2016). This
environment can be the Internet—as in the study of Söllner, Ho↵mann, and Leimeister
(2016)—but also a blockchain-based environment.
H1a: Trust in blockchain technology has a positive e↵ect on trust in the community of
blockchain users.
H1b: Trust in blockchain technology has a positive e↵ect on trust in platform.
H1c: Trust in blockchain technology has a positive e↵ect on trust in peers.
As Söllner, Ho↵mann, and Leimeister (2016) argue, IS often depend on services or
content provided by members of the community of internet users, and thus, trust in an
IS increases with the trust in the community. We argue that the same holds true for
blockchain-based platforms. The e↵ect might even be more prevalent since the commu-
nity of blockchain users (in many cases) directly contributes to the core functionalities
of the blockchain-based platform itself by contributing to the consensus mechanism. At
the same time, it is likely that a contributor to the consensus mechanism is at the same
time also a user of the platform, and thus, trust in the community will also positively
a↵ect trust in peers.
H2a: Trust in the community of blockchain users has a positive e↵ect on trust in plat-
form.
H2b: Trust in the community of blockchain users has a positive e↵ect on trust in peers.
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The 3P model of Hawlitschek, Teubner, and Weinhardt (2016) suggests that the
three targets of trust in peer, platform, and product have positive e↵ects on transaction
intentions in the sharing economy. Likewise, trust transfer theory suggests that trust
may well be transferred between di↵erent sources, such as platforms and peers in the
sharing economy (e.g., Teubner, Hawlitschek, and Adam, 2019) or peers and their of-
fered products.
H3a: Trust in platform has a positive e↵ect on trust in peers.
H3b: Trust in platform has a positive e↵ect on intention to rent.
H4a: Trust in peers has a positive e↵ect on trust in products.
H4b: Trust in peers has a positive e↵ect on intention to rent.
H5: Trust in products has a positive e↵ect on intention to rent.
3.3.4 Method & Procedure
To test our research model, we conduct an online survey among a sample of Millennials
of IS students (undergraduate) recruited at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology using
the organizing and recruiting software hroot (Bock, Baetge, and Nicklisch, 2014). For
our study, using a well-educated student sample is reasonable, as this group of people
represents one of the main user groups on P2P platforms (Godelnik, 2017; Ranzini et
al., 2017; European Union, 2017; PwC, 2015; Akbar, Mai, and Ho↵mann, 2016). First,
participants were introduced to a blockchain-based P2P sharing platform. This introduc-
tion to the scenario was conducted by means of a written text and a subsequent video
outlining the vision of a blockchain-based P2P sharing platform utilizing IoT assets—the
Slock.it platform (https://slock.it/). Second, participants answered a questionnaire of
fully randomized survey items (previously validated by Hawlitschek, 2019). To ensure
content validity, the operationalization of all constructs follows established scales from
literature (see Table D.13). Additionally, we control for demographic and trait informa-
tion, including risk propensity (Dohmen et al., 2011), disposition to trust (Gefen, 2000),
familiarity with blockchain technology, age, gender, and highest education degree. We
further included multiple attention checks, as well as language proficiency, to ensure a
high level of quality among the answers. Participants were incentivized with monetary
rewards (equaling €10.39/hour per person).
3.3.5 Results
Due to the exploratory research objective of the study and the inclusion of formative
scales in the model, we employ Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling
(PLS-SEM) for the analysis (Hair et al., 2016; Gefen, Straub, and Rigdon, 2011). We
follow the two-stage approach by Hair et al. (2016) to analyze and interpret the research
model.
Data collection took place in May 2019. Initially, 177 participants provided complete
answers to the survey. Due to incorrect answers to one or more of the control questions,
we excluded 16 participants from further analysis. The final sample consisted of 161
participants, a sample size adequate to detect small-sized e↵ects with a power of .80
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and alpha of .01 (Cohen, 1992).
Within the sample, the average age was 23.30 (SD=3.44), and among the par-
ticipants, about 35% were female. The survey lasted, on average, 16.14 minutes
(SD=3.60). The results for risk propensity (mean=6.22, SD=1.96; measured on an
11-point scale ranging from 0: not at all willing, to 10: very willing to take risks) indi-
cates that the sample’s average tends to be willing to take risks. Regarding disposition to
trust, the sample’s mean value is 3.97 (SD=1.27; 7-point Likert scale with the endpoints
1: strongly disagree, 7: strongly agree) and for familiarity with blockchain technology
the mean is 4.40 (SD=2.31; 11-point scale ranging from 0: not at all familiar, to 10:
very familiar). Table 3.16 provides descriptive statistics.
Next, we analyze the quality of the measurement model, starting with evaluating
internal consistency reliability, convergent as well as discriminant validity for the re-
flective constructs. For all these constructs, values for composite reliability (CR) and
Cronbach’s ↵ are above the proposed cuto↵ value of 0.7 [smallest CR value TPR (.821);
smallest Cronbach’s ↵ TPR (.719)], confirming internal consistency reliability. Concern-
ing convergent validity, we assessed each construct’s average variance extracted (AVE)
and each indicator’s outer loading. For the prior, all values were above the commonly
applied threshold value of 0.5 (Hair, Ringle, and Sarstedt, 2011), for the latter, however,
two items [TPE1 (.611), TPR2 (0.683) and TPR3 (.684)] had an outer loading below
0.7 (Hair et al., 2016) (Table 3). Following Hair et al. (2016), we examined whether the
threshold values for AVE and internal consistency reliability can be reached by removing
these items. Since the threshold values have already been met before, we decided to
retain the items and proceed with the assessment of discriminant validity. The Fornell-
Larcker criterion (Fornell and Larcker, 1981), the Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT),
as well as the consideration of cross-loadings, were checked, all confirming su cient dis-
criminant validity. Table 3.16 summarizes the properties of the reflective measurement
scales.
For the formative constructs, we analyze the variance inflation factor (VIF) of the
formative indicators to assess the measurement models for collinearity between indica-
tors. All VIF values were below 5 (highest value 1.181 for TBL1 and TBL2), indicating
that no collinearity issues between the indicators are occurring. Formative indicator
relevance and significance testing resulted in the decision to drop TBU1 (outer weight
insignificant, and outer loading below 0.5). Last, we control for collinearity issues among
predicting constructs. All VIF values are well below the cuto↵ value of 5 (Hair et al.,
2016), providing evidence for not facing collinearity issues within our structural model.
Table 3.16: Properties of measurement scales. Diagonal values indicate the square root






CR AVE HTMT* ITR TBL TBU TPE TPL TPR
ITR 3.157 1.312 .905 .940 .840 no .916
TBL 3.429 1.068 / / / no .559
TBU 3.323 0.923 / / / no .233 .437
TPE 3.157 0.822 .807 .874 .639 no .309 .471 .424 .799
TPL 3.152 0.925 .820 .881 .650 no .544 .626 .473 .642 .806
TPR 3.366 0.949 .719 .821 .535 no .312 .505 .451 .614 .663 .732
To test the structural model, we employ PLS-SEM using SmartPLS 3.0 (Ringle,
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Wende, and Becker, 2019). Path significances were obtained by means of bootstrapping
with 5,000 subsamples, no sign changes, bias-corrected and accelerated, and two-tailed
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*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05
Figure 3.13: Results of PLS structural equation modeling (standardized path coe cients,
R2 adjusted)
As hypothesized, higher trust in blockchain technology has a positive influence on
trust in the community of blockchain users (H1a), as well as on trust in the service
providing platform (H1b). However, we do not find evidence for a significant relationship
between trust in blockchain technology and trust in the providing peer, which is why
hypothesis H1c cannot be confirmed. In line with H2a, higher trust in the community
of blockchain users has a positive e↵ect on trust in platform. The second hypothesis
emanating from trust in the community of blockchain users, by contrast, is not signif-
icant, indicating no support for H2b. Both hypotheses, which have their origin in trust
in platform (H3a and H3b), can be confirmed, thereby suggesting that higher trust in
platform leads to higher trust in peers and that it significantly increases the intention
to rent a product. Following H4a, we find evidence for higher trust in the providing peer
leading to higher trust in their o↵ered product. However, neither a positive e↵ect of
trust in peer on intention to rent (H4b) nor of trust in product on intention to rent (H5)
can be confirmed—not confirming the proposed hypotheses.
Interestingly, only paths passing through trust in platform show a significant e↵ect
on the dependent variable intention to rent, revealing that trust in platform remains the
only relevant predictor of intention to rent within the model. Overall, the model explains
28.7% (adj. R2) of the variance in the intention to rent, with trust in platform being the
only significant predictor (f2 = .259; medium e↵ect, classification following Henseler,
Ringle, and Sinkovics, 2009). Concerning the other e↵ect sizes, the e↵ect of trust in
blockchain on trust in platform (.389) and the e↵ect of trust in peer on trust in product
(.605) can be classified as large, whereas the e↵ect of trust in blockchain on trust in the
community of blockchain users (.236), as well as of trust in platform on trust in peer
(.272), constitute medium-sized e↵ects. The remaining significant relationship of trust
in community of blockchain users on trust in platform shows a small e↵ect size (.088).
Table 3.17 summarizes e↵ect sizes for all significant paths.
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Table 3.17: E↵ect Sizes following Cohen (1988)
Independent Construct Dependent Construct Coef. f2 E↵ect Size
TBL → TPL .518 .389 Large
TBL → TBU .437 .236 Medium
TBU → TPL .247 .088 Small
TPL → TPE .525 .272 Medium
TPL → ITR .620 .259 Medium
TPE → TPR .614 .605 Large
Multi-Group Analysis
To assess the e↵ects of control variables, we conduct a multi-group analysis (MGA).
Thereby, we can estimate sub-group specific e↵ects (Table 3.18). MGA yields seven
significant group-specific di↵erences. First, the relation of TPE and TPR is stronger
for male than for female participants. Next, the older half of participants account
for the e↵ect of TBL on TPL, while this e↵ect is insignificant for the younger half.
Furthermore, the senior participants show a more prominent e↵ect of TPL on ITR, and,
somehow surprisingly, show a significant negative e↵ect of TPR on ITR. The e↵ect of
TBL on TBU is stronger for participants less familiar with the blockchain and risk-seeking
participants. Last, we find an e↵ect of TBL on TPE—exclusively driven by participants
with lower trust propensity.
Table 3.18: Results of MGA Analysis.
Gender Age Familiarity Risk Prop. Trust Prop.
m f <23  23 <5  5 <7  7 <5  5
n:105 n:56 | | Sig. n:77 n:84 | | Sig. n:87 n:74 | | Sig. n:68 n:93 | | Sig. n:87 n:74 | | Sig.
H1a .340 .456 .116 n.s. .495 .422 .088 n.s. .550 .295 .282 * .589 .313 .284 * .473 .367 .118 n.s.
H1b .486 .551 .065 n.s. .601 .470 .129 n.s. .597 .456 .146 n.s. .533 .533 .002 n.s. .444 .546 .103 n.s.
H1c .244 .024 .268 n.s. .045 .175 .141 n.s. -.032 .193 .226 n.s. -.001 .101 .100 n.s. .240 -.153 .406 *
H2a .359 .159 .200 n.s. .115 .341 .232 * .153 .351 .212 n.s. .216 .262 .055 n.s. .313 .184 .131 n.s.
H2b .157 .192 .035 n.s. .161 .129 .027 n.s. .181 .142 .034 n.s. .271 .113 .144 n.s. -.002 .270 .293 n.s.
H3a .419 .567 .148 n.s. .571 .459 .123 n.s. .633 .419 .213 n.s. .479 .546 .059 n.s. .530 .551 .016 n.s.
H3b .634 .596 .038 n.s. .403 .795 .387 * .563 .622 .040 n.s. .690 .547 .134 n.s. .597 .639 .041 n.s.
H4a .718 .563 .155 * .590 .665 .087 n.s. .632 .642 .011 n.s. .623 .626 .012 n.s. .670 .551 .126 n.s.
H4b -.067 -.038 .029 n.s. -.073 -.011 .064 n.s. -.029 -.072 .044 n.s. -.166 .027 .193 n.s. -.109 .010 .128 n.s.
H5 -.024 -.094 .069 n.s. .265 -.314 .578 ** .076 -.17 .228 n.s. -.038 -.080 .049 n.s. -.009 -.104 .108 n.s.
Qualitative Analysis
To better understand participants’ answers in the survey, we re-invited them for qual-
itative feedback. Doing so, we asked each participant to describe in their own words,
how the blockchain would a↵ect their perceptions in the outlined scenario. We received
192 answers, which we classified into first, a positive or negative assessment, and sec-
ond the six categories depicted in Figure 3.14. These categories were derived by initial
screening of all responses individually, then discussed, refined, and, finally, applied by two
researchers independently. With an average Cohen’s Kappa score of .632 across all cat-
egories, we achieve a substantial agreement among our raters (Landis and Koch, 1977).
Among the answers, stating to perceive an e↵ect (161 total), 39.75% name Security
aspects (79.69% positive), 34.16% Trustworthiness (90.91% positive), 10.56% Trans-
parency (all positive), 4.35% Reliability (85.71% positive), and 3.73% Privacy (50%
positive). 7,45% state to have not enough knowledge to evaluate a blockchain e↵ect.
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Figure 3.14: Categorization of participant answers. Categorization was non-exclusive
(i.e., each answer can be assigned to multiple categories)
3.3.6 Discussion
We conducted an online survey to investigate how the application of blockchain technol-
ogy in a P2P sharing scenario influences trusting beliefs. While previous research studies
the blockchain mainly from a Bitcoin perspective (Auinger and Riedl, 2018; Sas and
Khairuddin, 2015; Ahangama and Poo, 2016; Zarifis et al., 2015; Connolly and Kick,
2015; Connolly and Kick, 2015; Connolly and Kick, 2015), we consider the blockchain
from a more general perspective as a technological foundation of a sharing platform. To
the best of our knowledge, it represents the first study to provide reliable survey-based
evidence with a su cient sample size about the perception of such platforms. By assess-
ing the perceptions of a blockchain-enabled platform, we enable a better understanding
of how users evaluate potential transactions and how they are guided by their trust in
three substantial targets of trust—peer, platform, and product. Our study contributes
to theory and practice by showcasing how established trust relationships are influenced
by the application of blockchain technology and by suggesting means how platform
providers shall best answer to these influences. Interestingly, we do not find support for
four of our hypotheses, from which H4b and H5 embody well-established relations within
the P2P sharing economy and trust literature (Connolly and Kick, 2015; Huurne et al.,
2017). A potential explanation for this could be that as soon as a platform ecosystem is
based on a trusted and (assuming trusted interfaces) potentially “trust-free” technology,
other trust relationships are diminishing in importance, so that trust in the individual
transaction partner constitutes no longer an important predictor for the ultimate deci-
sion to enter a transaction on the platform. Trust in the facilitating platform run on
blockchain technology consequently increases in importance. In this context, users seem
to especially value blockchain’s security-, trustworthiness-, and transparency-related as-
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pects: “I would have a higher trust in the sharing platform since I do not have to trust
the other users anymore” [Respondent 107, male, 26].
Thus, we experience a shift from trust in individual transaction partners to trust in
platforms. Therefore, the term “trust-free systems” (Greiner and Wang, 2015) with
which the blockchain is frequently associated, fits in so far as trust in the individual
seems no longer to be a great matter of concern. Before such a platform landscape can
be successfully implemented, trust in the overall blockchain technology must be ensured.
In line with our results, there is a substantial e↵ect of trust in blockchain technology
on trust in platform. As a consequence, platforms need to build trust in the blockchain
technology itself. Interestingly, those e↵ects remain stable, though smaller, even when
controlling for experience with the blockchain technology itself, contrasting previous
literature describing it as an essential prerequisite (Greiner and Wang, 2015). A possible
explanation for this is the composition of our participant pool of IS student Millennials—
the explicit target group of P2P sharing services and familiar with technological novelties
(Greiner and Wang, 2015; Greiner and Wang, 2015; Greiner and Wang, 2015; PwC,
2015; Akbar, Mai, and Ho↵mann, 2016). Even though (and in line with the quantitative
data of our total sample) participants state that the blockchain “[. . . ] does not a↵ect
the credibility of the o↵ering users” [Respondent 103, female, 19 years], we find a trust-
enhancing e↵ect of trust in blockchain technology for the subgroup with a lower trusting
propensity.
Summarizing, platform managers may consider leveraging the blockchain technology
to increase the level of trust that users place in the platform. This can particularly
a↵ect novel platforms that lack an established user base. Especially here, reputation
mechanisms cannot attain their full potential, as they are often subject to the “cold start”
problem (Akbar, Mai, and Ho↵mann, 2016). This refers to the initial state of either the
platform user (or the platform itself), in which few or none transactions are completed,
and no reputation can be propagated by common reputation mechanisms (e.g., star
ratings, text reviews, profile images). Fostering first transactions would benefit both
sides of P2P platform users since it supports them realizing first transactions and build
a reputation on the platform. Platform providers should not entirely omit reputation
systems, since users may “still need confirmed reviews by other peers about the ‘sharing
partner‘ [. . . ] to trust the other person” [Respondent 182, female, 21 years]. The
combination of blockchain as the underlying technology of a platform with reputation
systems could be a viable strategy for platforms for which the blockchain “will not a↵ect
the reliability of the physical products” [Respondent 100, male, 29 years].
On the other hand, blockchain technology may help established platforms as well.
As soon as common reputation mechanisms are devalued by, for instance, inflationary
positive assessments (Akbar, Mai, and Ho↵mann, 2016; Akbar, Mai, and Ho↵mann,
2016; Akbar, Mai, and Ho↵mann, 2016; Akbar, Mai, and Ho↵mann, 2016; Akbar, Mai,
and Ho↵mann, 2016; Bridges and Vásquez, 2018), or a discriminatory use of these
(Edelman and Luca, 2014; Edelman, Luca, and Svirsky, 2017), trust in the platform and
the assurance of further transactions (and thereby the platform’s continued existence)
could be supported by an underlying blockchain technology.
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3.3.7 Limitations & Future Research
Like any study, the present paper faces limitations. First, the decision to enter a transac-
tion on a P2P sharing platform may di↵er from the statements made within a scenario-
based online survey—with potential external influences. While laboratory studies might
create a higher level of internal validity, field experiments might create a higher level of
external validity. Next, our sample of undergraduate Millennials lessens the generalizabil-
ity of our e↵ects. Although this group is particularly relevant for P2P sharing platforms,
a broader sample should be considered to derive more general implications. Further, as
our research model shows a number of unsupported hypotheses, e↵ects of demographic
and trait variables, and a certain amount of unexplained variance, this indicates potential
for further influencing factors to be considered. Future research may follow a broader
qualitative approach to identify further influencing factors. Last, longitudinal studies
are needed to clarify the e↵ects of diminishing trust-enhancing e↵ects for users with
higher familiarity with blockchain. The question arises if, in the long-term, “[h]aving
information about how Blockchain is working would increase my trust” [Respondent
30, female, 23 years] or “Blockchain is just a hype word” [Respondent 82, female, 26
years]. It this sense, we recommend putting more research e↵orts into the promising
and highly relevant field of trust in blockchain and distributed ledger technology as well
as the corresponding antecedents. Especially, we recommend to further investigate real-
world use-cases and platforms, which—admittedly and despite the hype during the last
years—still lack significant traction and success.
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3.4 How do Tax Compliance Labels Impact Sharing
Platform Consumers? An Empirical Study on the
Interplay of Trust, Moral, and Intention to Book
Following the analysis of how the technological layer of a platform itself a↵ects its users,
this chapter considers P2P platforms from a societal perspective. The main focus is on
the perception of users’ tax behavior. Certain platform-based business models facilitate
tax evasion as tax authorities typically lack information to monitor the income generated
by providers on these platforms. Moreover, it is not clear whether tax compliance of the
respective transaction partner constitutes a value for consumers at all. Therefore, this
study investigates the role of tax compliance for platform users by employing an online
experiment. The results show that consumers perceive providers’ tax compliance and
regard it as a trust-enhancing signal for which they are also willing to pay a premium.
The results also show how consumers’ moral norms moderate both the trust-building
e↵ect and the subsequent transaction intention. Based on the results, policymakers
should actively engage in cooperation with platform operators to ensure tax compliance
among users and a level playing field in the platform economy.
David Dann, Raphael Müller, Ann-Catherin Werner, Alexander Mädche & Christoph
Spengel12
3.4.1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, we have seen a tremendous digitalization of our economy
and society. In particular, digital platforms play an important role in this ongoing pro-
cess and have grown in popularity and size. Today, they are an integral part of the
economy (Mittendorf, Berente, and Holten, 2019; Zimmermann et al., 2018; European
Commission, 2016).
With that development, we have also seen the birth and rise of the so-called “sharing
economy” (Sundararajan, 2016; Teubner and Hawlitschek, 2018), in which idle resources
are e ciently shared among di↵erent user groups. Peer-to-Peer (P2P) platforms are
considered particularly interesting in terms of user uptake, revenues, and firm value (Zijm
et al., 2019). These platforms facilitate the exchange of goods and services between
mostly private providers and consumers in various segments (e.g., accommodation, retail,
mobility, Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002; Ma, Neeraj, and Naaman 2017; Teubner and
Flath 2015). The worldwide gross volume generated by the platform-driven gig and
sharing economy is estimated to grow to USD 455 billion by 2023 doubling the gross
volume of USD 204 billion in 2018 (Mastercard and Kaiser Associates, 2019). One of
these key sectors is P2P accommodation sharing (European Commission, 2016). Airbnb,
the most prominent player within this domain, provides listings from over 220 countries
and regions and estimates that there have been over 500 million guest arrivals at listings
from their platform since it was founded in 2008.13 Depending on the platform’s revenue
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model, platform operators are estimated to receive up to 15% of the revenues (Vaughan
and Daverio, 2016).
Besides their increasing economic relevance, platform businesses, however, are said
to cause several problems for the economy and society in general. For the prominent
example of P2P accommodation sharing, the most pressing concerns include local side
e↵ects such as over-touristification (Oskam and Boswijk, 2016), ever-increasing rent
prices (Gurran and Phibbs, 2017), and illegal hospitality operations (Schäfer and Braun,
2016). Furthermore, ensuring an adequate taxation of the sharing economy’s booming
revenues is identified as one of the major regulatory challenges that policymakers on
national and international level are concerned with. In the US, for instance, less than
25% of all Airbnb providers meet local tax obligations (Bibler, Teltser, and Tremblay,
2019). For the German market, the annual revenues generated via Airbnb amount
to approximately e 700 million and would generate income tax revenues of more than
e 100 million (Bräutigam, Ludwig, and Spengel, 2019). In light of the volume of tax
revenues at stake, ensuring tax compliance is one of the most salient public interests
in the platform economy (Frenken et al., 2019). Hereby, tax compliance describes the
decision of the income earning individuals to declare their income truthfully and to
pay the respective amount of taxes on that income, in accordance with the applicable
tax laws (Slemrod, 2018; Mascagni, 2018). This raises questions on the adequate
implementation of both indirect (value-added) and direct (income) taxation systems
(European Parliament, 2017). Recently, the OECD stated that improving self-reporting
by individual providers (e.g., Airbnb hosts) is one of the main policy concerns and called
for exploring di↵erent design options to ensure that taxable income is truthfully reported
(OECD, 2019).
On the other hand, the success of the P2P sharing platforms depends on the typical
characteristics of two-sided markets. The one user group, providers (e.g., hosts), benefits
from the existence and activity of the other, consumers (e.g., guests)—and vice versa
(McAfee A and Brynjolfsson, 2017). In this context, research has shown that platform
users’ mutual trust represents one of, if not the most important, prerequisite for users
on P2P platforms (Gebbia, 2016; Hawlitschek, Teubner, and Weinhardt, 2016), and
thereby, the platforms overall continued existence (Hodapp, Hawlitschek, and Kramer,
2019). If providers are, however, suspected to engage in tax evasion by non-reporting
their income realized via the transactions on the platform, they may be threatened with
mistrust from prospective customers. In the domain of P2P platforms, arising mistrust,
in turn, typically also raises fear of fraud, misconduct, or even harassment (Abramova,
Krasnova, and Tan, 2017; Krasnova et al., 2009). To address trust-related aspects in
general, platform operators implement reputation mechanisms within their platform de-
sign to ensure and propose a high level of service quality. One of these mechanisms are
quality labels. Visual labels (often referred to as “badges”) aim to propagate certain
qualifications or service quality standards (Hesse et al., 2020; Teubner and Hawlitschek,
2018; Dann, Teubner, and Weinhardt, 2019). Studies document that the information
inherent to these labels translates into increased levels of trust, willingness to pay more
for o↵ers from such providers (Abramova, Krasnova, and Tan, 2017; Liang et al., 2017),
and transaction numbers (Ke, 2017b). While tax-relevant behavior of providers remains
unobservable for consumers, the important question here is whether providers can ben-
efit from indicating their tax compliance with regard to their platform-based income.
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Against this backdrop, we provide first answers to this question by examining whether a
quality label that signals tax compliance a↵ects consumers’ evaluations of the respective
provider’s trustworthiness and, in turn, their transaction intentions (i.e., to book) at
such a provider. Specifically, we raise the following research question:
RQ1: How does the presence of a tax compliance label a↵ect consumers’ trust towards
and, in turn, their intentions to book at the tax-compliant provider?
The extent to which consumers respond to the label likely depends on the perceived
relevance of tax compliance for the consumers. Personal values and moral beliefs are
known to be important determinants for individuals’ behavior (Bergquist, Nilsson, and
Schultz, 2019) and to influence their economic decisions (Frey and Torgler, 2007; An-
tonetti and Anesa, 2017). Given that tax evasion is a controversial topic due to its
adverse e↵ects on public budgets, we examine the role of moral norms on consumers’
evaluation of the tax compliance label to understand the mechanisms through which
a tax compliance label influences consumers’ reactions. Therefore, we also raise the
research question:
RQ2: How do individual moral norms moderate the e↵ect of tax compliance labels?
It is important to note that the e↵ectiveness of a tax compliance label critically hinges
on how such labels are awarded. Only if the platform can assure beyond doubt that a
certain provider does in fact pay taxes on their platform income, the label can be assumed
to be credible and hence have an e↵ect. The platform operator, therefore, needs to share
information with the tax authority and displays the tax compliance label on an individual
provider’s profile once it receives information that the provider has correctly declared
his platform-related income and paid the respective tax liability. Airbnb already shares
some information with tax authorities and has entered co-operations with several local
tax authorities and municipalities to collect occupancy taxes (Airbnb, 2020b; Beretta,
2017).
In our paper, we develop a research model tying together the e↵ects of a tax com-
pliance label and consumers’ booking intention. Our analysis is based on the theoretical
lens of signaling theory (Spence, 1973). We evaluate our research model by means
of an online experiment (n=286) in which participants take the role of consumers and
evaluate a set of available listings and, implicitly, the associated providers. Furthermore,
we provide qualitative insights into consumers’ perceptions of tax-compliant providers
based on open-ended written responses.
Overall, our paper makes two main contributions. First, we extend existing knowl-
edge about consumers’ transaction intentions on sharing economy platforms. We show
that consumers do indeed reflect on providers’ tax behavior, finding that a visual tax
compliance label positively influences consumers’ trust in a provider. Moreover, con-
sumers’ moral norms take a moderating role in both the trust-fostering e↵ect of the tax
compliance label and the positive e↵ect of trust on consumers’ willingness to enter a
transaction. Prior literature on the role of tax compliance for consumer behavior reports
mixed results on whether corporations face reputational costs for their tax planning (i.e.,
legal and “grey area” measures to reduce the tax liability; Slemrod, 2018) (Gallemore,
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Maydew, and Thornock, 2014; Hardeck and Hertl, 2014; Hoopes, Robinson, and Slem-
rod, 2018). To the best of our knowledge, this study represents the first to examine
consumers’ reaction to tax behavior of P2P accommodation sharing users. Second, our
results provide several practical implications for platform users, operators and policymak-
ers. Consumers are not only more willing to enter transactions with providers that hold
the tax compliance label, they also are willing to pay a price premium. This indicates a
proverbial “win-win-win” situation for platform users, operators, and policymakers.
3.4.2 Conceptual Background and Related Work
Taxation in the Platform Economy
The taxation of the digital economy is under large public scrutiny (OECD, 2015). The
profits of the platform operator (e.g., Airnbnb, Uber) are subject to corporate income tax
in the country of residence of the business (i.e., the place of legal seat or management
Endres and Spengel, 2015; OECD, 2017). However, the key challenge regarding the
sharing economy is to ensure the taxation of the individual providers, who generate
income on the platform. The taxation of income resulting from platform-based activities
follows the same rules that have been established to tax the income of individuals and
businesses in the traditional economy. The income realized by the provider typically
constitutes taxable income and qualifies either as private income or as business income
depending on the professional capacity with which the activities are carried out. In
case of P2P accommodation sharing, the income from letting apartments or rooms
is generally treated as rental income from immovable property which is taxed at the
personal income tax rate. This means that the providers are responsible for filing and
reporting the income and related expenses in their tax returns according to existing tax
regulations (Kußmaul and Kloster, 2016; Beretta, 2017).14 From a legal perspective,
the tax treatment of income realized by providers is, therefore, unambiguously regulated
by existing tax laws.
For the German market, Bräutigam, Ludwig, and Spengel (2019) examine the activ-
ities on Airbnb. Using publicly available data, they estimate an annual turnover realized
via transactions on Airbnb of e 700 million in 2018 and, with that, an income tax revenue
of roughly e 114 million. However, tax authorities typically face di culties in enforcing
existing tax provisions for the entire platform economy. In particular, tax authorities lack
information about the numerous online transactions between (mostly private) providers
and consumers and have to rely on the self-reported information provided in tax returns
(European Commission, 2016; Elliot, 2018). Furthermore, the declared personal income
in the providers’ tax returns is suspected to deviate from their actual income (Bräutigam,
Ludwig, and Spengel, 2019). The deviations mainly occur for two reasons.
First, many providers are only occasionally letting their apartments or rooms and
may not be aware of the tax implications of their activities (Grlica, 2017). According
to a survey among providers in the UK, 54% of respondents stated that they are not
required to pay taxes on their sharing economy income (Rahim et al., 2017). Another
14In addition to income taxes, most jurisdictions also levy consumption taxes (e.g., the value added
tax, VAT, in the European Union) on the monetary consideration paid by the consumer to the provider
for the provision of goods and services. If the annual turnover of the provider exceeds a certain threshold,
the provider is obliged to register with national tax authorities and to account for VAT (Beretta, 2018).
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13% of respondents did not know about their tax liability. Further, the determination of
taxable income is not trivial and requires detailed documentation of income and related
expenses. Airbnb and Uber provide some general information on potential tax obligations
but no specific guidance for providers (Airbnb, 2020c; Uber, 2020).
Second, some providers may deliberately evade taxes by reporting low or no earned
income from renting activities, which renders the tax enforcement even more burden-
some. Tax evasion refers to all illegal and intentional actions by individuals to minimize
their tax obligations (Alm and Torgler, 2011). P2P platforms arguably facilitate tax eva-
sion as tax authorities lack resources and e↵ective mechanisms for monitoring providers.
Alm, Deskins, and McKee (2009) show that self-reporting and low detection probability
induce higher non-compliance of taxpayers. Besides some anecdotal evidence covered
by the media (Ramthun, 2018; Fricke and Linnemann, 2018), empirical evidence on the
extent of tax evasion by providers in the platform economy is scarce. Two recent stud-
ies provide strong, but indirect evidence that Airbnb providers do not report their full
income in the absence of additional compliance mechanisms (Bibler, Teltser, and Trem-
blay, 2019; Wilking, 2019). And indeed, the estimated losses in tax revenues resulting
from the discrepancy between declared and actual income are substantial. For the US,
Bibler, Teltser, and Tremblay (2019) conclude that less than 25% of Airbnb providers
comply with local tax obligations. Non-compliant providers gain an unfair advantage
over honest providers as they can demand lower prices and, thereby, distort competition
with traditional providers such as the traditional hotel industry (OECD, 2019). More
importantly, tax evasion challenges public budgets—a context, which can lead to moral
reflections regarding the individual responsibility towards a society.
Moral Norms
In the tax compliance literature, scholars argue that moral norms are a central explanation
of why most people pay their taxes even though detection probabilities and fines are
rather low (Torgler et al., 2008; Pickhardt and Prinz, 2014). In fact, personal moral
norms with respect to paying taxes are strongly correlated with the individual decision to
comply with tax regulations (Wenzel, 2004; Cummings et al., 2009; Jimenez and Iyer,
2016; Fochmann, Müller, and Overesch, 2018).
People define their moral standards based on personal values and beliefs. The con-
struct of “personal moral norms” is closely related to personal attitudes (i.e., the eval-
uation of the outcome of a particular behavior). Botetzagias, Dima, and Malesios
(2015), for instance show this in the context of recycling intentions. Personal norms
are strongly influenced by social norms of the relevant reference group, which may be
personally adopted and internalized (Schwartz, 1977; Luttmer and Singhal, 2014; Hof-
mann, Hoelzl, and Kirchler, 2008). In line with this, Frey and Torgler (2007) conclude
that the individual tax morale depends on the pro-social behavior of other taxpayers.
Prior research suggests consumers take moral considerations into account when in-
teracting with companies. Hoopes, Robinson, and Slemrod (2018) find that consumers’
sentiment for brands of domestic firms declines after the firms’ actual tax payments are
publicly disclosed by the government. Similarly, consumers evaluate firms’ reputation
and ethicality more negatively if these firms are associated with strategic tax reduction
(Hardeck and Hertl, 2014; Antonetti and Anesa, 2017). The study of Hardeck and Hertl
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(2014) shows that the reputation of tax planning firms is significantly lower among con-
sumers who consider strategies that reduce the tax burden as unethical. The authors
conclude that moral beliefs are an important criterion for consumers when evaluating
firms’ observable corporate tax behavior. Yet, the overall e↵ect of moral norms on ac-
tual purchase decisions is less clear. According to a recent survey among US consumers,
participants indicate higher willingness to purchase from firms that did not engage in
any form of corporate tax planning (Asay et al., 2018). In experimental studies, partic-
ipants penalize tax avoiding firms with a reduced willingness to pay for their products
and overall lower purchase intentions (Hardeck and Hertl, 2014; Antonetti and Anesa,
2017). In contrast, Gallemore, Maydew, and Thornock (2014) do not observe changes
in sales or advertising expenses of US firms that have been revealed to engage in tax
planning. Still, the evidence implies that consumers are aware of morality aspects with
respect to tax compliance.
Labels, Reputation, and Trust
Demonstrating trustworthiness is essential for successful participation on P2P platforms
(Tussyadiah and Park, 2018). Studies have shown trust in a prospective transaction
partner is a crucial factor and that a lack of trust is likely to hinder the realization
of any transaction (Hawlitschek, Teubner, and Gimpel, 2016). Unsurprisingly, major
platforms explicitly state to design for trust (Gebbia, 2016) and give users the opportunity
to establish their trustworthiness and to establish a reputation on the platform. This
reputation is of vital importance for providers as they have to market themselves via
the platform to generate demand (Tussyadiah, 2016b). To this end, platform operators
implement various artifacts such as star ratings or text review systems (Hesse et al.,
2020; Dann et al., 2020b).
Among the most successful trust-building artifacts are platform-specific visual labels.
Typically, these labels are granted by platforms themselves and are intended to certify a
user’s superiority in terms of one or more value dimensions. This separating component
of superiority may relate to di↵erent aspects. It may indicate that the user has demon-
strated a particularly high level of service quality in the past (e.g., consistently high
evaluations from transaction partners), has achieved a particular proficiency or achieve-
ment on the platform (e.g., long-term membership), or has been verified in some form
(e.g., by means of an ID card). Indeed, scholars show that consumers are willing to
pay more for o↵ers from such providers (Abramova, Krasnova, and Tan, 2017; Liang
et al., 2017). On Airbnb, for instance, the Superhost label attests that a provider fulfils
excellent standards in the dimensions communication, commitment, guest satisfaction,
and experience (Airbnb, 2014b). The e↵ectiveness of such labels is undisputed. Users
state to perceive providers with the Superhost label as high-quality and are willing to pay
a price premium (Liang et al., 2017). Further empirical evidence reflects this pattern
where quality labels appear to be a significant driver of prices (Teubner et al., 2016;
Wang and Nicolau, 2017; Kakar et al., 2018) and the amount of realized transactions
(Ke, 2017b). Given that no o cial nor otherwise visible verification of the tax-compliant
behavior is available, consumers are not able to di↵erentiate tax-compliant (i.e., honest)
providers from non-compliant providers. Since, at the same time, individual tax evasion
is perceived as immoral behavior (Kirchler, Maciejovsky, and Schneider, 2003; Frey and
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Torgler, 2007), a non-compliant tax behavior on P2P sharing platforms poses a risk to
their general reputation—and the platform economy as a whole.
Signaling Theory
To provide a theoretical frame for the role of tax compliance labels in our study, we
draw on signaling theory (Spence, 1973). The theory assumes markets with information
asymmetry, for instance, between job seekers and employers or online vendors and cus-
tomers. According to signaling theory, the more informed side (i.e., job seekers, sellers)
can use signaling (or signals) to demonstrate their otherwise unobservable quality (e.g.,
talent, skill, intelligence, product quality; Basoglu and Hess, 2014). One of the funda-
mental principles of signals is that they are inherently costly. The individual signaling
costs depend on the underlying trait that the signal is intended to represent, that is,
higher quality is associated with lower costs. For instance, wealth is clearly signaled by
a $250K sports car or a $75K wristwatch since these signals are prohibitively expensive
for non-wealthy individuals. Moreover in biology, it is assumed that gazelles’ stotting
behavior (i.e., jumping into the air, lifting all four feet o↵ the ground simultaneously)
is used to signal physical fitness to predators (which, in turn, target other, non-stotting
gazelles). Another example is the signaling of high product quality through the provision
of warranties. For sellers of low-quality products, this strategy will—ceteris paribus—be
much more costly as their products will fail more often and cause warranty claims. This
cost di↵erentiation for high- and low-quality “sellers” causes a separating equilibrium
in which it is only worthwhile for high-quality sellers to acquire the costly signal. The
signal itself therefore becomes a separating factor.
Within the context of platforms and accommodation sharing in particular, similar
informational asymmetries between consumers and providers exist. This aspect becomes
particularly precarious considering that (1) in almost every transaction on P2P platforms,
both sides interact with each other for the first time (Teubner, 2018), and (2) most o↵ers
are run by private individuals rather than corporate hospitality providers (Ke, 2017b). In
this sense, tax compliance labels constitute a signal of honesty, integrity, and a sincere
interest in societal well-being and the common good through paying taxes (as credibly
documented by the signal). The underlying premise here is that for honest and sincere
providers, paying taxes represents a matter of course. For them, in the sense of the
theory, providing this signal does not incur any additional costs since they would pay
taxes in any case. For dishonest providers who would rather refrain from paying taxes
on their rental revenues, in contrast, providing the signal (tax compliance label) comes
at a much higher cost, that is, the cost of actually paying the taxes.
Related Work
With respect to the platform economy, recent tax research has mainly focused on quan-
tifying the extent of non-compliance on P2P platforms (Bibler, Teltser, and Tremblay,
2019; Wilking, 2019). While non-compliance seems to be widespread among individual
providers on P2P platforms (Ramthun, 2018), it is unclear whether tax compliance of
providers constitutes a relevant factor for platform consumers and influences their de-
cision to enter transactions. Previous studies mainly examine consumers’ reactions to
certain tax behavior by companies (e.g., Hoopes, Robinson, and Slemrod 2018; Asay
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et al. 2018; Hardeck, Harden, and Upton 2019) on consumer reactions to corporate
tax planning). In this context, only Hardeck and Hertl (2014) investigate the role of
individual norms to frame the perception of corporate tax strategies. In contrast to
legal tax reduction strategies, tax evasion constitutes an illegal infringement of tax law.
Since consumers’ acceptance of illegal tax evasion by other individuals likely di↵ers from
their attitude toward legal tax planning (Kirchler, Maciejovsky, and Schneider, 2003;
Kasper et al., 2018), insights on consumer reactions from prior studies might not be
directly transferable to the platform economy. Hence, the examination of, so to speak,
individual’s tax strategies on platforms remain unconsidered so far. Platform economy
literature shows that visual labels constitute an e↵ective means to establish trust and
to boost individuals’ reputation (Liang et al., 2017; Teubner et al., 2016; Wang and
Nicolau, 2017; Kakar et al., 2018; Ke, 2017b). The consideration of labels as a signal
for tax compliance, however, has not been considered in the literature so far. Thereby,
bringing both the platform economy and tax perspectives together, our interdisciplinary
approach addresses a clear research gap (see Table 3.19). We examine tax evasion on
P2P platforms by identifying causal e↵ects of the interplay of visual tax compliance
labels, moral norms, trust, and transaction intention.











Kirchler, Maciejovsky, and Schneider (2003) ⇥ ⇥ ⇥
Wenzel (2004) ⇥ ⇥ ⇥
Frey and Torgler (2007) ⇥ ⇥ ⇥
Hofmann, Hoelzl, and Kirchler (2008) ⇥ ⇥ ⇥
Torgler et al. (2008) ⇥ ⇥ ⇥
Cummings et al. (2009) ⇥ ⇥ ⇥
Hardeck and Hertl (2014) ⇥ ⇥ ⇥ ⇥
Pickhardt and Prinz (2014) ⇥ ⇥ ⇥
Gallemore, Maydew, and Thornock (2014) ⇥ ⇥ ⇥
Jimenez and Iyer (2016) ⇥ ⇥ ⇥
Antonetti and Anesa (2017) ⇥ ⇥ ⇥
Asay et al. (2018) ⇥ ⇥ ⇥
Fochmann, Müller, and Overesch (2018) ⇥ ⇥ ⇥
Hoopes, Robinson, and Slemrod (2018) ⇥ ⇥ ⇥
Kasper et al. (2018) ⇥ ⇥ ⇥
Bibler, Teltser, and Tremblay (2019) ⇥ ⇥
Wilking (2019) ⇥ ⇥
Hawlitschek, Teubner, and Gimpel (2016) ⇥ ⇥
Teubner et al. (2016) ⇥ ⇥ ⇥
Tussyadiah (2016b) ⇥ ⇥
Abramova, Krasnova, and Tan (2017) ⇥ ⇥
Ke (2017b) ⇥ ⇥
Liang et al. (2017) ⇥ ⇥
Neumann and Gutt (2017) ⇥ ⇥
Scheiber (2017) ⇥
Teubner, Hawlitschek, and Dann (2017) ⇥ ⇥
Wang and Nicolau (2017) ⇥ ⇥
Xie and Zhenxing (2017) ⇥ ⇥
Kakar et al. (2018) ⇥ ⇥
Tussyadiah and Park (2018) ⇥ ⇥ ⇥
Ert and Fleischer (2019) ⇥ ⇥ ⇥
This Study ⇥ ⇥ ⇥ ⇥ ⇥
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3.4.3 Hypotheses Development
To understand how signals of tax compliance manifest themselves in consumers’ percep-
tions of providers and how this perception ultimately a↵ects their willingness to enter
into a transaction with them, our research model (Figure 3.15) regards the dimensions
of trust and moral norms. We approximate the transaction intention by means of cus-
tomers’ intention to book an o↵er on a P2P accommodation sharing platform. Since the
positive association of trust and intention to book has already been demonstrated con-
clusively by various studies (e.g., Teubner and Hawlitschek 2018; Teubner et al. 2014;
Hawlitschek, Teubner, and Gimpel 2016; Liang, Choi, and Joppe 2018b; Mittendorf
2017), we consider this positive relationship as given. We develop our hypotheses in the
following.
Moral Norms
Intention to BookTrust (in Provider)Tax Label




Gender P2P Familiarity Tax Experience
Figure 3.15: Research Model
The Influence of Tax Compliance Label on Trust (H1)
Existing literature shows that labels imply quality (Liang et al., 2017) and can establish
trust (Teubner and Hawlitschek, 2018). Platform users even seem to be well aware
of the e↵ectiveness of these labels and claim to use them strategically (Neumann and
Gutt, 2017; Liang et al., 2017). Signaling theory in the context of tax compliance hence
means that labels are a necessary means to establish a separating equilibrium in which
only the actual tax-compliant providers will bear the cost of acquiring the label. Hence,
we hypothesize that a label for tax-compliant behavior constitutes a signal to create
a separating equilibrium that positively influences the perception of how trustworthy a
provider is. Formally, our hypothesis states:
H1: The presence of a tax compliance label has a positive e↵ect on consumers’ trust in
the provider.
The Moderating Role of Moral Norms (H2 and H3)
Prior research further suggests that consumers react to corporate behavior contingent
on the perceived congruence between a firm’s character and their own character (Sen
and Bhattacharya, 2001; Hardeck and Hertl, 2014). In the context of tax behavior, tax
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morale constitutes an important determinant of the level of congruence. For instance,
consumers’ individual moral norms seem to moderate the e↵ect of corporate tax plan-
ning on corporate reputation (Hardeck and Hertl, 2014). Moreover, the evaluation of
firms’ tax behavior by consumers is strongly linked to their personal attitudes towards
taxation (Antonetti and Anesa, 2017). Similarly, information about a person’s tax com-
pliance does influence the overall perception of that person. Confronted with di↵erent
types of tax behavior (tax avoidance, tax flight and tax evasion), people consider tax
evasion immoral and unfair toward society (Kirchler, Maciejovsky, and Schneider, 2003).
Kasper et al. (2018) document that people attribute positive characteristics to honest
taxpayers whereas tax evaders are judged least favorable and described as “aggressive”
and “uncooperative”.
In the platform economy, where non-compliance is equivalent to tax evasion, we
therefore expect similar observations. Specifically, we expect that consumers that con-
sider tax compliance as a moral obligation towards society perceive strong congruence
with providers holding a signal of tax-compliant behavior:
H2: The e↵ect of the tax compliance label on trust in the provider is stronger if tax
compliance is in line with consumers’ moral norms.
Apart from reputational aspects, moral norms also frame actual behavior. Studies
on pro-environmental behavior show that norms may help to address environmental
problems (see, e.g., Bergquist, Nilsson, and Schultz, 2019). Beyond pro-environmental
behavior, moral norms also a↵ect mere economic decisions. A large body of literature
confirms the positive e↵ect of tax morale, that is, the perceived moral obligation to
pay taxes, on personal tax compliance decisions (Wenzel, 2004; Alm and Torgler, 2006;
Frey and Torgler, 2007). In addition, moral norms seem to moderate the e↵ect of other
determinants on tax compliance. Wenzel (2004), for instance, shows that the threat of
monetary sanctions and legal consequences only have a deterrent e↵ect on tax evasion
if taxpayers consider tax evasion to be a minor o↵ense (i.e., if they have weak personal
norms regarding tax compliance).
Besides personal tax behavior, moral norms also moderate the willingness of con-
sumers to enter into economic transactions with firms (Antonetti and Anesa, 2017).
Participants with a negative attitude toward legal tax planning exhibit both lower pur-
chase intentions and a reduced willingness to pay for a product of a firm that was
associated with corporate tax planning (Hardeck and Hertl, 2014). These findings are
in line with Asay et al. (2018)—participants that are aware of specific cases of negative
corporate tax practices claim to have declined purchasing from those firms due to their
tax behavior.
To summarize, this implies that consumers prefer providers whose presumably ob-
servable behavior (i.e., tax compliance) is in line with their moral norms and what they
think is the right thing to do (Klöckner, 2013). We hypothesize:
H3: The e↵ect of trust in the provider on intention to book is stronger if tax compliance
is in line with consumers’ moral norms.
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3.4.4 Method
We evaluate our research model by means of an scenario-based online experiment. Par-
ticipants take the role of consumers and consider a set of listings from di↵erent providers.
Employing a treatment-based experiment allows us to have a high degree of control and,
at the same, allows for causal claims on the e↵ects of the exogenous treatment variables
(i.e., the presence of tax compliance labels) (Friedman and Cassar, 2004).
Scenario and Treatment Design
Participants face the following scenario. They are looking for a place to stay in a
foreign city for two nights for themselves and a friend. For this trip, they are looking
for a suitable accommodation on an P2P sharing platform. Their friend has already
pre-selected one of five available listings of di↵erent configuration (Table 3.20), and
they are now in charge of evaluating this pre-selected listing in terms of how likely they
would be to actually book it. The treatment design manipulates the configuration of the
pre-selected accommodation such that the listing either has a tax compliance label or
not (binary treatment design). Each participant is either in one or the other treatment
condition (between-subjects design). To ensure a high degree of comparability between
treatments, two out of the five listings have the tax compliance label, while the other
three do not. Depending on the treatment condition, the pre-selected listing is either
one of the two with the label, or one of the three without.
Stimulus Material
To create an engaging scenario and to mimic an actual search/booking process as close
as possible, we visually align our stimulus material with that of popular accommodation
sharing platforms such as Airbnb (see Figure 3.16; right). After being welcomed and
having read the scenario description, participants are forwarded to the overview page,
showing the five listings including their friend’s pre-selection. The rating of each listing
is randomly set to either 4.5 or 5 stars and the number of ratings is randomly chosen
from the range of 14 and 17.15 In order to prevent any inferences about merits of the
individual listings (e.g., information about the location), the titles as well as the pictures
and the markers on the overview map are blurred.
Tax Compliance Label Since tax compliance labels are not (yet) used by any major
platform, we newly design such a label (Figure 3.16; left). Given the scenario is set in
Germany and also the sample is recruited from Germany, the label uses typical design
elements associated with German Federal Ministries (i.e., the federal eagle). Regarding
color, the design is mainly kept in blue tones, following Sundar and Kellaris’ (2016) em-
phasis of color symbolism. During the experiment, participants were able to mouse-over
the label to see an explanation about the label’s meaning, stating: “This provider is
verified according to FAIRTAX and pays income tax for all bookings. The price shown
includes all taxes.”
15Thereby, we align the number of ratings towards the actual distribution of Airbnb listings (Ke,
2017b; Dann, Teubner, and Weinhardt, 2019; Cox, 2019).
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Figure 3.16: Tax Compliance Label Stimulus with Mouse Hover (left) and Exemplary
Screenshot of overall Stimulus (right).
Prices For the prices, we select five di↵erent price levels, derived from the 25-, 50-,
and 75-percentiles of comparable listings on Airbnb (Teubner, Hawlitschek, and Dann,
2017). Rounded to the nearest integer, we thereby generate the following set of prices:
(1) 25-percentile -5%: e 90, (2) 25-percentile: e 95, (3) 50-percentile: e 124, (4) 75-
percentile: e 165, and (5) 75-percentile +5%: e 173. These five prices are allocated
to the five listings at random whereby we ensured that the pre-selected listing is either
associated with 25- (low) or 75-percentile (high) price.
Table 3.20: Stimulus Elements
Element Manipulation
Amenities Constant for each listing—private room in apartment: 2 guests, 1 bed-
room, 1 bed, WiFi, kitchen, washer.
Images Randomly drawn (without replacement) for each listing and participant
from set of five blurred images of real Airbnb listings.
Titles Randomly drawn (without replacement) for each listing and participant
from set of five blurred titles from real Airbnb listings.
Star Rating Randomly drawn for each listing and participant 4.5 or 5 stars. The
selection always has 5 stars.
#Ratings Randomly drawn for each listing and participant between 14 and 17—
aligned towards the 75-percentile of comparable Airbnb listings.
Tax Compli-
ance Label
Treatment-based: Either the pre-selection and one other random listing
has the label or the pre-selection has no label and two other random
listings have it.
Price Randomly drawn (without replacement) from a set of five prices—aligned
towards the 25-, 50-, and 75-percentile of comparable listings on Airbnb.
The pre-selected listing either has the 25- or the 75-percentile price.
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Measures
All measurement instruments of this study are based on validated scales. We adapt the
operationalization of intention to book (ITB) from Gefen and Straub (2003), moral norm
(MN) from Botetzagias, Dima, and Malesios (2015), and trust in provider (TIP) from
Pavlou and Gefen (2004). All construct items were measured using 7-point Likert scales.
Beyond these constructs, we survey demographic traits as control variables. These
include age, gender, individual risk propensity (Dohmen et al., 2011), general trusting
disposition (DTT) (Gefen and Straub, 2004), P2P familiarity (Gefen and Straub, 2004),
and experience with taxes. All measurement instruments are listed in Table E.14.
Procedure and Sample
Participants have been recruited from the student subject pool at a large European uni-
versity using the software hroot (Bock, Baetge, and Nicklisch, 2014). We incentivize
participants with monetary rewards (equalizing e 10.26 per hour and person). The
median time spent in the experiment amounts to 9.09 min and 362 participants have
started the experiment. 286 participants pass all attention checks and finish the exper-
iment and survey completely. The resulting sample size is well above the threshold of
samples needed for most applications (Hair, Babin, and Krey, 2017). Following power
calculation, this sample size is appropriate for e↵ect sizes d=.50 and ↵=.05 (Faul et al.,
2007).
Within this sample, 34% are female, average age is 23.57 years (SD=3.91) with a
minimum of 18 and a maximum of 59 years. Risk a nity (scale from 0 to 10) is 4.96 on
average (SD=1.85). Overall, 55.2% of participants state to have experience declaring
(their own or someone else’s) taxes. We summarize the sample characteristics in Table
3.21.
Table 3.21: Sample Demographics
All Treatment (n=145) Control (n=141)
Trait Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range




Age 23.6 (3.91) 18-59 23.8 (4.33) 18-59 23.3 (3.45) 18-37
Risk A nity 4.96 (1.85) 0-10 5.09 (1.83) 0-8 4.82 (1.86) 0-10
3.4.5 Results
First, we analyze the overall treatment e↵ects of the tax compliance label on intention
to book (see Figure 3.17). A 2 (label: yes, no) ⇥ 2 (price: high, low) ANOVA reveals
significant e↵ects for both the tax compliance label (F (1,283)=7.88, p=.005), and
price (F (1,283)=94.82, p<.001), and no significant second-order interaction e↵ects.
Subsequent post-hoc analysis (TukeyHSD) confirms the significant distances both for
the tax compliance label
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(DLAB NO LAB=.391, p=.005) and price (DLOW HIGH=-1.36, p<.001). We list the
main treatment e↵ects for the groups in Table 3.22.
Figure 3.17: Main Treatment E↵ects.
Note: Continues variables (Moral Norms, Trust in Provider) split at median. Error bars
indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Table 3.22: Main E↵ects on Intention to Book
Available Not Available
Artifact Mean (SD) 95% CI Mean (SD) 95% CI
Tax Compliance Label 4.77 (1.29) .215 4.38 (1.42) .233
Low Price 5.24 (1.14) .190 3.90 (1.24) .206
Measurement Model
To initially explore the underlying factor structure of our measurement instrument, we
conduct an Explonatory Factor Analysis (EFA) (Reio and Shuck, 2015). The EFA uses
the Maximum Likelihood procedure and Promax Rotation resulting in an acceptable
four factor model with all factor loadings greater than .50. Table 3.23 lists the adequacy
measures. Table 3.24 provides the corresponding pattern matrix, item-level descriptives
are provided in Table 3.25. We summarize construct descriptives, correlations, and
reliability measures in Table 3.26.
We ensure internal consistency by confirming that all constructs fulfill the threshold of
.70 for Cronbach’s ↵ and composite reliability (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988). Next, we confirm
convergent validity by validating that all Average Variance Extracted (AVE) values exceed
the .50 threshold (Hair, Ringle, and Sarstedt, 2011). Regarding discriminant validity, the
Fornell-Larcker criterion (Fornell and Larcker, 1981) is met, and we observe no influential
cross-loading values in the pattern matrix (Table 3.24).
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Table 3.23: Adequacy Measures
Adequacy Measure Value
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin .813
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity .000
Communalities .572
Non-Redundant Residuals 8 (6%)
Total Variance Explained 67.3%
Table 3.24: Pattern Matrix
Factor

















Table 3.25: Item Descriptives
Item Mean St. Dev Skewness Kurtosis
ITB1 4.09 1.75  .200  1.13
ITB2 5.09 1.51  .862 .006
ITB3 4.52 1.65  .426  .917
MN1 4.34 1.78  .396  .913
MN2 5.26 1.56  1.09 .618
MN3 3.94 1.84  .063  1.19
TIH1 4.74 1.15  .422  .097
TIH2 4.22 1.25  .218  .542
TIH3 4.38 1.12 .003 .810
TIH4 4.58 .998  .246 .741
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Table 3.26: Construct Descriptives, Reliability Measures, and Correlations
Correlation Matrix
Mean (SD) Comp Rel. CR ↵ AVE ITB MN TIH DTT
ITB 4.57 (1.37) .875 .788 .700 .837 .154 .304 .117
MN 4.51 (1.49) .881 .821 .714 .845 .013 .142
TIH 4.48 (.859) .840 .716 .636 .798 .366
DTT 4.48 (1.12) .921 .896 .665 .816
Note: Square roots of AVE on the diagonal of the correlation matrix.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
We proceed with the Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) using AMOS 26 (IBM, 2019).
Following the guidelines of Hair, Babin, and Krey (2017), we determine the factor struc-
ture within our dataset and to test our hypotheses. To assess assumptions of multivariate
normality, we confirm values within the range of ±2.2 for both skewness and kurtosis
(Table 3.25; Skarpness, 1983). For all models, we compare model fit by means of five
fit indices, following the guidelines and thresholds of Hu and Bentler (1999).16 For
our initial model, we observe  2=161.7, p<.001,  2/df=2.61, CFI=.941, SRMR=.052,
RMSEA=.075, PClose=.002, indicating an insu cient model fit (particularly regard-
ing the PClose value). Based on the standardized residual covariances, we decided to
drop DTT3 for the subsequent analysis. The resulting model achieves good model fit
regarding all fit measures:  2=145.4, p<.001,  2/df=1.73, CFI=.965, SRMR=.054,
RMSEA=.051, PClose=.452.
Measurement Model Invariance To ensure that the observed factor structure and
loadings are equal across groups, we run invariance tests using a gender-based participant
split. The model shows good fit, when assessed with both groups unconstrained ( 2=
332.2, df=196,  2/df=1.695, CFI=.934, SRMR=.061, RMSEA=.049, PClose =.527),
confirming configural invariance. Next, comparing the measurement model to the un-
constrained model, we observe no significant di↵erence ( 2= 19.6, df=16, p=.237),
meeting the requirements for metric invariance (Schmitt and Kuljanin, 2008).
Common Method Bias To account for potential Common Method Bias (CMB), we
conduct a test of an unmeasured method factor (Podsako↵ et al., 2003; Gaskin and
Lim, 2017). We find that the unconstrained model is invariant from the constraint to
zero model (unconstrained model:  2=53.0, df=98; zero constrained model:  2=90.0,
df=98; delta:  2=37.0, df=588, p>.999). We conclude to observe no CMB and remove
the unmeasured method factor for creating our factor scores.
Manipulation Check To ensure that our externally manipulated treatment conditions
are perceived as such by the participants, we included two manipulation checks in our
survey (Table E.15). Figure 3.18 depicts the manipulation’s e↵ect on the respective
16The recommended thresholds are:  2/df>.95, CFI>95, SRMR<.09, RMSEA<.05, and
PClose>.05.
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items. The visual impression of a discernible di↵erence in the means across the groups is
supported by separate two-sided Mann–Whitney U tests showing significant di↵erence for
both the tax compliance label (U=3418.5, p<.001) and the price conditions (U=1287.0,
p<.001). Consequently, we conclude that the manipulation was successful.
Figure 3.18: Manipulation Check for Tax Compliance Label (left) and Price (right).
Note: Error bars indicate the 95% level confidence intervals.
Structural Model and Hypotheses Testing
We build our structural model using the composites imputed from the previously vali-
dated measurement model’s factor scores. We validate the multivariate assumptions of
the generated composites by evaluating Cook’s distance values. We observe no values
larger than .008 indicating no multivariate influential outliers (Aguinis, Gottfredson, and
Joo, 2013). Regarding multicollinearity, all observed variance inflation factors are below
the 3.0, and tolerance values above the .10 threshold, indicating no multicollinearity
issues (O’Brien, 2007). The final model (Figure 3.19) shows good model fit ( 2=6.62,
df=5.00,  2/df=1.32, CFI=.994, SRMR=.020, RMSEA=.034, PClose=.595), allowing









Figure 3.19: Standardized Estimate Results of Structural Model Testing.
The model explains 44.2% of the variance in consumers’ intention to book and
confirms all hypothesized relations. We observe a positive and significant e↵ect of the
tax compliance label on trust in provider (H1, =.197, p<.001). Further, this e↵ect is
stronger for consumers for which tax compliance is in accordance with their moral norms
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(H2, =.109, p=.026). While the expected positive relationship between trust in provider
and intention to book is also reflected in the model ( =.435, p<.001), it further shows
that, consistent with our hypothesis, this e↵ect is stronger for consumers for whom tax
compliance is in accordance with their moral norms (H3, =.094, p=.035). Figure 3.20
depicts the moderation e↵ects.
Figure 3.20: Left: Moral Norms ⇥ Tax Compliance Label on Trust in Provider (H2).
Right: Moral Norms with Trust ⇥ Trust in Provider on Intention to Book (H3).
Note: Continues variables (Moral Norms, Trust in Provider) split at median. Error bars
indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Control Variable Analysis
Next, we analyze the influence of the secondary variables on our structural model and
hypotheses (Table E.15). Control variable analysis shows three significant e↵ects. First,
participants overall trusting disposition positively a↵ects trust in provider ( =.504,
p<.001). Second, male participants show a lower level of trust in the provider ( =-.132,
p=.007). Third, the listing’s price negatively influences booking intentions ( =-.441,
p<.001). None of the control variables alters our findings in terms of magnitude, sign,
or significance.
Monetary Equivalent of the Tax Compliance Label
The two employed price levels (see Table 3.20) allow us to calculate a monetary equiv-
alent that participants assign solely to listings holding the tax compliance label. A price
increase of e 10 corresponds, on average, with a decrease of .194 points on the intention
to book 7-point Likert scale. Contrasting this to the di↵erence in the stated booking
intention influenced by the label itself delivers a proxy for the monetary equivalent of
e 23.12 ( =.450).
Qualitative Assessment
To better understand participants’ perception of the tax compliance label, as part of the
online experiment, we collected qualitative feedback in the form of short free texts. We
ask each participant to “please describe in your own words how the aspect of assuring
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tax compliance (i.e., the FAIRTAX label) has a↵ected your evaluation of the selected
listing.” We collected 286 responses, which we classify on three levels. First, we assess
whether the tax compliance has a general influence on booking decisions or not. Second,
we classify whether a stated influence is perceived to be large or small. Third, we classify
each response according to a set of 11 topic-based categories (Table 3.27).
Table 3.27: Categorization Schema
# Category Label’s Influence
1
Tax compliance (i.e., the label)
. . . increases trust/competence/transparency of the provider
Given and
large
2 . . . serves as signal/di↵erentiation
3 . . . justifies small surcharge
4 . . . is a social responsibility
5 . . . is an additional criterion for equivalent providers
Given and
small
6 Other factors are more important
7 Credibility of the label is unclear
8 Tax compliance (i.e., the label) plays no/little role
Not given
9 Cheapest price is decisive
10 Solely the provider is responsible for tax matters
11 Labels are not very helpful in general
To create the set of categories, three researchers independently screened each re-
sponse and generated a set of categories. Subsequently, categories were discussed,
refined, and synthesized. Across responses, we observe a the distribution of categories
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Figure 3.21: Categorization of Participant Responses. Categorization was non-exclusive
(i.e., each response can be assigned to multiple categories).
Regarding inter-rater reliability, the final classification yields an average Fleiss’ Kappa
score of .660, indicating substantial agreement among raters (ranging from 394 indicat-
ing fair agreement to .850 indicating perfect agreement) (Landis and Koch, 1977).
The majority (69.2%) of the respondents state to perceive an influence of the tax
compliance label (37.5% large; 31.7% small). Among the answers stating to perceive
a large influence, participants predominantly highlight the labels trust-, competence-,
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and transparency-fostering e↵ect (31.8%) and regard it as a signal with di↵erentiating
character (31.3%). Further, participants describe the label as a signal that justifies a
small surcharge (23.5%) and marks social responsibility (13.4%). Statements referring
to a small influence mainly consider the tax compliance label as a further criterion if the
o↵ers are otherwise equal (47.7%), but consider other things more important (27.3%)
and express uncertainty regarding the label’s credibility (25.0%). Participants that do not
observe a general influence are strictly price-oriented decision-makers (23.4%), have a
strict understanding of tax responsibility as a matter for the provider exclusively (13.4%),
or question the usefulness of labels in general (10.0%).
3.4.6 Discussion
In this paper, we study the e↵ects of tax compliance labels on consumers’ booking
intentions on P2P sharing economy platforms. While platforms such as Airbnb have es-
tablished artifacts allowing consumers to assess providers’ otherwise unobservable trust-
worthiness and service quality (e.g., text reviews, star rating scores, number of reviews),
providers’ tax compliance behavior is, as of today, not subject to signaling. Providers’ tax
compliance, however, is of utmost importance from an economic and societal perspec-
tive. This holds specifically given the substantial tax revenue associated with peer-based
accommodation sharing and the competitive dynamics in the respective markets where
maintaining “a level playing field” is the ultimate goal for public institutions (European
Commission, 2016, p. 13).
Theoretical Implications
There is a diverse body of P2P platform literature that examines how di↵erent design
artifacts influence consumers’ perception of potential transaction partners. Nevertheless,
our study is the first to examine the e↵ectiveness of labels in the context of individual
platform users’ tax compliance by means of an online experiment. Thus far, existing
literature mainly considered visual labels as signals of various quality dimensions directly
related to the associated service or product of the transaction (e.g., Airbnb’s Superhost
label Teubner, Hawlitschek, and Dann 2017; Ke 2017b; Liang et al. 2017). Extending
signaling theory to the context of tax compliance labels through our study emphasizes
the theory’s robustness. Thereby, tax compliance may constitute a relevant factor for
achieving a separating equilibrium, where some consumers regard provider tax compli-
ance as a necessary condition to consider an o↵er at all. The responses to our open-ended
question highlights this relationship. In this, participants stated that:
“I would filter the listings without the tax compliance label” (Participant 203, 26, male).
“I would use a tax compliance label filter” (Participant 96, 19, male).
While providers’ tax compliance is not directly linked to the quality of the service they
provide per se (e.g., their service quality or their apartment), it does impact consumers’
evaluation of the provider and leads to an increased willingness to pay. Thereby, we
show that signaling tax compliance seems to induce a kind of cross-context signaling,
which helps providers to establish the image of a trustworthy transaction partner (i.e.,
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H1)—ultimately reflected in booking intentions. Thereby, we emphasize the instrumen-
tal role of platforms in designing, creating, and maintaining an environment that allows
for and stimulates trust-building (Kim, Yoon, and Zo, 2015). Our findings suggest that
credibly demonstrating one’s tax compliance represents a powerful lever in this regard.
“The tax compliance label shows that the provider pays their taxes and therefore should
be more trustworthy” (Participant 146, 27, female).
“I would trust the provider more” (Participant 288, 20, female).
We contribute to theory by showing how individual normative concepts influence the
e↵ects of this label. We extend existing findings from research describing the influence
of consumers’ moral standards on the relationship of tax-compliant behavior and corpo-
rate reputation (Hardeck and Hertl, 2014; Hoopes, Robinson, and Slemrod, 2018) with
an individual perspective. The e↵ect of signaling tax compliance on trust in provider
is stronger for participants who consider tax compliance as a moral obligation toward
society (i.e., H2). In addition, conformity of moral norms a↵ects consumers’ actual
transaction intentions (i.e., their intention to book) and intensifies the positive relation-
ship between trust in the provider and transaction intention (i.e., H3).
“I would limit the variety of the available listings to my price budget and then choose
from those that have such a tax compliance label to meet my moral standards and to
ease my conscience” (Participant 261, 22, female).
Our assessment of the drivers behind participants’ intentions provides a better under-
standing of how consumers evaluate providers and how, within this process, their moral
norms guide their decisions. Previous literature, examining this context from a signal-
ing perspective, primarily argues with the mere bridging of information asymmetry—
whenever a signal is present, the associated quality is strictly given. However, our
results indicate that the consideration of consumers’ moral norms constitutes one nec-
essary piece of the puzzle in understanding these relationships. In addition, moral norms
as a whole seem to gain in importance since the 1980s (Wheeler, McGrath, and Haslam,
2019), and their relevance should not be neglected. This insight is especially important
for studies in the context of P2P sharing platforms, since virtually all of these are directly
associated with societal changes and, thereby, constitute no ordinary neutral markets.
Particularly the case of P2P accommodation sharing is inherently burdened by emerg-
ing urgent conflicts (e.g., over-touristification, increasing rent prices, illegal hospitality
operations), which today’s media coverage increasingly focuses on.
Practical Implications
Our study further provides implications for platform users, operators, and policymakers.
First, providers should be aware that consumers actually care about tax behavior, in turn
rendering it a key driver of trustworthiness. Signaling tax compliance thereby helps to
generate an overall honest and trustworthy appearance.
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“I would consider the provider holding a tax compliance label to be more trustworthy,
as he/she tries to behave correctly. I would also be under the impression that he/she is
trying to act as honestly as possible” (Participant 318, 28, female).
Second, platform operators should consider implementing tax compliance labels.
Such labels not only strengthen consumers’ willingness to enter transactions with “tax-
certified” providers, they also allow for charging price premiums for the associated o↵ers.
Our results indicate a feasible price markup of up to 18%. Some users even categorically
refuse transactions with non-certified providers—an attitude, which may threaten the
ongoing realization of transactions, and, thereby, the continued existence of a platform
(Hodapp, Hawlitschek, and Kramer, 2019). Besides, it can be assumed that a proactive
step towards tax compliance will certainly improve the platform’s reputation (Hardeck
and Hertl, 2014).
“I would also be willing to pay more for an apartment that has the tax compliance label”
(Participant 362, 24 male).
Third, policymakers should actively engage platforms to install platform designs that
include artifacts for signaling tax compliance. Considering the flexibility in the design of
digital platforms, integrating such a tax compliance label seems to be an acceptable e↵ort
for platform operators and an e↵ective means to take the first step towards a transparent
taxation of transactions. Furthermore, implementing a tax compliance label would keep
administrative e↵orts at a reasonable level for tax authorities, platform operators, and
providers in ensuring tax compliance on P2P platforms (Fetzer Thomas, 2020). At
the same time, it may increase compliance regarding self-reported income. In that,
policymakers should consider both that consumers actually value tax-compliant behavior
and that providers can also demand higher prices as compensation, which, in turn, may
result in higher revenues for the platform. Basically, there are two options how such a
tax compliance label may be granted to the provider.
First, one of the most conceivable ways is by having the platform deduct and trans-
fer the tax component directly to the tax authority. Banks have a very similar practice
for security portfolios (Ashauer-Moll Ellen, 2015), and several countries and munici-
palities have already arranged a co-operation agreement with Airbnb and implemented
the taxation at source (i.e., via the sharing platform itself) for specific types of taxes
such as occupancy taxes (Airbnb, 2020c). Beyond that, some countries implemented
unilateral measures to ensure the taxation of the platform-related income. Belgium, for
instance, has implemented a tax at source of 10% on certain types of sharing income
(BRF Nachrichten, 2017). With this approach, the platform operator becomes liable for
the collection and transfer of tax payments in every jurisdiction. Given that the plat-
form operator has all necessary information available, granting the tax compliance label
within this system of direct tax deduction becomes technically e cient. Policymakers
worldwide are currently also debating on common rules for platform operators to share
information on the transactions realized on their platform with national tax authorities
(OECD, 2020). The exchange of information would enable tax authorities to identify
and track cases of potential tax evasion. Moreover, a common reporting format would
reduce complexity and keep the administrative burden for the platform operators at a
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reasonable level. Airbnb, for instance, has begun to show cooperativeness and goodwill
in this regard (Kang, 2016; Airbnb, 2020a).
The second option for the certification procedure for tax compliant providers could
follow three steps. (1): Providers give consent that the platform shares their transac-
tion data with tax authorities, including name, address, tax ID, and details on realized
transactions. (2): Tax authorities assess the information and compare it with income
declared through the tax return. (3): The provider receives the tax compliance label
if the tax authority confirms the correct and truthful declaration of income over the
previous year(s). Obviously, providers may still decide not to declare their full income in
future periods, but now at a higher risk of detection and prosecution. In other words,
signaling tax compliance (e.g., through a tax compliance label) would be more costly
for tax evaders. Besides, the verification of tax compliance by local tax authorities
would substantiate the tax compliance label’s credibility, which constitutes a concrete
requirement for consumers.
In light of our findings, policymakers might explore novel forms of cooperation that
include, for instance, the o cial certification of tax-compliant providers as outlined
above. Such interaction with taxpayers would meet frequently raised calls by scholars
for more service-oriented tax authorities and may improve intrinsic motivation for tax
compliance (Pickhardt and Prinz, 2014; Batrancea et al., 2019). Overall, by ensuring
tax compliance among providers, policymakers would create equal and fair competitive
conditions among market participants and, thereby, might even strengthen the overall
acceptance of the platform economy within the society.
Limitations and Future Work
We are aware of several limitations of our study. First, while all used stimulus materials
are closely aligned to the look and feel of actual platforms, participants’ statements
within the online experiment may not properly reflect their behavior when using sharing
platforms as consumers. Nevertheless, our experiment’s scenario is inherently hypothet-
ical. Other study designs (e.g., field experiments) might yield higher external validity.
Second, our sample consists mostly of students within their 20’s. However, while our
sample represents the target and most active user group of P2P platforms (Mittendorf,
Berente, and Holten, 2019; Godelnik, 2017; European Union, 2017), it also lessens our
results’ generalizability to the entire population or society as a whole. To ensure that
our results are not driven by the most obvious covariates, we control for a broad set
of variables, including age, gender, tax experience, disposition to trust, familiarity with
P2P platforms, and general risk a nity. We explain 44.2% of the variance of consumers’
transaction intention, which indicates potential for future research to investigate further
drivers. Fourth, the “monetary equivalent” analysis provides only a first impression.
For reliable numbers, longitudinal studies or conjoint-based studies are certainly more
suitable for this particular aspect. Fifth, our study considers only the perspective of
consumers. Aspects of what would motivate or deter providers from acquiring a tax
compliance label remain unanswered at present. Finally, while we discuss options for
how a provider may be granted the tax compliance label, this study does not describe
the technical and legal details of such a certification procedure. In drawing the ap-
plication and evaluation process, one certainly needs to consider a di↵erent stream of
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literature and even a di↵erent discipline within business economics (e.g., tax compli-
ance and enforcement) and further details may be relevant for the label’s perception
by consumers. As some respondents state that they are uncertain about the credibility
and origin of the label, further investigation of this aspect seems necessary. Moreover,
future research should investigate potential spillover e↵ects for platforms itself, which
may improve their reputation just by o↵ering a tax compliance label at all.
3.4.7 Conclusion
The issue of tax compliance is a socially highly relevant topic that is additionally bur-
dened by a variety of aspects. These certainly include uncovered tax scandals such as
the Panama Papers (Harding, 2016) or CumEx files (Reuters, 2019a) but also reports
on the dimensions of tax avoidance by digital corporations (e.g., Apple; Schulze 2019 or
Google; Reuters 2019b). As the emergence of the ride-sharing provider Uber has already
shown, the dominant presence of P2P platforms poses challenges for regulatory insti-
tutions (Fitzsimmons, 2018). With our paper, we show that tax compliance on these
platforms is perceived by consumers and constitutes reputational and monetary value—
particularly when tax compliance is in line with consumers’ moral norms. If existing (or
new) platform operators do not seize the opportunity to address this topic proactively in
order to enhance their reputation (Hardeck and Hertl, 2014), policymakers bear the so-




The previous chapters summarize four studies on the interplay of user representation,
perceived social and economic values, and transaction intentions/behavior on P2P plat-
forms. First, a structured literature review established a general understanding of P2P
platforms’ economics and which aspects existing literature has not su ciently considered
yet. These aspects were then examined in four studies: First, the overall role of user
representation (UR) and how it relates to expected social and economic values and the
ultimate intention to enter transactions. Next, the influence of UR on actual behav-
ior across (multiple) transactions. Then, the influence of technological innovation on
the need for trust among users. Last, the influence of signaling tax compliance within
providers’ UR on consumers’ perception. This last chapter summarizes the contribution
of the thesis, answers all raised research questions, and elaborates on existing limitations
of the conducted studies as well as potential next steps of research.
4.1 Contributions and Answers to Research Ques-
tions
This thesis provides a comprehensive understanding of how social and economic values
a↵ect the initiation and conduction of transactions on P2P platforms. The studies pre-
sented cover (at least to some extent) all topics of existing literature that were identified
in the preceding literature review (Chapter 2.1) (i.e., user motives and types, reputation
systems, text reviews and self-descriptions, profile photos, prices and pricing value, eco-
nomic and media impact, legal and regulatory aspects). This chapter summarizes the
answers to each research question and summarizes the main contributions.
RQ1: How do di↵erent UR artifacts facilitate co-usage transactions through social and
economic value?
As discussed in Chapter 3.1, a scenario-based online experiment is employed to
answer this question. Participants took the role of a consumer evaluating the UR of a
specific provider. The results show that self-descriptions, an artifact providing personal
information, induces expectations about the social value of a transaction and star ratings,
an artifact providing exogenous information, induces expectations about economic value.
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The presence of a text review, an artifact providing personal and exogenous information,
excerts an e↵ect on both motives. Ultimately, both expectations about social and
economic value drive transaction intentions in about equal shares.
Given this particular strength of text reviews, platform operators may consider al-
lowing new transactions only after the previous transaction has been evaluated with a
text review. However, as this is likely to result in more non-authentic reviews, platform
operators should at least encourage and support platform users to always write a text
review (e.g., by providing templates or text examples).
Furthermore, platform users should be aware of the strengths of each individual
artifact within their UR. Even artifacts requiring comparatively low e↵ort to obtain
(e.g., the self-description) influence the evaluation as a potential transaction partner.
However, they are currently not used by everyone (e.g., only about half of all Airbnb
providers have written a self-description; Ke, 2017b).
Besides, platform operators should be aware of the importance of social and eco-
nomic value for the creation of transactions. In line with the attempt of major platforms
to expand their business model regarding social experiences (e.g., tours by local guides,
local cooking courses; Airbnb, 2016a), platform operators may even consider to recom-
mend or match transaction partners using social criteria. While this is of course directly
tied to challenges in avoiding social discrimination and harassment, aspects such as
having the same (or deliberately di↵erent) hobbies or interests could be included in the
process of matching providers and consumers.
RQ2: How does the interplay of cognitive and a↵ective trust cues a↵ect trusting be-
havior in sharing transactions over time?
This next question, discussed in Chapter 3.2, focuses on actual behavior across
(multiple) transactions. Within a laboratory experiment, participants formed (multiple)
transaction dyads themselves and conducted a transaction with each selected trans-
action partner. Treatment-based, participants UR within the experiment included a
(self-provided) profile photo and/or star ratings. The availability of star ratings or pro-
file photos showed a distinctly di↵erent e↵ect on trusting behavior. While the cognitive
trust cue star ratings (associated with the central route of processing), showed a sta-
ble e↵ect, the e↵ect of the a↵ective trust cue (associated with the peripheral route of
processing) varied—depending on the specific transaction phase. However, the combina-
tion of both types of trust cues showed the most substantial e↵ect on trusting behavior.
These findings indicate that cognitive and a↵ective trust cues are complementary over
time. Furthermore, the results show that existing assumptions about the static influence
of trust cues (Mcknight, Cummings, and Chervany, 1998; McKnight, Choudhury, and
Kacmar, 2002) do provide an incomplete picture of their influence on trusting behavior.
The results stress the importance of the dual role of information processing (Petty
and Cacioppo, 1986) for platform design. Trust cues processed via the central route
need to be treated di↵erently than trust cues processed via the peripheral route. While
a↵ective trust cues allow a “kick-starting” of trust in early phases of (novel) users or
platforms to overcome the “cold-start problem” (Wessel, Thies, and Benlian, 2017),
cognitive trust cues ensure that this increased level of trust does not collapse back to
its initial level later on.
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Overall, platform operators should encourage users to leverage both types of trust
cues. While, on some platforms, users do not actively use these trust cues, there exist
platforms, on which they are not available at all (e.g., Craigslist, Gumtree; Hesse et al.,
2020).
RQ3: How do blockchain-enabled platforms frame consumers’ trust perception and their
intention to enter a transaction?
Chapter 3.3 addresses the influence of the technological innovation blockchain as the
technical layer of a P2P platform on consumers’ perception of the platform itself and
providers on it. As the blockchain is supposed to act as a trust-building factor and may
enable the creation of trust-free systems, the study investigates how the trust-related
properties of the blockchain technology influence platform users’ trust relationships.
Within a scenario-based online survey, participants took the role of consumers evaluating
a blockchain-based P2P platform.
The results provide evidence that, on blockchain-based platforms, trust in the trans-
action partner or the product itself shows no e↵ect on the intention to enter a transac-
tion. In this context, solely trust in the platform itself was an antecedent of transaction
intentions. The study shows how established trust relationships shift from a peer and
product focus towards trust in platforms and their underlying technology. Platform op-
erators may leverage the blockchain technology to increase the level of trust that users
place in the platform. This may also constitute a practical way to address the afore-
mentioned cold-start problem as a new platform. In combination with established trust
cues, a platform could thus foster transactions from the very beginning and ensure that
a su cient level of trust is maintained in later phases of platform evolution.
RQ4a: How does the presence of a tax compliance label a↵ect consumers’ trust towards
and, in turn, their intentions to book at the tax-compliant provider?
RQ4b: How do individual moral norms moderate the e↵ect of tax compliance labels?
Last, Chapter 3.4 discusses P2P platforms from a societal perspective. Focusing on
providers’ tax behavior on P2P platforms, the presented study examines how signaling
tax compliance a↵ects consumers’ perception and choice of a transaction partner. To
this end, the study introduces a label for tax compliance within providers’ UR. In an
online experiment, participants evaluated several o↵ers of providers, of which some had
this label for tax compliance, and some did not.
The results show that consumers are aware of providers’ tax behavior and that tax
compliance constitutes a trust-enhancing signal for which they are willing to pay a
premium. Furthermore, consumers’ moral norms positively moderate both the trust-
building e↵ect of tax compliance and the subsequent e↵ect on transaction intention.
In light of the current policy debate about taxing the platform economy, the study
provides valuable practical insights for tax legislators. In particular, public institutions
should actively engage in cooperation with platform operators to ensure tax compliance
among users. In this regard, a label-based approach may represent one step towards their




The applicability of presented results have to be considered in light of several individual
limitations. First, the underlying participants of answering Research Questions 2, 3, and
4 stem from a pool of undergraduate students at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology.
Thereby, the sample is inherently subject to the characteristics of a student sample.
Even though this specific group of users is the explicit target group of P2P platforms
(Mittendorf, Berente, and Holten, 2019; Godelnik, 2017; European Union, 2017), and
each study incorporates a comprehensive set of demographic control variables, it lessens
the overall applicability of the individual results.
Next, all studies lack, to some degree, external validity. Perceptions about social and
economic values, as well as the decision to enter a transaction on a P2P platform, may
di↵er from the statements made within scenario-based surveys and online/laboratory
experiments. Although all used stimulus designs are closely aligned to the look and feel
of actual platforms, some of the outlined scenarios (i.e., blockchain-based platform, tax
compliance label on a platform) are hypothetical. Field experiments may constitute a
viable complement for the presented studies.
Subsequently, each study considers an individual set of UR artifacts. Although, across
all studies, the influence of the most common UR artifacts is examined (i.e., profile
photos, self descriptions, text reviews, star ratings, labels; Hesse et al., 2020), there
exist various other artifacts that have not been included (e.g., membership duration,
certificates, videos).
Last, apart from Chapter 3.2, all of the presented studies exclusively cover the per-
spective of consumers. Aspects of what would motivate providers to obtain a tax com-
pliance label or o↵er their product/service on a blockchain-based platform remain unan-
swered.
4.3 Future Research
There exist various research opportunities to follow this thesis. This last chapter high-
lights three possible topics for future research. These include (1) the emergence of the
technological innovation of virtual reality, (2) further research on the taxation of P2P
platforms and its users, and (3) tackling existing discrimination.
Virtual Reality To establish trust, providers not only provide photos depicting them-
selves, they also provide photos of their o↵ered assets (e.g., accommodation, car). How-
ever, the presented photos, may create a biased impression, since, for instance, a provider
(consciously) only shows the pleasant parts of an accommodation, but not the unpleasant
ones. Future research may address this problem of information asymmetry by exploring
the potential of virtual reality in this context. Analogous to the blockchain, virtual reality
is an emerging technology whose influence on the P2P platform economy is barely ex-
plored. While corporations are already embracing the potential of virtual reality in their
online appearances (e.g., 360-degree representations of hotel rooms, cars, or commodi-
ties), it is still rarely used on P2P platforms. Given that existing research has already
shown that virtual reality has a positive influence on buying intention (Suh and Lee,
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2005) and travel desirability (Gibson and O’Rawe, 2018), P2P platforms should also
leverage the merits of this technology.
In this manner, providers on P2P platforms may create 360-degree photos of their
assets, which potential consumers could then view in a virtual reality representation
using a head-mounted display. Thereby, they might get a more detailed and realistic
impression of the o↵ered assets. Since today’s mobile phones’ capabilities and available
apps overcome prior technical barriers for creating 360-degree photos, it should be quite
feasible for providers to integrate them into the presentation of their o↵ers. Studying
the perceptions of consumers of this representation, whether they can develop a better
impression of the asset or overall situation they are expecting, whether this leads to a
(perceived) reduction of information asymmetry, and whether this increases trust in the
o↵er and the transaction partner, represents a natural next step for research.
Taxation of P2P platforms The study presented in Chapter 3.4 represents the first
step in the analysis of tax-compliant behavior on P2P platforms. However, there still
remain further subjects of investigation for this societally highly relevant topic.
First, this relates to technical investigations of how taxes can be paid directly via the
platform to the responsible tax authorities. As emphasized in Chapter 3.4, in this context,
aspects such as credibility and transparency should bear special consideration. Especially
with regard to transparency, this context might be a possible field of application for the
blockchain, which is frequently associated with this aspect (see Chapter 3.3). Future
research may investigate the e↵ectiveness of the blockchain for a transparent taxation
of P2P platform transactions. Second, it remains unanswered as to what motivates
providers to (not) behave tax-compliant. Whether this is primarily related to the prospect
of higher (net) earnings, to a general unawareness of the issue, or a lack of knowledge
about how to actually behave tax compliant is currently unclear.
Discrimination The existence of social interaction within transactions on P2P plat-
forms where, at the same time, users share a variety of demographic traits results in
undesirable side e↵ects such as racial discrimination (Kakar et al., 2018; Edelman, Luca,
and Svirsky, 2017). Although platforms deliberately speak up against discrimination
through statements (Airbnb, 2019; Benner, 2016), their ultimate influence on the even-
tual discriminatory behavior of specific user groups is limited.
In times of the Black Lives Matter movement (Blum, 2020), the grievances on P2P
platforms, that African-American providers are forced to demand lower prices (Edelman
and Luca, 2014), or are rejected as transaction partners more often (Edelman, Luca,
and Svirsky, 2017), should be tackled more intensively. While, during the emergence
of P2P platforms, the prevailing direction was to disclose more and more information
within the URs, future research should examine whether the reduction of demographic
characteristics within URs may prevent discrimination. This poses a challenging task
for platform designers, as they have to balance trust among users and avoid racial
discrimination at the same time. One existing mechanism for reducing discrimination
is the instant booking feature, which allows consumers to enter transactions without
providers’ prior review. The question of why only a minority of providers provide the
option of instant booking (Table A.1), and how these rates could be increased should
be examined by future research.
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Keser, Claudia and Maximilian Späth (2020). The Value of Bad Ratings: An Experiment
on the Impact of Distortions in Reputation Systems. Tech. rep. 389.
Kim, Dongmin and Izak Benbasat (2009). “Trust-assuring arguments in B2C e-commerce:
Impact of content, source, and price on trust”. In: Journal of Management Informa-
tion Systems 26.3, pp. 175–206.
Kim, Hee-Woong, Hock Chuan Chan, and Sumeet Gupta (2007). “Value-based adoption
of mobile Internet: An empirical investigation”. In: Decision Support Systems 43.1,
pp. 111–126.
Kim, Jeonghye, Youngseog Yoon, and Hangjung Zo (2015). “Why people participate in
the sharing economy: A social exchange perspective”. In: PACIS 2015 Proceedings.
Singapore, Singapore, pp. 1–6.
Kim, Jong Uk, Woong Jin Kim, and Sang Cheol Park (2010). “Consumer perceptions
on web advertisements and motivation factors to purchase in the online shopping”.
In: Computers in Human Behavior 26.5, pp. 1208–1222.
Kim, Taegoo Terry, Osman M Karatepe, and Gyehee Lee (June 2019). “Test of an inte-
grative model of travel-related social media users’ switching intentions”. In: Service
Business 13.2, pp. 339–361.
Kimbrough, Amanda M. et al. (2013). “Gender di↵erences in mediated communica-
tion: Women connect more than do men”. In: Computers in Human Behavior 29.3,
pp. 896–900. arXiv: arXiv:0812.1622v1.
Kirchler, Erich, Boris Maciejovsky, and Friedrich Schneider (2003). “Everyday represen-
tations of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight: Do legal di↵erences matter?”
In: Journal of Economic Psychology 24.4, pp. 535–553.
Kitchen, Philip J. et al. (2014). “The elaboration likelihood model: Review, critique and
research agenda”. In: European Journal of Marketing 48.11/12, pp. 2033–2050.
Bibliography 143
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A Supplementary Material for Chapter 2.1
Table A.1: City summary
Region, City #T #Listings Density Date #Hosts R/L Price (US$) Score Inst.B. Ent.Apt Prf.Lst
NA Asheville 1 864 9.7 04/2016 643 32.1 99 95.32 .19 .62 .43
Austin 3 9,663 10.2 03/2017 7,492 13.9 160 95.85 .23 .69 .36
Boston 3 4,870 7.2 10/2017 2,705 24.8 140 93.37 .35 .62 .60
Chicago 2 5,207 1.9 05/2017 3,532 25.4 99 95.04 .29 .59 .48
Denver 2 3,918 5.7 11/2017 3,030 32.8 100 96.63 .44 .68 .42
Los Angeles 11 31,253 7.9 05/2017 20,810 20.8 100 94.21 .27 .58 .51
Montreal 2 10,619 6.1 05/2016 8,368 9.2 55.2 92.39 .14 .60 .35
Nashville 4 5,332 7.8 09/2017 3,425 31.9 149 96.53 .49 .76 .51
New Orleans 27 5,215 13.3 03/2018 3,050 36.3 132 95.71 .56 .83 .59
New York City 35 48,852 5.7 03/2018 40,530 18.5 100 93.56 .31 .49 .32
Oakland 2 1,718 4.1 05/2016 1,427 15.6 98 93.96 .11 .56 .34
Portland 29 4,738 7.4 02/2018 3,793 49.5 90 96.81 .41 .66 .37
Quebec City 9 2,297 4.3 09/2017 1,662 22.7 64 93.41 .41 .63 .45
San Diego 2 6,608 4.7 07/2016 4,300 14.1 135 94.38 .18 .66 .52
San Francisco 29 4,804 5.6 03/2018 3,346 49.9 150 95.79 .36 .58 .51
Santa Cruz 1 814 3.0 10/2015 616 27.2 150 94.86 .10 .65 .40
Seattle 2 3,818 5.4 01/2016 2,751 22.2 100 94.54 .15 .67 .43
Toronto 7 12,714 4.5 06/2017 9,152 16.0 76.8 94.00 .21 .62 .44
Vancouver 4 6,651 10.3 10/2017 5,050 22.5 92 94.13 .26 .68 .41
Victoria 1 1,691 19.7 08/2016 1,256 18.5 80 94.53 .21 .67 .44
Washington D.C. 3 7,788 11.4 05/2017 5,820 19.5 125 94.72 .30 .68 .40
AS Hong Kong 1 6,474 0.9 08/2016 3,334 12.7 70.59 88.44 .25 .50 .61
AU Melbourne 8 14,305 3.7 04/2017 10,506 16.3 81.9 94.02 .29 .57 .41
Northern Rivers 1 2,350 7.9 04/2016 1,703 10.6 114.27 93.85 .13 .65 .47
Sydney 12 32,830 8.1 01/2018 25,221 10.3 104.52 93.28 .34 .61 .36
Tasmania 18 4,459 8.7 02/2018 3,038 31.2 116.22 95.54 .51 .76 .48
EU Amsterdam 28 18,547 22.6 12/2017 15,907 18.2 141.6 94.41 .20 .79 .24
Antwerp 2 1,227 2.5 05/2017 968 21.6 76.7 92.33 .26 .70 .36
Athens 2 5,127 7.7 05/2017 3,535 24.2 47.2 94.23 .51 .83 .54
Barcelona 21 18,531 11.5 02/2018 10,909 27.6 69.62 90.76 .45 .47 .60
Berlin 19 20,576 5.9 05/2017 17,810 12.9 53.1 93.39 .17 .50 .25
Brussels 2 6,192 5.4 05/2017 4,623 18.0 64.9 91.45 .25 .65 .39
Copenhagen 2 20,545 26.9 06/2017 19,079 10.7 105.92 94.39 .15 .81 .16
Dublin 3 6,729 12.8 02/2017 4,756 21.0 93.22 91.99 .26 .47 .47
Edinburgh 10 9,638 19.5 09/2017 7,175 26.9 94.47 94.69 .35 .57 .42
Geneva 19 3,060 15.7 01/2018 2,361 15.5 96.305 93.42 .28 .66 .41
London 6 53,904 6.1 03/2017 37,642 12.5 93.8 91.71 .23 .50 .45
Madrid 6 16,313 5.2 01/2018 9,838 27.7 69.62 92.43 .48 .63 .57
Malaga 1 4,853 8.5 11/2017 2,386 20.2 69.62 91.00 .57 .76 .70
Mallorca 2 14,858 17.1 03/2017 6,323 7.4 118 91.88 .36 .87 .71
Manchester 1 865 1.6 04/2016 560 17.2 62.98 91.18 .17 .41 .52
Paris 28 59,945 26.7 03/2018 51,683 16.3 88.5 92.49 .27 .87 .25
Rome 1 25,275 8.8 05/2017 14,100 22.6 82.6 91.99 .45 .60 .65
Trentino 1 1,847 1.7 10/2015 1,275 3.1 82.6 91.39 .13 .77 .55
Venice 2 6,027 22.8 05/2017 2,860 35.8 129.8 91.16 .50 .75 .73
Vienna 22 9,201 5.2 09/2017 6,522 20.8 64.9 93.84 .36 .67 .44
Notes: #T = number of available snapshots (months); Density = Listings per 1,000 capita; #R/L = number of reviews per listing;
Inst.B. = Instant Booking; Ent.Apt = Entire Apartment; Prf.Lst = Professional Listing (i.e. host o↵ers more than one);
NA = North America; AS = Asia; AU = Australia; EU = Europe
Source: Data from InsideAirbnb.com
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Figure A.1: Comparison of cities along the dimensions Airbnb density (#listings per
1,000 population) and median price ($US)
Notes: Bubble opacity indicates data recency. Data retrieved from InsideAirbnb.com. An
animated version of this figure is provided at https://im.iism.kit.edu/img/airbnb_
cities.gif.
B Supplementary Material for Chapter 3.1
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Table B.2: Related literature on value motives and user representation artifacts in the
sharing economy.
Tested Value Motives Tested UR Artifacts
Publication Sample Context Social Economic SR SD TR
Chiu et al. (2014) 782 e-com .310 .450
Bilgihan and Bujisic (2015) 334 acc .415 .344
Möhlmann (2015) 187 acc n.s. .230
Bucher, Fieseler, and Lutz (2016) 498 misc .350 .210
Tussyadiah (2016a) 644 acc .168 .269
Barnes and Mattsson (2017) 115 misc .205 .493
Mittendorf and Ostermann (2017) 203 acc n.s. .220
Hawlitschek, Teubner, and Gimpel (2018) 745 misc .076 .231
Lee and Kim (2018) 511 acc .260 .220
Lutz et al. (2018) 374 misc n.s. .200
Oyedele and Simpson (2018) 345 misc n.s. n.s.
So, Oh, and Min (2018) 519 acc n.s. .110
Sung, Kim, and Lee (2018) 422* acc n.s. n.s.
Tussyadiah and Park (2018) 2,045* acc .190 .420
Clauss, Harengel, and Hock (2019) 146 misc .478 .132
Henry et al. (2019) 500 misc n.s. .227
Jiang, Balaji, and Jha (2019) 332 acc .190 .100
Kim, Karatepe, and Lee (2019) 393 misc .360 n.s.
Tsou et al. (2019) 460 misc .680 .140
Wang, Asaad, and Filieri (2019) 606 acc .102 .116
Wang et al. (2019) 378 misc .360 .570
Ye et al. (2019) 571 acc .258 .472
Zhang, Gu, and Jahromi (2019) 985 misc .650 .100
Ert, Fleischer, and Magen (2016) 270 acc ⇥
Abrahao et al. (2017) 8,906 acc ⇥
Abramova, Krasnova, and Tan (2017) 450 acc ⇥
Fagerstrøm et al. (2017) 139 acc ⇥
Ma et al. (2017) 355 acc ⇥
Fagerstrøm et al. (2018) 30 acc ⇥
Qiu and Abrahao (2018) 5,277 acc ⇥
Tussyadiah and Park (2018) 301 acc ⇥
Zloteanu et al. (2018) 430* acc ⇥ ⇥
Abrate and Viglia (2019) 981 acc ⇥
Cheng et al. (2019) 30 acc ⇥
Heejeong (2019) 854 acc ⇥ ⇥ ⇥
Zhu, Lin, and Cheng (2019) 4,602 acc ⇥
This Study 486* acc .420 .424 ⇥ ⇥ ⇥
Note: Numbers in the Tested Motives columns represent significant path coe cients; SR = star rating;
SD = self-description; TR = text review; acc: accommodation sharing; e-com: e-commerce; misc: miscellaneous;
*: multiple sub-samples
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B.2 Measurement Instruments
Table B.3: Main Constructs, Items, and Sources.






ITB1 I am very likely to buy
ticket from
Travelocity.com.
I would be very likely to
book at this host.
.911
ITB2 I would use my credit card
to purchase from
Travelocity.com.
I would stay at the
apartment of this host.
.895
ITB3 I would not hesitate to
provide information about
my habits to Travelocity.
I would not hesitate to









EEV1 Compared to the fee I need
to pay, the use of
M-Internet o↵ers value for
money.
Compared to the costs of
booking with this host, it
would still financially
benefit me to do so.
.940
EEV2 Compared to the e↵ort I
need to put in, the use of
M-Internet is beneficial to
me.
Compared to the e↵ort
associated with booking
with this host, it would still
financially benefit me to do
so.
.929
EEV3 Compared to the time I
need to spend, the use of
M-Internet is worthwhile to
me.
Compared to the financial
risks I am taking, it would
still benefit me to book
with this host.
.905
EEV4 Overall, the use of
M-Internet delivers me
good value.
Overall, it would financially
benefit me to book a stay







ESV1 In the particular experience,
I believed that the
interaction would fulfill my
social needs (for example,
companionship, approval,
acceptance, respect,
status) in some way.
The interaction with this





ESV2 In the particular
experience, I believed that
the interaction would help
me cultivate a good
relationship with the other
party.
I would get on well with
this host.
.863
ESV3 In the particular
experience, I believed that I
could derive satisfaction
from interacting with the
other party.
It would be nice to get to
know this host in person.
.825
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Table B.4: Demographic and Control Constructs, Items, and Sources.





DTT1 I generally trust other people.
DTT2 I tend to count upon other people.
DTT3 I generally have faith in humanity.





RP How do you see yourself: Are you prepared to take risks, or do you rather
try to avoid them? Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0
means: ‘not at all willing to take risks’ and the value 10 means: ‘very
willing to take risks.’
Experience
(as host)




– EXC Describe your use of platform Airbnb as a guest (never/ sometimes/
regularly)
Gender – – Specify your gender.
Age – – How old are you?
Control – CTR Please check the second box from the left.
B.3 Mediation Analysis
To elaborate in greater detail how much of the e↵ect of the treatment variables on
intention to book can be attributed to the paths via expected social value and expected
economic value, we conduct a mediation analysis. The paths from self-description (  =
.055, n.s.), text review (  = .034, n.s.), and star rating (  = .061, n.s.) on intention
to book, from self-description on expected economic value (  = .045, n.s.), and from
star rating on expected social value (  = .022, n.s.) are insignificant (Figure C1).
Furthermore, in this extended model, none of the hypothesized e↵ects is altered regarding
magnitude, sign, or significance. Consequently, the e↵ects of all treatment variables on


































Figure B.2: Results of the Structural Model Testing for the Saturated Model
C Supplementary Material for Chapter 3.2
C.1 Star Ratings and Trusting Behavior
To shed further light on how the availability of star ratings contributes to engendering
trust, we consider which star ratings were exchanged, how specific scores are associated
with trusting behavior, and also how—in turn—behavior is reflected in star ratings.
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To do so, we focus on the corresponding subset in which star ratings were available
(n=72). First, it strikes the eye that the distribution of exchanged star rating scores
greatly resembles distributions observed on actual peer-to-peer sharing platforms (Figure
C.3; mean=4.09 stars, SD=1.17) with 5 stars being the most frequently used score
(50% of all cases). In this regard, the experiment’s rating distribution is consistent
with what is typically observed on contemporary peer-to-peer platforms and review sites
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Figure C.3: Rating distribution (based on 396 star ratings from 198 completed transac-
tions)
Second, as shown in Figure C.4, providers’ trusting behavior (as per the transferred
amount) is strongly correlated with the star rating they receive from the consumer
(Pearson’s r =.686, p <.001). Moreover, consumers’ trustworthiness (as per the re-
turned amount) is strongly correlated with the star rating they receive from the provider
(r =.731, p <.001). Thus, within the scope of our experiment, star rating scores did,
in fact, reflect (past) behavior and hence carried informational value (star ratings as the
result of behavior).














































Figure C.4: Correlation of provider’s trusting behavior (i.e., transferred amount), con-
sumer’s trustworthiness (i.e., returned amount), and the associated star ratings received
from the respective other party
Third, we consider how the information carried in the average star rating scores trans-
lated into behavior, that is, behavior as a result of star ratings. To do so, we first consider
whether consumers’ chances of being accepted depend on their aggregated rating score.
Moreover, once a transaction was initialized, we consider the provider’s trusting behavior
based on the consumer’s current average star rating. Note that overall, 61% of all 645
sent requests were accepted. Thus, a considerable fraction of requests were actually
declined, which is consistent with results from the platform literature (Edelman, Luca,
and Svirsky, 2017; Fradkin, 2015; Karlsson, Kemperman, and Dolnicar, 2017). Table
C.5 summarizes linear and logistic regression estimates for (1) the probability that a
provider accepts a consumer’s request and (2) the provider’s trusting behavior. We find
that higher star rating scores increase consumers’ chances of being accepted (  =1.06,
p <.001) and higher levels of trusting behavior once a transaction was realized (  =.130,
p <.001).





Consumer’s average rating score(1–5) 1.06 *** .130 ***
(.192) (.017)
Period(0–5) .177 .039 ***
(.092) (.009)
Treatment: Profile Photos(yes=1) .029 .112 ***
(.253) (.025)
Time to Accept/Decline(sec) .043 **
(.015)




Note: Ordinary least squares (provider’s trusting behavior) and logistic (provider accepts request)
regression models. DV=dependent variable; standard errors in parentheses; *** p<.001; ** p<.01;
* p<.05. Moreover, note that the number of observations in these regression models is smaller
than the overall number of requests (left-hand model) and transactions (right-hand model) as
there occur cases in which no star rating score was available yet (e.g., in the first period).
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Taken as a whole, the distributions of star rating scores observed in the experiment
are comparable to those on contemporary peer-to-peer sharing platforms and also that
the specific properties of the displayed star rating scores (qualitatively and quantitatively)
carry meaningful information which both reflect past and impact future behavior.
C.2 Face Visibility, Attractiveness, and Visual Trustworthiness
As an additional control analysis, we take a closer look at the profile photos and how
specific properties were associated with participant behavior. To do so, we focus on the
corresponding treatment conditions for which profile photos were available (n=72). Note
that in these treatment groups, all participants provided a profile photo. We consider
face visibility (fully visible: 60; partly visible: 5; not visible: 7), attractiveness, and visual
trustworthiness. Face visibility was assessed by manual inspection. Attractiveness and
visual trustworthiness were assessed in an additional survey, complementing the main
study’s data. In this survey, an unrelated set of 16 respondents evaluated the main
study’s profile photos in terms of attractiveness and visual trustworthiness (each on a
single-item 7-point Likert scale). On average, attractiveness scored at 4.24 (SD=.502)
and visual trustworthiness at 4.26 (SD=.623). Inter-rater reliability was rwg=.768 for the
visual trustworthiness, and rwg=.677 for attractiveness, suggesting adequate inter-rater
agreement (James, Demaree, and Wolf, 1984).
We now consider whether, and if so, how this information translated into behavior,
that is, behavior as a result of specific photo properties. Table C.6 summarizes the
logistic and regular regression estimates for (1) the probability that a provider accepts
a consumer’s request and (2) the provider’s trusting behavior (as per the transferred
amount to the consumer). The results show that face visibility, visual trustworthi-
ness, and attractiveness do neither significantly a↵ect acceptance nor trusting behavior.
This suggests that—compared to the paramount e↵ect of profile photo availability as
such—specific photo characteristics played a subordinate role within our experiment.





Consumer Face Visibility(yes=1) -.221 .083
(.468) (.063)
Consumer Attractiveness(1–5) -.218 -0.34
(.280) (.036)
Consumer Visual Trustworthiness(1–5) .359 .002
(.315) (.041)
Consumer Gender(female=1) .064 .058
(.264) (.033)
Treatment: Star Ratings(yes=1, no=0) -.206 .100 **
(.242) (.032)
Period(0–5) .031 .020 *
(.068) (.009)
Time to Accept/Decline(sec) .029 *
(.013)




Note: Ordinary least squares (provider’s investment) and logistic (provider accepts request) regression models.
DV=dependent variable; standard errors in parentheses; *** p< .001; ** p< .01; * p< .05
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C.3 Consumers’ Returns
Analogously to provider’s trusting behavior, we also analyze returns (i.e., how much
consumers transfer back to providers; normalized to the interval [0, 1]). As depicted in
Figure C.5, the joint availability of both trust cues yields return levels of about 43%,
while for the absence of both yields 29%. If only one cue is available, returns are 38%






















Star Ratings (Cognitive Trust Cue)
no yes
Profile Photos (Affective Trust Cue)
yes
no
Figure C.5: Main treatment e↵ects of trust
cues on consumer’s return



























Figure C.6: Curse of consumer’s return
across periods
Figure C.6 shows the periodic-specific e↵ects. We observe relatively stable or slightly
decreasing returns overall, while there occurs a rather sharp decrease of return rates in
the profile photos treatment condition. We assess the time-dependent e↵ects with two
random e↵ects panel regression models. The models (Table C.7) take into account
repeated measures (period 1 to 6) per subject with single returns as the unit of analysis
(n=378).1 Model I confirms a general treatment e↵ect for star ratings (  =.078, p <.01)
but not for profile photos (  =.018, p =.503). Providers’ trusting behavior significantly
influences return behavior (  =.202, p <.001).
Furthermore, the model shows a negative overall time e↵ect (  =-.021, p <.001).
Model II shows no significant time-treatment interaction but also a negative overall
time e↵ect (  =-.018, p <.05). Both star ratings and profile photos seem to have no
e↵ect in the first period (star ratings:   =.059, p =.079; profile photos:   =.054,
p =.111). Again, providers’ prior trusting behavior significantly influences return behav-
ior (  =.199, p <.001). However, this finding is in line with previous work that describes
return behavior as inherently dependent on—and mostly driven by—preceding trusting
behavior. Thus, the analysis thereof is only of secondary interest (Bapna, Qiu, and Rice,
2017). None of the control variables (gender, age, experience) exert significant e↵ects.
1Note that for 16 transactions, the provider’s trusting behavior was 0 (i.e., no monetary units
transferred to the consumer), and hence relative returns are nonsensical (division by zero). The set of
transactions considered for returns hence only contains 378 (rather than 394) observations.
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Table C.7: Regression models on returns (as an operationalization of consumers’ ex-post
trustworthiness)
DV=Return
Model I Model II
Star Ratings(yes=1, no=0) .078 ** .059
(.026) (.034)
Profile Photos(yes=1, no=0) .018 .054
(.026) (.034)
Period(0–5) -.021 *** -.018 *
(.005) (.008)
Trusting Behavior(Transferred Amount) .202 *** .199 ***
(.037) (.037)
Star Ratings ⇥ Period .008
(.009)












Note: Generalized linear models with subject random e↵ect. DV=dependent variable;
standard errors in parentheses; *** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05
C.4 Trusting Behavior-Trustworthiness E↵ect Decomposition
Next, we take a closer look at the value that is captured by providers and how this
e↵ect can be decomposed into partial e↵ects of their own trusting behavior (transferred
amounts) and ex post trustworthiness exhibited by consumers (i.e., returned amounts).
The payo↵ ⇡it a provider i receives in period t amounts to:
⇡it = .5 + 1 + yit · (3zjt   1),
where yit denotes the provider’s trusting behavior, zit is the relative consumer’s
trustworthiness j, and the absolute values of .5 and 1 denote the booking fee as well
as the provider’s endowment. Given this, we can decompose (i.e., factorize) ⇡it and
examine the individual e↵ects of yit and zit. To do so, we analyze the aggregated average
trusting behavior and trustworthiness rates as well as the provider values across the four
treatment conditions (Table C.8). Both for trusting behavior and trustworthiness rates,
the treatment without any true cues yields the lowest rates, while the treatment with
both true cue types yields the highest. The generated values reflect this pattern.









Star Ratings=no, Profile Photos=no .567 .294 .932
Star Ratings=no, Profile Photos=yes .770 .380 1.11
Star Ratings=yes, Profile Photos=no .757 .427 1.21
Star Ratings=yes, Profile Photos=yes .882 .431 1.26
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The baseline treatment exhibits both the lowest overall levels of trusting behavior
and returns. Comparing the only-star-ratings with the only-profile-photos treatment
shows that while trusting behavior was higher in the profile photos treatment, trustwor-
thiness was higher in the star ratings treatment. Beyond these overall findings, Figure
C.7 depicts the course of trusting behavior and trustworthiness across treatments and
individual periods, providing more detailed insights into the development of these val-
ues. The iso-value lines indicate equal levels of ⇡. Interestingly, for the only-star-ratings
treatment, trusting behavior initially rises until the third period, while trustworthiness
remains relatively constant. From the fourth period on, however, the return rates decline































































Figure C.7: E↵ect decomposition for each treatment condition throughout the six periods
with iso-value lines. The curve of the photos-only treatment (orange) shows the inverted
u-shape (tilted to the side)
Note: 1 denotes treatment’s first period, ⇥ indicates overall average treatment value.
Considering the ⇥-marks in Figure C.7 illustrates along which partial e↵ects the
treatment conditions (and hence the trust cues) make a di↵erence with regard to value
capture by providers. As can be seen, “activating” either one of the cues increases both
trusting behavior and trustworthiness since both colored marks lie further up and further
right than the grey mark. While both of the cues yield similar trusting behavior, star
ratings yield higher degrees of trustworthiness. This treatment di↵erence can hence be
attributed to the star ratings’ e↵ect on consumer rather than provider behavior. Now,
considering how the additional value is captured when both cue types are present at
the same time, we see that it is mainly the provider’s trusting behavior that makes the
di↵erence.
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C.5 Realization of Matches and Request Behavior
Realization of Matches Overall, we observe comparable numbers of realized
matches—both across treatments as well as across periods—as expressed by the fraction
of how many of all possible matches are actually realized. These rates exceed 90%, so
that basically every participant is matched (and hence enters a transaction) in almost
every period (see Table C.9).






Request Behavior Next, we control for potential confounds regarding requesting be-
havior. Table C.10 shows how the rare cases that, in a given period, a participant did not
(1) send at least one request (consumers) or (2) receive at least one request (providers)
are distributed across the four treatment conditions.
Table C.10: Distribution of absent requests sent and received across treatments
Star Ratings Profile Photos Possible cases 1)
Cases in which no requests were:
. . . sent . . . received
no
no 108 8 10
yes 108 1 6
yes
no 108 0 10
yes 108 0 5
Overall 432 9 (2.1%) 31 (7.2%)
Note: 1) per treatment condition, there were 3 sessions · 6 participants · 6 periods
Table C.11 underpins the above observations by means of regression analyses. These
models show that the presence of both trust cues (star ratings and profile photos) had
no significant e↵ect on the realization of transactions. However, we find that both star
ratings (  =.042; p <.01) and profile photos (  =.032; p <.05) have positive e↵ects
on the share of participants (i.e., consumers) who sent at least one request (averaged
by treatment and period). However, we do not find any significant influence of these
treatment variables on the fraction of participants who received at least one request
(i.e., providers). This suggests that the additionally sent requests are not spread out
evenly across providers but concentrate on those who already receive requests from other
consumers. Last, note that period did not a↵ect the dependent variable in any of these
models.
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DV=Share of Requests. . .
. . . sent . . . received
Treatment: Star Ratings(yes=1, no=0) .009 .042 ** .005
(.021) (.013) (.023)
Treatment: Profile Photos(yes=1, no=0) .037 .032 * .042
(.021) (.013) (.023)
Period(0–5) -.003 .002 -.006
(.006) (.004) (.007)
Intercept .900 *** .935 *** .926 ***
(.028) (.017) (.031)
Observations 24 24 24
R2 .154 .474 .169
Note: Ordinary least squares regression models. Data on “treatment and period” level (i.e., n = 4 · 6 = 24);
DV = dependent variable; standard errors in parentheses; *** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05
C.6 Introductory material
This appendix includes the material provided to the participants in the experiments.
Depending on the specific treatment condition, the material slightly di↵ered in terms
of whether (1) star ratings and (2) profile photos were available. This relates back to
our 2 (star ratings: yes/no) ⇥ 2 (profile photos: yes/no) full factorial between-subjects
treatment design (see Treatment Structure subsection in the body of the paper). The
material shown in this appendix was specifically for the treatment condition where both
star ratings and profile photos were available. All participants saw the welcome screen.
Then, depending on the role that a particular participant was randomly assigned to, the
participant either saw the material for a consumer or a provider.
Welcome
You are participating in an experiment from which you can earn money. During the
whole experiment you will operate with monetary units (MU), which will be converted
into Euros and paid out afterwards. A conversion factor of 4 MU = 1.00 € applies.
The amount of your payo↵ depends on your behavior and the behavior of the other
participants. The results at the end of each period you will play are decisive. The role
you take in the experiment was randomly determined. You either take the role of a
provider or a consumer. You will retain this role for the entire experiment.
The experiment randomly comprises between five and eight periods. Each period
comprises two phases in which you can undertake di↵erent actions. At the end of each
period, a summary and your payo↵ for this period is depicted. After the experiment,
three of your periods are randomly selected and you get the payo↵s from those periods
paid out.
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Figure C.8: Experiment overview
First Phase (Consumer)
Your role is consumer. Each period you receive an endowment of 10 MU. In the first
phase, you can request providers to exchange MU with them in the second phase. You
will see a list with information about the providers and the booking fee if a provider
accepts your request. You will see a list with information about all providers including
the applicable booking fee if a provider accepts your request.
Information about this 
provider
Booking fee if provider 
accepts request
Button to send a request
Figure C.9: List of providers
Providers that cannot be requested are marked with a “not available” label. You
cannot request a provider who has declined your request in this period or who has already
accepted another participant’s request. A provider who was your transaction partner in
the previous period is not available and not displayed for two consecutive periods.
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This provider has 
already accepted 
another consumer’s 
request or declined 
your request and is 
therefore marked as 
“not available”
Figure C.10: Not available provider
Requests are valid for 30 seconds. The remaining time is shown by a countdown.
During this time, you cannot send any further requests to other providers. Not processed
requests within this time limit will be automatically withdrawn.
Countdown timer 
(seconds)
Figure C.11: Request countdown
As soon as a provider has accepted your request, a confirmation notification will
appear on your screen. The 5 MU booking fee will be subtracted from your endowment
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and transferred to the provider. Clicking the “continue” button brings you to the second
phase of the current period.
Provider accepted
request
Continue to second 
phase
Figure C.12: Accepted request
If no provider is available for a request, you cannot participate in the second phase
of this period. The “continue” button brings you directly to the period summary. Your
payo↵ for this period will be your endowment (10 MU).
No provider 
available
Continue to period 
summary
Figure C.13: No provider available
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If you do not want to request any of the providers available, you can also skip the
current period. You will then not participate in the second phase of this period. The
”skip period” button brings you directly to the period summary. Your payo↵ of this
period will be your endowment (10 MU).
Skip current period 
and continue to 
period summary
Figure C.14: Skip current period
Second Phase (Consumer)
The second phase begins with your transaction partner transferring an amount of MU to
you. The amount the provider transfers to you is then tripled and added to your current
period payo↵. During this process, you will see a waiting screen.
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Figure C.15: Waiting screen
As soon as the provider has chosen the amount to be transferred to you, you will
have to decide via a dropdown bar how much of the tripled amount you want to transfer
back to the provider. This amount will be added to the provider’s period payo↵ (without
further tripling). Confirming your choice with the “continue” button brings you to the
period summary.
Already tripled amount
Dropdown bar to 
select how much 
should be returned 
to the provider.
Figure C.16: Return to provider
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Period Summary (Consumer)
The period summary will show you your payo↵ for this period. Using the five-star rating
system, you must evaluate your partner for this transaction. You will also receive a
rating for this period from your transaction partner. Confirming your rating with the
continue button brings you to the first phase of the next period.
Rating system
Period summary
Figure C.17: Period summary (consumer)
Comprehension Questions (Consumer)
With the following questions you can check whether you have understood the rules
of this experiment. The statements are either true or false. Please check the correct
answer.
Figure C.18: Comprehension questions (consumer)
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First Phase (Provider)
Your role is provider. Each period you receive an endowment of 10 MU. In the first phase
you will receive requests from consumers from whom you can choose one to exchange
MU with in the second phase. The list of current requests contains information about





Figure C.19: Available consumer requests
Consumer requests are valid for 30 seconds. The remaining time is indicated by a
timer next to the buttons to accept/decline a request. If you do not process a request
within this time limit, it will be automatically withdrawn.
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Countdown timer 
(seconds)
Figure C.20: Request countdown
If you accept one of multiple open requests, all others are automatically declined.
The consumer whose request you have accepted is your transaction partner for the
second phase of this period. The consumer will send you a 5 MU booking fee that will
be added to your endowment for this period. The “continue” button brings you to the





Figure C.21: Accepted request
If you do not receive any requests in the current period, or if you have rejected
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all requests received, you will not participate in the second phase of this period. The
“continue” button brings you directly to the period summary. Your payo↵ for this period
will be your endowment (10 MU).
Continue to period 
summary
Figure C.22: No consumer requests
Second Phase (Provider)
In the second phase of a period, you must now decide how much of your endowment you
want to transfer to your transaction partner via a dropdown bar. This amount will then
be subtracted from your endowment for this period. It is then multiplied by a factor of
3 and added to the consumer’s account. Confirm your choice by clicking the “continue”
button.
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Dropdown bar to 
select how much 
should be transferred 
to the consumer.
Figure C.23: Transfer to consumer
Once the consumer has received the tripled amount of what you have transferred,
your transaction partner can now decide to transfer an amount back to you. This amount
will be credited to your payo↵ of this period (without further tripling). A waiting screen
is displayed during this transaction.
Figure C.24: Waiting screen
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Period Summary (Provider)
Once your transaction partner has transferred an amount back to you, the period sum-
mary will be displayed. The period summary will show you your payo↵ for this period.
Using the five-star rating system, you must evaluate your partner for this transaction.
You will also receive a rating for this period from your transaction partner. Confirming
your rating with the “continue” button brings you to the first phase of the next period.
Rating system
Period summary
Figure C.25: Period summary (provider)
Comprehension Questions (Provider)
With the following questions you can check whether you have understood the rules
of this experiment. The statements are either true or false. Please check the correct
answer.
Figure C.26: Comprehension questions (provider)
Supplementary Material for Chapter 3.2 179
C.7 Manipulation Check Material





The interface allows me to assess the other user based on a star rating
score.
MC COG 2
The interface allows to draw trust inferences about the other user based
on a numerical assessment of their past behavior.
MC COG 3
The interface allows me to make an analytical assessment about the
other user’s trustworthiness.
MC COG 4





The interface allows me to assess the other user based on a profile
image.
MC AFF 2
The interface allows me to draw trust inferences about the other user
by literally ”seeing it in their faces”.
MC AFF 3
The interface allows me to emotionally evaluate the other user’s
trustworthiness.
MC AFF 4
The interface allows for an a↵ective assessment of the other user’s
trustworthiness.






















(i.e., personal contact, mutuality and level of exposure)
This study’s focus
Figure C.27: Delineation of platform businesses by mode of matching and transaction-
ality
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D Supplementary Material for Chapter 3.3
Table D.13: Applied measurement scales in the research model and outer loadings
Construct Code Items (adapted) loading/
weight
Trust in Blockchain (formative)
Söllner, Ho↵mann, and Leimeister (2016)
TBL1




I feel assured that legal and technological structures adequately
protect me from problems on the Blockchain.
.653
Trust in Blockchain User (formative)
Söllner, Ho↵mann, and Leimeister (2016)
TBU1




Other users of the Blockchain o↵er me help when I have questions. .341
TBU3
In general, I can count on the information provided by other
Blockchain users.
.859
Trust in Platform (reflective)
Möhlmann and Geissinger (2018)
TPL1 As a platform provider, Slock.it can be trusted at all times. .756
TPL2
As a platform provider, Slock.it can be counted on to do what is
right.
.805
TPL3 As a platform provider, Slock.it has high integrity. .834
TPL4 Slock.it is a competent platform provider. .826
Trust in Peers (reflective)
Möhlmann and Geissinger (2018)
TPE1 The peers on the Slock.it platform are in general dependable. .611
TPE2 The peers on the Slock.it platform are in general reliable. .852
TPE3 The peers on the Slock.it platform are in general honest. .825
TPE4 The peers on the Slock.it platform are in general trustworthy. .880
Trust in Product (reflective)
Hawlitschek, Teubner, and Weinhardt (2016)
TPR1




In general, you will rarely experience nasty surprises with the
products on the Slock.it platform.
.683
TPR3
In general, the products booked on the Slock.it platform will not
break down during use.
.684
TPR4
In general, the products on the Slock.it platform will not have
defective parts.
.741
Intention to Rent (reflective)
Lu, Zhao, and Wang (2010)
INR1
Given the chance, I would consider renting products from the
Slock.it platform in the future.
.930
INR2
It is likely that I will actually rent products on the Slock.it
platform in the near future.
.879
INR3
Given the opportunity, I intend to rent products on the Slock.it
platform.
.940
Note: † initial loading for items removed in the course of measurement model evaluation.
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Table E.14: Constructs, Items, and Sources
Code Construct Original Item Adaption Reference
ITB1 Purchasing
Intentions
I am very likely to buy ticket
from Travelocity.com.
I would be very likely to book
at the selected provider.
Gefen and Straub
(2003)
ITB2 I would use my credit card to
purchase from
Travelocity.com.
I would stay at the selected
provider’s apartment.
ITB3 I would not hesitate to
provide information about my
habits to Travelocity.
I would not hesitate to




It is my moral obligation to
other people and/or the
environment that I recycle my
waste in the Blue Bins
It is my moral obligation to
other people and/or the
society that I book at
providers that pay their taxes.
Botetzagias, Dima, and
Malesios (2015)
MN2 It is morally responsible to
other people and/or the
environment that I recycle my
waste in the Blue Bins
It is morally responsible to
other people and/or the
society to book at providers
that pay their taxes.
MN3 I would have moral scruples
to book at providers that do






can be trusted at all times.




TIP2 As an auction
host/intermediary, Amazon
can be counted on to do
what is right.
The selected listing’s provider
can be counted on to do
what is right.
TIP3 As an auction
host/intermediary, Amazon
has high integrity.
The selected listing’s provider
has high integrity.
TIP4 Amazon is a competent and
knowledgeable auction
host/intermediary.
The selected listing’s provider
is competent and
knowledgeable.
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Table E.15: Demographic and Control constructs, Manipulation Check Items, and
Sources.
Code Construct Original Item Adaption Reference
DTT1 Trusting
Disposition
I generally trust other people I generally trust other people. Gefen and Straub
(2004)
DTT2 I tend to count upon other
people
I tend to count upon other
people.
DTT3 I generally have faith in
humanity
I generally have faith in
humanity.
DTT4 I feel that people are
generally well meaning
I feel that people are
generally well meaning.
DTT5 I feel that people are
generally trustworthy
I feel that people are
generally trustworthy.
DTT6 I feel that people are
generally reliable
I feel that people are
generally reliable.
FAM1 Familiarity I am familiar with searching
for books on the Internet
I am familiar with searching




FAM2 I am familiar with buying
books on the Internet
I am familiar with renting
apartments on the Internet.
FAM3 I am familiar with
Amazon.com
I am familiar with platforms
such as Airbnb, Homestay,
9flats, or or similar.
FAM4 I am familiar with inquiring
about book ratings at
Amazon.com
I am familiar inquiring about
apartment and provider




I am confident the selected
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